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Abstract
A new trend of research in information security revolves around the idea of treating
individuals not as their intrinsic characteristics, e.g., honest or dishonest, but as utility
maximisers. This is a special feature of the field of economics of security, namely
rational security. Looking into the economic incentives of participants in a security
scenario brings different insights and solutions than traditional security research in
cryptography or formal method. First, traditional security mechanisms assume a set
of permanently honest parties, which does not necessarily hold in economic models
with utility-driven behaviours. Second, the notion of capabilities/powers/advantages of
dishonest parties in traditional mechanisms may be too strong for certain scenarios (e.g.,
many civil purposes), leading to either impossibility results or practically infeasible
security solutions.
In this thesis, we examine several security problems where above issues would
emerge alongside traditional security research. We use game theory to study strate-
gies and economic incentives of participants in these problems, e.g., attackers and
defenders. Our goal is to provide, for each scenario, useful insights about the trend of
behaviours/decisions these participants should take, which would be useful in under-
standing and predicting their actual courses of actions, thus helping future research or
realistic solution design. When possible, we also propose security solutions, such as
protocols or contracts that, under rational security, would lead to desirable outcomes
in which, for example, attacks do not occur. Our research involves both high-level (e.g.,
investment) and low-level (e.g., network communication) security problems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The concept of rationality-driven behaviours has long been subliminally acknowledged
and accepted in human society. As the main tool for modelling and analysing such
behaviours within interactive environments, game-theoretic reasoning has brought sig-
nificant contributions to the fundamentals of economics. It also pervades to other fields
such as political sciences, biology, and is potentially applicable to all problem contexts
with multiple decision-makers of unaligned interests. In a typical example of such,
game-theoretic studies of information security problems has recently emerged as a new
research direction, spanning across many subfields such as cryptography, network se-
curity, privacy, etc. In this chapter we explain the advantage of this direction and
therefore motivate our interests in applications of game theory to information security.
For the purpose of self-containment, we also discuss basic game concepts that will occur
frequently throughout the content of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Our research is motivated by the fact that traditional treatments of security problems
may be too strict to adapt to the dynamic changes of reality, which are often led by
economic incentives. We explain this further by contrasting the two different views on
participants in a security problem, namely honest/malicious versus rational agents.
1.1.1 The Nature of Information Security
The world nowadays values information as one of the most important and strategic
assets for the survival and growth of communities and businesses [130]. As information
technology evolves, a wide range of systems are being utilised, from personal devices
such as PCs and mobile phones, to sophisticated server farms, mainframes, or super-
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computers (for organisations). The better collection, refinement and effective process-
ing make information even more valuable as a resource. Hence, whilst businesses gain
remarkable benefit through effective gathering and use of information, the lack of such
effectiveness would also lead to disruptions, delays, or failures in operations.
The need to protect such effectiveness from deliberate corruptions gives rise to what
is called information security, termed in US Code, title 44, section 3542 as “protecting
information and information systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disrup-
tion, modification, or destruction...” [140]. There are two important observations from
this definition, namely the act of protecting, and what to protect from. The need for
information security thus implies the existence of threats, such as malicious attackers,
to information and/or information systems. The existence of threats in turn leads to
the emergence of defenders in response to the need of protection.
From the above description, information security conveys a set of games, or in-
teractive situations, between the attackers (who might be referred to as “bad guys”
based on social knowledge) and the defenders, the “good guys”. Alternatively these
two sides may be termed malicious and honest agents, respectively. Depending on the
specific types of targets, attackers can also be of different types. For example, there
are organisational insiders who seek sensitive/secret information over illegal accesses
to database or wiretapping communication channels, spies that aims at sabotaging
information infrastructures, or simply script-kiddies digging around the Internet for
trivially vulnerable websites, etc. For each type of attacker, a corresponding defender
exists, perhaps not restricted to prevent attacks from happening, but to minimise the
risk-damage product caused by such attacks.
A traditional view of security problems is that for each scenario there is a clearly
defined set of attackers and defenders whose types and purposes remain unchanged
over time. To account for the worst case, security solutions are often designed so that
even the most powerful adversaries, e.g., ones with infinite power, would gain little
by committing the attack. Such solutions are then utilised in all scenarios, thanks to
the security guarantees they hold. Notable examples of such attitude are the seminal
model of mutually authenticated communication by Bellare and Rogaway [17] and the
Dolev-Yao threat model [47]. Another distinguished example is the general concept of
multiparty protocols, such as multiparty computation [95] and secret sharing [135], in
which parties are either honest or dishonest. Although the context does not explicitly
define the nature of each party, any existing security solution operates on a specific
configuration of their honesty.
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1.1.2 The Role of Rationality
Whether provably secure, traditional treatment of security might be problematic when
bridging from theory into practice. In fact, there might be cases in which strongly
secure solutions are either too expensive or restrictive for deployments, especially if
the threat level is low, i.e., the solution is an overkill. For example, the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), although has been cryptographically implemented and is thus
strongly secure, is not universally deployed for securing Internet communications. This
could be due to the unaffordable cost of adopting PKI, e.g., in peer-to-peer network
of Internet users. Alternatively, the communication (e.g. news surfing) may be not
sensitive enough to require such extreme guarantee of security.
Even if technical security solutions are being employed, the overall security also
depends on the decision making process of users of such solutions. This becomes more
and more significant as the involvement of users’ decision increase, for example in leap-
of-faith protocols [112]. Here a user must decide whether to trust the peer it is talking
with. The user may be careful enough to attempt to verify the peer’s trustworthiness,
or it might just be lazy and forgo the checking. Another notorious example is phone-
to-phone communication via Bluetooth, in which phone holders are supposed to match
the random strings appeared on each other’s screen [146]. Lazy users might skip this
step and are thus exposed to the threat of man-in-the-middle attacks [33].
Another problem not captured in traditional security solutions is the dynamic
changes in the types of agents, e.g., from honest to dishonest/malicious. This can be
easily seen in multiparty protocols that assume the honesty of certain parties. In real-
ity, any party might as well deviate from its supposed honesty if there is enough benefit
in doing so. For example, Halpern and Teague [67] argue that a party in multiparty
computation may withdraw its participation as soon as it receives the computation
result, thus leaving the computation process incomplete. Since no party can be fully
trusted to be honest, existing solutions would fail to deliver their security guarantees.
A similar issue also occurs in attacker-defender paradigm. An attacker may cease its
attack if that is costly whilst the gain is small. Meanwhile, misaligned incentives [6]
may neutralise security measures because defenders are not motivated enough to utilise
them properly.
In one way, we may argue that agents’ behaviours in traditional security treatments
are irrational, that is, they act in a way against their preferences. For example, the
adversary model for a cryptographic protocol used in daily life communication (such
as TLS) is assumed to be very powerful, e.g., it is willing to spend its effort breaking a
1024-bit RSA key. However, except for critical-mission purposes, the cost of breaking
this key may not be paid well, if such key is only used for a small HTTP server.
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Likewise, the assumed honest/dishonest parties in multiparty protocols, as well as
those of misaligned incentives [6] are all seemingly irrational. From economic viewpoint
however, this phenomenon is instead termed bounded rationality [57]. In other words,
agents are in fact still rational, but their knowledge and capacity is bounded that lead
to inaccurate analysis of the situations, and hence suboptimal decision making.
To address this issue, one needs to revise the concept of rationality and re-model
agents following this concept [5]. It is not difficult to realise that in not just security,
a rational agent must have preferences over its choices. Such preferences could, for
example be economic benefits, morality, reputation, etc, as consequences of the cho-
sen behaviour. Based on a well-defined system of preferences, a rational agent would
behave in the most preferred way. In contexts like security scenarios however, the
situation might be further complicated, because an agent’s outcome (which determine
preferences) depends not just on its behaviour, but also other agents involved (e.g.,
attackers, collaborators). The rationality of an agent must also take into account these
externalities.
Note that in the description above, we do not mention security as part of rationality.
Thus, when adopting rationality, the “security battle” among honest and malicious
agents is more like a game where security is really not the matter, but that each game
player selects an action/strategy/move1 in a way aligned with its preferences, and
that such preferences persist over time. By modelling agents as being rational instead
of having definite type (e.g., honest, dishonest), we would thus be able to capture
their actual behaviours in each realistic scenario where the security game is played.
Consequently, this leads to our interest in using game theory, a rich mathematical
toolset for modelling rational agents, to model and analyse security problems, as well
as to design rational solutions.
1.2 Basics Concepts in Game Theory
Subliminal existence of game theory appeared as early as the 18th century [19]. It was,
however, not widely studied and developed as a field of mathematics, until early 20th
century, with notable work by von Neumann and Morgenstern [103]. Game theoretic
studies focus on situations involving more than one party, with unaligned interests. In
other words, a party’s outcome is influenced not only by his/her actions, but also by
the choices of others. As a result, such situations are referred to as games.
Game-theoretic studies involve formalisation of the context in which the game is
1These are used with the same meaning, in different texts: what a player chooses to do in a strategic-
form game. For consistency we denote by action what a player can actually perform, and by strategy
how the action is chosen, e.g., a probability distribution over an action space.
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played, as well as analysis of players’ strategic behaviours driven by their rationality.
Formal models often consist of several important components, including a list of players,
their available actions/strategies, their preferences over outcomes resulted from chosen
strategies. For convenience of analysis we assume that players’ preferences can be
effectively represented by assigning real values to outcomes. Such assignment is called
a utility function, and is generally unique for each player. Results from analysis of
game models could be used in various ways, e.g., as recommendations for players, as a
guide for altering the context so as to drive the strategic behaviours of the players. In
the game-theoretic jargon, the latter is referred to as mechanism design.
In the following subsections we discuss several important game concepts which
are used in our research. These are strategic-form games with players’ simultaneous
moves, extensive-form games with sequential moves [83], and incomplete information
games [68] in which players might be uncertain about the game structure, such as
payoff functions, or others’ set of strategies. For each game we also discuss important
equilibrium concepts that are useful for the purpose of game analysis and mechanism
designs. Note that for simplicity of presentation we only consider finite games, i.e.,
games with finite strategy sets/spaces. The definition for games with sets of infinite
strategies can be adapted easily as needed.
1.2.1 Strategic-Form Games
The simplest but also central game concept is one-shot, or strategic form, or simultane-
ous games. Often these games model situations in which players move simultaneously.
However, in reality there is hardly any situation in which moves are made absolutely
simultaneously. A better description of these games is that players play independently.
In other words, each player obverses no information about others’ decisions, and hence
independently selects a pure strategy2. Thus, whether moves are simultaneous of se-
quential does not matter. The game can be defined formally as follows:
Definition 1.1. A strategic-form game is a tuple 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 where N is the
set of players, for each i ∈ N , Ai is a non-empty non-singleton set of pure strategies
available for player i, and ui : A → R is player i’s utility/payoff function, where A =
×i∈NAi. For each strategy profile a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A and i ∈ N , denote ui(ai,a−i) =
ui(a), where a−i = (aj)j 6=i .
Although simple, the above definition captures all the necessary information of a
game. Indeed, each tuple a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A, which can be called as either strategy
2A pure strategy is a deterministic selection of actions, i.e., it is equivalent to an action. This is in
contrast with a mixed strategy that chooses an action probabilistically.
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profile or outcome, represents what may happen at the end, whereas A is the set of all
possible outcomes. The rationality of each player is depicted via its utility function, so
that for two outcomes a,a′ ∈ A with ui(a) > ui(a′), it means that player i prefers a
to a′. Inherently, each player must know exactly about what others can do ({Ai}) as
well as their preferences ({ui}).
To support analysis of games, a number of solution concepts have been constructed.
Basically, solution concepts refer to strategies/outcomes with some particular feature(s)
which can be either interesting, or desirable. A fundamental notion in non-cooperative
game theory is the best-response:
Definition 1.2. Let 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 be a strategic-form game. For each player
i ∈ N let A−i = ×j 6=iAj, player i’s best-response BRi : A−i → 2Ai is defined as
BRi(a−i) = arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,a−i)
While the best-response function simply states which action(s) a player should fol-
low in response to specific action tuples by the rest, it leads to more interesting solution
concepts, e.g., dominant equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Dominant equilibrium is
an outcome in which no player needs to care about how others may act, as its chosen
action is always the best response. This is probably the most desirable feature of any
game, because if a game with this feature happens in real life, such outcome is very
likely to occur. Nash equilibrium, a central breakthrough in game theory however,
relaxes the former “difficult-to-achieve” solution, in that each player’s action needs to
be a best-response to only what others have chosen in the outcome. In other words,
if the outcome has already been designated to occur, then no individual player would
benefit by acting in a different way. These two concepts are formalised as follows:
Definition 1.3. Let 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 be a strategic-form game. For each player
i ∈ N , a strategy ai ∈ Ai is dominant if ai ∈ ∩a−i∈A−iBRi(a−i). An outcome a ∈ A is
a dominant equilibrium if for each i ∈ N , ai ∈ a is a dominant strategy of player i.
Definition 1.4. Let 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 be a strategic-form game. An outcome a ∈
A is a Nash equilibrium if ai ∈ BRi(a−i) for all i ∈ N .
The reason why some outcome is called an equilibrium is because each player,
knowing exactly the actions that will be taken by others, do not want to deviate from
the “equilibrium”. This left out other interesting equilibria in which such knowledge is
imperfect, i.e., each player only has knowledge on the probability distribution over the
actions of others. This leads to the concept of mixed-strategy version of a game, made
famous by von Neumann and Morgenstern [103]:
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Definition 1.5. Let Γ = 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 be a strategic-form game such that A
is finite. A mixed-strategy version of Γ is a strategic-form game 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N 〉
such that for each player i ∈ N , Ai is the set of all probability distribution over Ai,
and that for all (∆i(Ai))i∈N ∈ ×i∈NAi = A,
Ui((∆i(Ai))i∈N ) =
∑
a∈A
(∏
i∈N
Pr
∆i
[ai]
)
ui(a)
An interesting result with mixed-strategy version of a game with finite actions is
that there always exists a Nash equilibrium [103]. When each player’ actions form a
compact metric space, Glicksberg [59] extends Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [76] and
shows the same conclusion, i.e., there is always a Nash equilibrium. Note here, that the
mixed-strategy version of a mixed-strategy game is of no difference, since eventually
each player’s strategy is a probability measure over the set of deterministic actions.
1.2.2 Incomplete Information Bayesian Games
Incomplete information refers to situations in which there is an oblivion by at least one
player about the exact outcome preferences of either itself or some other. This happens
due to the existence of the so-called state of the Nature, which is decided probabilisti-
cally by some relevant random source, which we call the Nature. For example, consider
a game played among a large population, in which each player must decide whether to
buy a lottery ticket. Even if a player knows every other’s decision, it cannot determine
its own utility, which is the earning from the lottery subtracted by the ticket price.
This is because the outcome of the lottery is probabilistically decided by the Nature,
which in this case is the lottery company. In security games, although it is known
that every player is rational, an “evil mind” player would have different preferences
to a “benign” player. Such type of a player is often unknown to the others, and is
decided probabilistically by Nature whose distribution depends on, for example, living
environments, education background, etc.
The simplest appearance of the Nature is in Bayesian games, which is a strategic-
form game, except that the utility function of each player probabilistically depends
on the state of the Nature. Note here that the probability distribution over these
states is private to each player i (depicted by pi), which represents its knowledge about
the Nature. To be even more generic, Bayesian games allow the Nature to leak some
information about its state, called signal, to players, so that they can probabilistically
work out their expected utilities. This comes from the fact that in reality, even if no
signal is given, data acquisition and statistical analysis might be used to learn about
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the state of the Nature. Bayesian games are defined in the following:
Definition 1.6. A Bayesian game is a tuple 〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 where Ω
is the set of nature states, and for each i ∈ N ,
• Ai is the set of i’s all available actions,
• Ti is the set of i’s signals/types, with τi : Ω→ Ti is the state-to-signal mapping,
• Ci : Ti → 2Ai is the set of i’s available actions after receiving ti ∈ Ti,
• pi is a probability measure over Ω, and,
• ui : Ω×A→ R is player i’s utility function
The adaptation of Nash equilibrium into Bayesian games, called Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, naturally follows from Definition 1.5:
Definition 1.7. Let G = 〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 be a Bayesian game. A strate-
gic form of G is a tuple 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N 〉 where for each i ∈ N , Ai = ×t∈TiCi(t),
and denote ai ∈ Ai of the form ai : Ti → Ai, and
Ui(a) =
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)ui(ω, (aj(τj(ω)))i∈N )
for all a ∈ ×i∈NAi.
Definition 1.8. Let G = 〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 be a Bayesian game and G′ =
〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N 〉 be its strategic form. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G is a
Nash equilibrium of the mixed-strategy version of G′.
1.2.3 Extensive-Form Games
A fundamental assumption in strategic-form games is that players’ actions are inde-
pendent. This does not hold in many situations, e.g., in chess games where each player’
moves are observable to its opponent. Such situations can alternatively be modelled in
extensive form, a game tree that specifies the order of plays, as well as what each player
can do at each of its turns. A general notion of extensive-form games also comes with
incomplete (with the Nature participating in the game) and imperfect information, as
defined below:
Definition 1.9. An extensive-form game Γ is a tuple 〈N,K,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 where
• N is the set of players,
19
1.2. Basics Concepts in Game Theory
• A is the set of all possible actions,
• K = 〈V,E, r, p〉 is a rooted tree with nodes V , node-to-player mapping r : V →
{0} ∪ N , edges E = {(v, v′) : v is the successor}, and edge-to-action mapping
p : E → A such that p(v, v′) = p(v, v′′) iff v′ = v′′ for all v, v′, v′′ ∈ V ,
• H is a partition of V such that all nodes within each information set H ∈H
(i) belong the same player, i.e., there exists i ∈ {0} ∪ N such that r(v) = i for
all v ∈ H (denoted by r(H)) and, (ii) have the same set of available actions, i.e.,
for all v, v′ ∈ H, {p((v, ·) ∈ E)} = {p((v′, ·) ∈ E)} (denoted by A(H)),
• ρ = {ρH : A(H)→ [0, 1] | H ∈H ∧ r(v) = 0 ∀ v ∈ H} is the family of probability
distributions over the states of the Nature and,
• ui : T → R, where T ∈ V is the set of terminal nodes.
In essence, each information set H ∈H represents the imperfection in knowledge of
a player about what has happened in the history, i.e., it is oblivious about which node
in H it is currently in. Therefore, the third condition of Definition 1.9 requires that a
player’s action must be the same for every node in the same information set. Because
of the dependence in the course of actions, we also need to be clear about what exactly
is a player’s strategy in this game, and the utility it receives from doing so. This can
be best captured by representing the game in strategic form:
Definition 1.10. Let Γ = 〈N,K,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 be an extensive-form game. The
strategic form of Γ is a tuple 〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N 〉 such that
• for each i ∈ N , Ai = {ai : H → A} where each ai maps an information set
H ∈H with r(H) = i to an action in A(H) ⊆ A.
• for each outcome a ∈ ×i∈NAi, define oa : E → [0, 1] such that for (v, v′) ∈ E,
if r(v) = 0 then o(v, v′) = ρH0(p(v, v′)) for H0 3 v, else o(v, v′) = 1 when
ar(H)(H) = p(v, v
′) for H 3 v, and 0 otherwise, then
Ui(a) =
∑
t∈T
ui(t)
∏
(v,v′)∈path(t)
oa(v, v
′) (1.1)
where path(t) is the set of edges from the root to t.
As can be seen, because players’ actions in an extensive-form game are not in-
dependent, a pure strategy of a player must be a plan of actions for every possible
situation that could happen during the game. Such plan can be made in advance,
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and is thus independent of others’ plans. While the formalisation of Nash equilibrium
for extensive-form game is trivial with the above definition, it is noticeable that such
equilibrium might have a problem, well-known as non-credible threats.
Indeed, from (1.1) we see that ui(t) only enters the utility if every edge leading to
t is chosen with non-zero probability. This indicates a possibility that some part of
the plans of actions does not affect the utility, and thus can be arbitrarily set. Thus,
a player may plan for that part irrationally, i.e., selecting non best-response action,
while still guaranteeing Nash equilibrium. Even worse, sometimes such irrationality is
the only way to make sure that the current outcome is in equilibrium. This is what
referred to as non-credible threat: a threat of acting in a way that would otherwise not
occur when triggered. Hence, a Nash equilibrium with such threats is hardly realistic.
A refinement of this, called subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), safely eliminates non-
credible threats:
Definition 1.11. Let Γ = 〈N,K,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 be an extensive-form game. A
subgame of Γ, defined over a node v ∈ H ∈ H where H is singleton, is a tuple
〈N,K′,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 such that K′ is a subtree of K containing v and all its succes-
sors. An outcome a of the strategic form of Γ is said to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium
if, for every subgame Γ′ of Γ, the induced outcome of a on Γ′ is a Nash equilibrium of
the strategic form of Γ′.
According the above definition, a subgame-perfect equilibrium is only a proper
refinement of Nash equilibrium if there is at least one singleton information set in the
game tree. In other words, in each subgame at least one player must know exactly what
has happened in the history, which include players’ exact past actions and all realised
states of the Nature. However, there might be games in which all information sets are
non-singleton, and thus the only valid subgame of the game tree is itself, which reduces
any SPE to a Nash equilibrium. This motivates further refinements, and consequently
led to the concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Unlike an SPE that requires
one player with perfect knowledge of history for each subgame, a PBE only requires a
player with a belief about history which is consistent (following Bayes’ rule) with the
strategy profile forming the equilibrium. Since the notion SPE appears in many results
of our research, we describe it formally below:
Definition 1.12. Let Γ = 〈N,K,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 be an extensive-form game, and
a be a strategy profile of the strategic form of Γ. For every information set H ∈ H,
a belief of player i = r(v) for v ∈ H is a probability distribution over H. A belief
system is the collection of beliefs for all information sets H ∈ H. A belief system
is said to be consistent with a if for every H ∈ H that can be reached with positive
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probability, the belief over H is identical to the posterior distribution over H derived
from a using Bayes’ rule.
Definition 1.13. Let Γ = 〈N,K,H,A, ρ, {ui}i∈N 〉 be an extensive-form game. A
strategy profile a of the strategic form of Γ and a belief system µ are said to form a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if (i) µ is consistent with a and, (ii) for every information
set H ∈H with i = r(H) 6= 0, then player i’s utility is maximal given a belief over H
derived from µ and other players’ strategies in a, that is,
ai ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
v∗∈H
Pr
µ
[v∗]
∑
t∈Tv∗
ui(t)
∏
(v,v′)∈path(v∗,t)
oa′(v, v
′)
where a′ = (ai,a−i), Tv∗ is the set of terminal nodes of K preceded by v∗, path(v∗, t)
is the set of edges from v∗ to t, and o· is as defined in Definition 1.10.
For compatibility with game-theoretic literature, with respect to a PBE we call the
information sets that can be reached with positive probabilities as on the equilibrium
path, and otherwise as off the equilibrium path. Unlike previous solution concepts, the
specification of PBE requires not just a strategy profile, but also a belief system. This
is because for information sets that are off the equilibrium path, there might be many
valid beliefs, each of which would lead to a distinct belief system. This gives rooms to
even further refinements of PBE along the development of game theory. In this thesis
however, we only utilise the notion of PBE, and thus we may safely ignore the need
to specify a belief system for each PBE, as the strategy profile alone would convey the
most important parts of the corresponding belief system.
1.3 Basic Cryptographic Primitives
Although cryptography is not the main focus of our research, in some of our works pre-
sented in this thesis we rely on cryptographic techniques to make sure that our game
models are realistic. To complete the formal treatments of our solutions, in this section
we define standard cryptographic primitives that would be used in our solutions, par-
ticularly in Chapter 4 (Section 4.8) and Chapter 5 (Section 5.6). We start by recalling
the central notion of negligible function, which is then followed by the definitions of key
exchange, proof-of-works, authenticated encryption, and non-malleable commitments.
Note that the definitions for authenticated encryption and non-malleable commitment
are borrowed from standard cryptographic definitions, meaning that there are existing
constructions satisfying them. However, our definitions of key exchange and proof-of-
works have been adapted to our needs. For completeness of solutions in Appendices C
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and D we show constructions that satisfy such adaptations.
Definition 1.14. A negligible function is  : N → R such that for every positive
polynomial poly there exists an integer n0 > 0 such that for all n ≥ n0 we have |(n)| ≤
1/poly(n). A non-negligible function is a function which is not negligible.
Definition 1.15. Let A1, . . . An be probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms.
A parallel execution of A1, . . . , An that respectively output o1, . . . , on is denoted by
(o1, . . . , on)← (A1, . . . , An).
Definition 1.16 ( [30]). Let K be a key space. A secure key-exchange protocol is a
tuple of PPT algorithms (I,R) satisfying for some negligible function  the following
properties:
• Correctness: Pr[(k1, k2)← (I(n),R(n)) : k1 = k2 ∈ K] = 1,
• Synchronisation: if the adversary modifies the communication, then it is hard to
make endpoints agree on the same key, i.e., for all PPT adversaries Adv
Pr [(k1, ·, k2)← (I(n),Adv,R(n)) : k1 = k2 6=⊥ | trI 6= trR] ≤ (n)
where trI and trR are transcripts of messages during the communication in the
views of I(n) and R(n), respectively,
• Key indistinguishability: the adversary must either make the endpoints accepting
different keys, or else it has no knowledge about the agreed key, i.e., denote by
D the distribution over K of k given that (k, ·, k)← (I(n),R(n)), for all stateful3
PPT adversaries Adv define
ΠAdvIND-KE =
[
(k0, ·, k2)← (I(n),Adv,R(n)); k1 ←D K; b←$ {0, 1}; b′ ← Adv(kb)
]
,
then either of the following holds:
Pr
[
ΠAdvIND-KE : b = b
′ | k0 = k2 6=⊥
]
≤ 1/2 + (n)
Pr
[
ΠAdvIND-KE : k0 = k2 6=⊥
]
≤ (n)
Definition 1.17. Denote by cost(Alg) a realisation of the computational cost when exe-
cuting a probabilistic algorithm Alg. A proof-of-work mechanism is a tuple (Prove,Verify)
3By “stateful” we mean that the adversary remembers what it has done within the same experiment.
This is to simplify the presentation of the definition by avoiding messages passing between stages of
an experiment.
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of PPT algorithms satisfying for some negligible function  that for all cost values
c ∈ [cmin, cmax], all proof identifiers id ∈ ID for some ID space ID, the following prop-
erties are satisfied:
• Correctness:
Pr
 (sig1, sig2)← (Proven(c, id),Verifyn(c, id)) :
sig1 = sig2 = true ∧ cost(Proven(c, id)) ≥ c− (n)
 = 1 and,
• Verifiability: even with helps from past or current communication, any save in
computation cost would result in a reduce in convincing the verifier by at least
the same proportion, i.e., for all PPT algorithms Adv = (Adv1,Adv2) and all
probabilities p:
Pr
s← Adv1Proven(·,·)(n, c, id); (·, sig)← (Adv2Proven(·,·)(n, c, id, s),
Verifyn(c, id)) : cost(Adv2) ≤ c · p ∧ sig = true
 4 ≤ p+ (n)
where Adv2 is not allowed to trigger Prove with id, and cost(Adv2) ignores the
executions of Prove(·, ·).
Definition 1.18. With respect to a message space M, an authenticated encryption
scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (K,Enc,Dec) satisfying for some negligible function
 the following properties:
• Correctness: for all m ∈M and all Pr[k ← K(n) : Deck(Enck(m)) = m] = 1,
• IND-CPA: the content of ciphertexts convey no information about the plaintexts,
i.e., for all stateful PPT adversaries Adv
Pr
k ← K(n); (m0,m1)← AdvEnck(·); b←$ {0, 1};
b′ ← AdvEnck(·)(Enck(mb)) : b = b′
 ≤ 1/2 + (n)
• IND-CTXT: it is hard for an adversary to produce a ciphertext (other than those
produced by the sender) that can be accepted by the receiver, i.e., for all stateful
4Here Adv1Prove(·,·) represents the fact that the adversary may rely on knowledge from past executions
of this proof-of-work mechanism, and Adv2Prove(·,·) indicates that the adversary might try to exploit
computational effort from the client, but for a different proof with id′ 6= id.
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PPT adversaries Adv
Pr[k ← K(n); c← AdvEnck(·) : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C] ≤ (n)
where C is the set of ciphertexts output by Enck(·) to Adv.
Definition 1.19 ( [43]). With respect to a message space M, a non-malleable commit-
ment scheme under common reference string (CRS) model is a tuple of PPT algorithms
(Setup,Commit,Open) satisfying for some negligible function  the following properties:
• Correctness: for all m ∈M
Pr[CK← Setup(n) : OpenCK(CommitCK(m)) = m] = 1,
• Hiding: the commit value conveys no information about the message being com-
mitted, i.e., for all stateful PPT adversaries Adv
Pr
CK← Setup(n); (m0,m1)← Adv(CK); b←$ {0, 1};
(c, d)← CommitCK(mb); b′ ← Adv(c) : b = b′
 ≤ 1/2 + (n),
• Binding: a commit value is only valid for one message, i.e., for all PPT adver-
saries Adv
Pr
CK← Setup(n); (c, d, d′)← Adv(CK);m← OpenCK(c, d);
m′ ← OpenCK(c, d′) : m 6= m′ ∧m,m′ 6=⊥
 ≤ (n)
• Non-malleability (w.r.t opening): given a commit value of a message, until re-
ceiving the corresponding opening value, it is hard to commit to any other related
message, i.e., for every stateful PPT adversary Adv there exists a PPT adversary
Adv′ such that p1 − p2 ≤ (n) for all efficiently sampleable distribution D over
M, and all polynomial-time computable relation R, where
p1 = Pr
CK← Setup(n);m←DM; (c1, d1)← CommitCK(m); c2 ← Adv(CK, c1);
d2 ← Adv(CK, c1, c2, d1);m′ ← OpenCK(c2, d2) : c1 6= c2 ∧R(m,m′) = 1

p2 = Pr[m←DM;m′ ← Adv′ : R(m,m′) = 1]
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1.4 Examples of Applications
The diversity of problem contexts in information security suggests a rich set of oppor-
tunities for game-theoretic studies. Indeed, research on game modelling of security has
established a wide range of results on different problems and areas. A major game
model used in these works is the attacker-defender game [3, 3.1], which is played be-
tween some attacker(s) and defender(s) in a strict competition, i.e., they have opposite
preferences over outcomes. Alternatively, many research also consider defenders-only
games, in which the defenders try to collaborate (whilst being individually selfish) in
mitigating a particular source of threat. As an illustration, we briefly review some of
the most notable game-theoretic studies on network security and security investment
– the areas that draw the most attention from intellectual fore.
1.4.1 Network Security
Network security has witnessed enormous efforts in game-theoretic modelling of secu-
rity. This is partly due to the diversity in problem contexts it covers, and party because
these contexts often involve multiple participants with independent behaviours and con-
flict of interests, e.g., in client-server model, peer-to-peer model, and a wide range of
adversary models. The most common approach to modelling network security problems
is to use attacker-defender game, for example zero-sum games [121] as in [2,27,91,153],
that is, the total utility of the players are always zero. Attacker-defender games can
also be extended to multiple defenders or attackers [4, 123].
Game-theoretic studies of security at TCP/IP access layer is one of the most active
approaches. There are work that rely on the attacker-defender model, for example by
Kashyap et al. [78], Altman et al. [4], or Buchegger and Alpan [27], who address the
problem of signal jamming in wireless networks. Effective, efficient, and secure signal
transmission is also investigated in defenders-only type of games, such as in the work
of Sagduyu and Ephremides [128], Raya et al. [123]. Unlike other work that rely on
non-cooperative players, Saad et al. [127] use coalitional games to study cooperation
among defenders in minimising eavesdropping.
Security games also appear naturally at higher network layers as well as over inter-
networks. A popular line of work focuses on the problem of intrusion detection [9].
Again the attacker-defender model proves its usefulness, such as in a simple zero-sum
stochastic game designed by Alpcan and Bas¸ar [2], and later by Zhu and Bas¸ar [151]
with more realistic game models. This problem is also studied in collaborative settings
where multiple intrusion detection systems (IDSs) cooperate, forming defenders-only
games. For example, while Zhou et al. [150] consider rational IDSs being malicious,
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Zhu et al. [152] focus on the problem of free-riding, i.e., some IDS might be lazy
and does not contribute. Another typical ground for game modelling is the issue of
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), which often involves a large body of Internet
nodes. Spyridopoulos et al. [138] and Jafarian et al. [74] study different defense mech-
anisms against DDoS attacks under attacker-defender game model, as well as provide
simulation results to strengthen their results. Meanwhile, Yan and Eidenbenz [148]
investigate economics incentives for ISPs to collaborate in defending DDoS attacks,
under defenders-only model.
1.4.2 Security Investment
Another natural place for game-theoretic modelling is in the organisational decision-
making process of strategic investment in security. This problem is made interesting by
the dependency of such process on not only the potential attackers, but also on other
relevant parties in the environment, such as markets, alliances, competitors, etc.
A well-known game model for studying security investment is the interdependent
security game (IDS) proposed by Heal and Kunreuther [84]. This is a defenders-only
game among entities whose security are tightly linked to each others, e.g., security of
airports against terrorists. Entities have an option to invest in a certain mechanism
with interdependent effects in security. Alternatively, they may ignore it as freeriders,
or because it becomes ineffective due to the lack of deployments by others. Different
contexts for IDS games have been proposed, each with a distinct type of security
interdependency. Grossklags et al. [65, 66] consider several models, including weakest
link, best shot, and total effort : a player’s security is determined by the smallest,
largest, or total investment by all players, respectively. There are also models that
consider negative externalities, i.e., deployments that have negative security effects on
other players, such as by Hausken [69] and Miura-Ko et al. [98]. Several mechanisms
have been proposed toward improving security and social utilities, e.g., using insurance
[65,66,109,111], auditing [22], information sharing [64,109]. Further, Laszka et al. [86]
provide a comprehensive survey of existing research on IDS games.
There are other topics in security investment which also benefit from game-theoretic
analysis. A notable example is sharing of security information between firms (with in-
dependent security) as part of strategic security investment. Several works [54, 64, 71]
of this type model “one-shot” games in which players’ strategies are either investment
or information sharing, or both. Others consider multi-stage games [71, 89] where in-
formation sharing may occur at one of the stages. In contrast to the above, another
emerging line of research exploits the attacker-defender theme, notably the FlipIt game
proposed by van Dijk et al. [141] that models strategic security plans against advanced
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persistent threats (APTs) in taking over the control of a resource. Several follow-ups
on FlipIt have appeared, e.g., an extension of the defender’s strategies by Pham and
Cid [114], an extension to multiple resources by Laszka et al. [87], as well as several
empirical studies by Reitter et al. [124] and Nochenson et al. [106]. Last but not
least, the growth of cloud and distributed computing also suggest a need for studies
on security of outsourcing against dishonest contractors. Most of existing results come
from cryptographic research, e.g., verifiable computation with fully-homomorphic en-
cryption [55], probabilistically checkable proof [131, 133]. There are however emerging
game-theoretic studies, such as by Belenkiy et al. [14], Nix and Kantarcioglu [104]
which apply principal-agent model [58, ch.7] to incentivise honesty among contractors.
Khouzani et al. [80] pursue this approach further to consider the problem of collusion
between contractors.
1.5 Outline of Thesis Contributions
This section summarises the content of the remaining of the thesis, as well as explaining
my shares of contribution for each of the works mentioned. There are four independent
pieces of research, as presented in the next four consecutive chapters. The thesis ends
with a conclusion chapter, along with an appendix. The main chapters are summarised
below.
Test It Before Flipping It: Security Assessment Games
Strategic security investments are an important part in organisational decision making,
due to the need for protection of information systems. Following a break to RSA [40],
Dijk et al. [141] employ the notion of games of timing in economics [21] to propose a
game called FlipIt that captures organisational strategies for security investment against
an advanced persistent threat (APT) adversary. APTs are growing threats that cause
detrimental effects to critical infrastructures [20]. In particular, FlipIt is a two-person
game whose gameplay starts at zero time, and flows indefinitely. During the game play,
players (attacker, defender) must decide when to make a move (usually system reset)
to take over control of a single resource (e.g. computer system), the action of which
incurs a cost, but which yields benefits from controlling the resource for the amount
of time until it is taken by the opponent. In their paper, Dijk et al. consider several
different types of moving strategies, including non-adaptive plans of moves that are
decided before the gameplay begins, such as periodic, randomised strategies, as well as
adaptive moves, i.e., moves decided during the gameplay based on observed history.
Our work is an extension to FlipIt by enriching further the types of moves that can be
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made during the gameplay. We take on the argument that system resets are not enough
in optimising organisational return on security investment, and that security assessment
should also be taken into the strategies. To do so, we introduce the strategies called
state checking, which allows a player to check if it is in control of the resource, and only
make a move if not. We perform analysis to compare between this and the blind move
strategies proposed by Dijk et al., with restriction to periodic type of strategies. Our
analysis yields conditions under which one type of strategy is preferred over another,
and vice versa. Further, we introduce another type move, called hardening, which allows
the defender not just to check then move, but also patch the system vulnerability (after
being taken by the attacker), so that later on it becomes harder for the attacker to take
over. Our analysis of hardening strategies give further insights on how enterprises
should spend on deep investigation to fix security problems of their infrastructures in
the event of breaches.
This work is published in [115], in which all authors contribute equally. Particu-
larly, I participate in seeking the research problem, proposing and revising the model,
performing the analysis, as well as presenting the work in text format.
Strategic Information Sharing in Competitive Environments
In an inter-connected world where no single organisation can really stand alone and
survive, there is a new trend of cooperation in which businesses do not just selfishly
spend on protecting their information assets, but also gathering and exchanging security
intelligence in helping themselves becoming more secure. The establishment of the
US “National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC)” as the “Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)” for telecommunications [108] is a sign of this
trend. Meanwhile, many investigations on information sharing in general [52,136,143],
as well as that specifically for security intelligence [53, 64, 70, 71] have been made by
academics, hoping to devise a effective and efficient system for information exchange.
Most of these works consider the problem of how firms should invest in securing their
systems, as well as how to share information to others.
Different from previous works, we consider the question of how much firms should
invest security research (e.g., Google Project Zero [50]), i.e., gaining information about
the security of their platforms, alongside sharing the research results. Also, we model
information as the number of vulnerabilities discovered instead of a value within [0,1]
as in other works. We consider a two-stage game played between two competing firms
in the same market who need to consider trade-offs between competition and sharing
information for mutual goods. Our analysis of the equilibrium points indicates insights
about firms’ expected trends of decisions. Further, we introduce the notion of a me-
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diator, and illustrate its effect on the firms’ behaviours, which surprisingly can bring
positive as well as negative outcomes to the individual firms, as well as social welfare.
This work is published in [81], in which all authors contribute fairly equally. In par-
ticular, I contribute mainly on designing/revising the model as well as in the analysis,
with less efforts on presentation of the research results.
Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computations
The idea of outsourcing complex computation tasks has been proposed and imple-
mented in a variety of applications. These include search for extra-terrestrial life
(SETI@Home), investigation of protein folding and computational drug design (Fold-
ing@Home and Rosetta@home). Businesses from different sections including finance,
energy infrastructure, mining and commodities transport, technology and innovation
[107] have also realised the benefits of outsourcing (data, computation, etc.) and “mov-
ing to the cloud”. In all of these scenarios, there is a concern for the outsourcer (client)
about the correctness of the returned results. With efforts from the cryptography com-
munity, many mechanisms have been proposed to address this concern, coming under
the name verifiable computation, e.g., homomorphic encryption [56], Probabilistically
Checkable Proofs (PCPs) [132,134], and then better schemes such as Pepper [131] and
Ginger [133]. However, these mechanisms are still practically infeasible, due to the
complexity of the computation process. From another route, there are economic studies
that aim at forming principal-agent contracts that rationally discourage workers/agents
from being dishonest.
Motivated by previous works that employ principal-agent contracts, we make an
attempt to design more rigorous and general contracts for outsourcing, which are op-
timal in terms of outsourcing expense. Our contract design utilise auditing, reward,
punishment in attracting workers, whilst at the same time encouraging their honesty.
Further, we take into account several obstacles in reality not addressed by previous
works, such as limited budget for expenditure, limited ability to punish, and limited
capacity for auditing. In addition, we consider the problem of information leakage that
gives workers extra advantages in cheating, as well as propose bounty hunter scheme
to deter collusions among workers. Our results are presented as optimal contract pa-
rameters and expected cost, given different conditions of the environment parameters.
This work is published in [116] and [80], in which all authors contribute fairly
equally. In particular, I contribute equally with others on designing and revising the
game model, discussion of results, and presentation of the works. I am also responsible
for all programming tasks that form the statements of the main theorems.
30
1.5. Outline of Thesis Contributions
Rational Security for Unauthenticated Communication
Due to physical and geographical separation, secure communication is vital in our inter-
networked world. Various aspects of security have been established for this need, e.g.,
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation. Security services that can offer these aspects
often operate on top of a mechanism that guarantees authenticity/correct identifica-
tion of communicating parties. However, authentication in general is not an easy task.
Although there exist effective authentication mechanisms such as Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) or Web of Trust (WoT), they are not efficient enough to be applicable
to the vast majority of everyday connections such as news surfing or peer-to-peer file
sharing. Quasi-authentication methods such as leap-of-faith have been proposed, but
only work well in small and static environments, and hence is less scalable. Barak et
al., on the other hand, consider the question: “What security can be achieved in the
presence of an attacker, without authentication?” [10]. They give an answer in the
form of a relaxed notion of security, which can easily be achieved using secure mul-
tiparty computation (SMPC) and digital signatures. Such relaxation states that, the
most an adversary can do is to sequentially impersonate communicating endpoints. In
other words, it cannot concurrently communicate with two or more endpoints and use
information obtained from one side to talk with another. This strictly minimises the
capability of an adversary as a man-in-the-middle attacker.
Inspired by this work, we also consider the same question, and arrive at the same
notion of relaxation for security. However, we realise that the solution provided in
[10] might be practically unfavourable. In particular, the use of SMPC may cause
unbearable overhead in computation. Also, it is not compatible with modules unaware
of SMPC, as these modules must be heavily reformatted in order to participate in the
protocol execution. Motivated by this, we approach the question and the prescribed
notion of security from a game-theoretic viewpoint to look for a more practical solution.
We start by proposing formalisation of the notion of security, called online-man-in-the-
middle (oMitM), with focus on query-response protocol, the most primal and common
form of Internet communication nowadays. Then, we develop a game-theoretic model
to study the equilibrium conditions under which a rational adversary would not violate
oMitM security. The game is played between the adversary and the communicating
endpoints. Finally, we develop a cryptographic protocol for the endpoints, so as to
force the adversary into playing the prescribed game, and thus being encouraged to
conform with oMitM security.
This work has not been published, and is fully a work of my own.
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Chapter 2
Test It Before Flipping It:
Security Assessment Games
Security assessments are an integral part of organisations’ strategies for protecting their
digital assets and critical IT infrastructure. In this chapter we propose a game-theoretic
modelling of a particular form of security assessment – one which addresses the question
“are we compromised?”. We do so by extending FlipIt, a game model recently proposed
by van Dijk et al. [141], which itself can be used to model the interaction between
defenders and attackers under the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) scenario. Our
extension gives players the option to “test” the state of the game before making a move.
This allows one to study the scenario in which organisations have the option to perform
periodic security assessments of such nature, and the benefits they may bring.
2.1 Introduction
The protection of digital assets and critical IT infrastructure is an ever-growing con-
cern for individuals, companies and nations. Information security is now a priority area
for investment, given the growing threats from hackers, competitors, organised crimi-
nal gangs and enemy nation-states, and the potential for loss of privacy and revenue,
negative reputational impact and effects in public welfare. In addition to direct in-
vestment in suitable and robust IT infrastructure, the performance of frequent security
assessments is also considered an important component of the defense strategy against
cyber-attacks. A security assessment is the process of determining how effectively an
entity being assessed meets specific security objectives [100]. A common method of
assessment is penetration testing, where security professionals target the network and
other IT resources, to try to identify and verify any vulnerabilities found. Popular
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penetration testing methodologies and frameworks work by essentially mimicking the
popular forms of attack used by hackers.
The nature of cyber-attacks has however been steadily changing in recent years.
While previously the typical threats were script kiddies, more interested in defacing
websites for fun and pride, attacks motivated by financial gains are increasingly be-
coming more prevalent. Particularly in the corporate and government spheres, the
threat of espionage and theft of intellectual property and state secrets are growing
causes of concern. With these goals in mind, the methods used by attackers have also
evolved. A form of attack that has received much attention recently are the so-called
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), which can often be seen as a signal of interna-
tional cyber warfare [20]. The premises in this form of attack are that IT networks and
systems are vulnerable, and therefore can be compromised by adversaries with enough
resources and motivation; furthermore, attacks are stealthy in nature [35, 142], and
adversaries can remain in control of the network and systems for long periods without
detection. Recent examples of cyber attacks that fit this profile are the security breach
at RSA Data Security [40], and the Stuxnet [85] worm infection of Iranian systems.
These developments should in turn motivate a reflection on whether current meth-
ods of security assessment remain sound under the changing nature of attacks. A
security assessment is typically seen to be trying to answer the question “are we vul-
nerable?” (and if so, how can we fix it?). Under APT’s premise, the answer for this
question is certainly “yes”. Thus a security assessment needs also to address the ques-
tion “are we compromised?”, and organisations need to consider cost-effective ways in
which they can can regain control of their IT assets if the answer is positive. This
current gap should certainly be the cause of concern for professionals involved in the
security of highly-targeted organisations.1
In this chapter we propose a simple game-theoretic modelling of this form of se-
curity assessment, and study its application in two-player security games. Our model
extends the recently proposed game FlipIt by van Diijk et al. [141], which itself can
be used to model the interaction between defenders and attackers under the APT sce-
nario. Our extension gives players the option to “test” the state of the game (i.e.
answer the question “are we compromised”). This allows one to study the scenario
in which organisations have the option of performing periodic security assessments of
such nature, and the benefits they may bring. In particular, how these assessments can
fit into an organisation’s security investment strategy. Proposals of models for security
1In fact these points were emphatically argued in a recent testimony before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear
Capabilities”, where one of the participants stressed the need of periodic security assessments of the
latter nature [12].
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investment and security testing have appeared before in the literature (e.g. [23,24,63]);
here we leverage on the elegance of FlipIt to investigate strategies for the application
of this form of security assessment.
This chapter is organised as follows. We start with a review of related literature
in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we describe the game FlipIt. In Section 2.4 we propose
our extension to the game, by introducing the option of a security assessment which
discloses the state of the game. We study further extensions in Sections 2.6 and 2.5,
which address the probabilistic effectiveness of security assessment, as well as the ability
to harden security over time. We finish with a conclusion in Section 2.7. For reader’s
convenience, we summarise the important notations in [table]
2.2 Related Work
The idea of a non-cooperative game in which players decide when to make a move
appears long before the proposal of FlipIt, and is referred to as “games of timing” [21].
A typical game of timing consists of two players with zero-sum utility. Each player
has a pool of resource to spend within a time interval (usually [0,1]). The players
must select strategies to spend their resources over time so as to gain the most from
each other at the end of the interval. The game becomes interesting when there are
trade-offs between early and late expenses of one’s resource. For example, consider
two shooters in a duel with limited resource (ammunitions) walking toward each other.
While conserving shots for later would increase accuracy (as distance shortened), early
fires would reduce the chance of being shot in the first place [106].
Following a detailed survey by Radzik [120], studies of games of timing consider
several different categories. In one dimension, players’ resources are separated between
discrete and non-discrete types, that is, they either consist of finite number of indivisible
amounts, or can be distributed arbitrarily over the time interval, respectively. From
another perspective, games can also be categorised based on information conditions
of the players. For example, Karlin [77] distinguishes between games in which players
have complete information about each other’s expenditure over time, and otherwise
games with limited information.
Applying to attacker-defender interaction in information security, van Dijk et al.
[141] propose FlipIt with as a game of timing with distinguishable features. In FlipIt,
the time interval is not bounded, but rather from 0 to ∞. This is to reflect the
persistence of the APT attacker. Secondly, players’ resources in FlipIt are costly (and
hence unlimited), making it a non-zero sum game. FlipIt also belongs to the class of
games with limited information. For example, non-adaptive games give no information
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Defender
Attacker
t
t0
t1
0
Figure 2.1: An example of FlipIt(P, P ) game with periodic strategies with defender’s
phase t0 and attacker’s phase t1. Each arrow indicates a flip to take over control of the
resource.
to the players.
Our contributions. Our work is the first extension of FlipIt following the original
proposal of the game. We focus on enriching the defense strategies, hoping to gather
interesting insights for realistic security strategies. As explained and motivated in Sec-
tion 2.3, we pick the FlipIt game with periodic moves as the basis for our extension.
We contrast the strategies of blind-reset and check-then-reset of information systems.
We also consider the investment strategies for hardening security when a breach oc-
curs. Our theoretical results are then explained in executive language as emphases and
recommendations for real-world security tactics.
2.3 FlipIt: The Game
Proposed by van Dijk et al. [141] in response to a data breach against RSA Security
[40], the original FlipIt games capture the battle between a defender and an advanced
persistent threat (APT) attacker for the control of a resource. The game is modelled
over infinite time, in which a player makes a move to gain control of the resource; it
remains in this state until the opponent makes its own move to take over. This control-
alternating process repeats infinitely as time passes, and the utility of each player is
determined by the total/average amount of time it controls the resource, as well as the
cost required to take over the resource from its opponent. An example of the game
play is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Formally, we consider FlipIt as a strategic-form game 〈N, {Ai}, {ui}〉 where the set
of players N = {0, 1} contains the defender and the attacker, denoted by player 0 and
1, respectively. FlipIt models a situation starting from some time moment t = 0 and
is continuously indefinite, during which the control of a resource R is being alternated
between the attacker and the defender. Particularly, let Ci(t) be 1 if player i controls
the resource at time t, and 0 otherwise, where C0(0) = 1, i.e., the game starts with the
defender controlling the resource. A player can claim control of the resource by making
a move, or flip. For instance, if the defender moves at time t, then C0(t) = 1; similarly,
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we have C0(t
′) = 0 if the attacker moves at time t′. This allows the total control time
of player i until time t to be computed as
Gi(t) =
∫ t
0
Ci(t)dt.
Denote player i’s number of moves until time t by ni(t), and the constant cost for each
move by ki; then the net benefit of player i is given by
Bi(t) = Gi(t)− ni(t)ki.
Alternatively, since the game continues indefinitely, a player’s utility can be represented
by its average benefit per unit time:
ui(t) =
Bi(t)
t
=
Gi(t)
t
− ni(t)
t
ki = γi(t)− αi(t)ki.
We call γi(t) and αi(t) the average gain rate and the average move rate of player i
up to time t, respectively. One may further assume that the functions γi(t) and αi(t)
converge to the values γi and αi, respectively, as t → ∞. We can then conveniently
represent player i’s utility without the time dimension as simply
ui = lim
t→∞ui(t) = γi − αiki. (2.1)
What remains to be modelled are γi and αi, which strongly depend on how the
players strategically act in the game. While the original work [141] discusses several
types of strategies for each player, we focus only on the so-called periodic strategies
with random phase (Figure 2.1), which is the main tool in our research. In this case,
we assume that before start, each player chooses a rate αi > 0 so that as the game
progresses, player i moves at rate αi, i.e., after every δi = 1/αi units of time. Further-
more, player i does not start moving immediately at t = 0, but selects uniformly at
random a starting point in the interval [0, δi]; this is called phase. The use of random
phase illustrates the fact that the defender and the attacker in reality only know each
other’s flipping period, not the exact flipping time. While players cannot control their
phases, their game action is determined by the chosen move rates, i.e, α0 (defender)
and α1 (attacker). For convenience, we denote the strategy space for periodic moving
strategies for both players as
A0 = A1 = P = {Pα|α > 0}.
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Assume that players move periodically following a strategy/action profile (Pα0 , Pα1) ∈
A0×A1, their average benefit, or utilities, can be computed in the following two cases:
• α0 ≥ α1: since δ0 = 1/α0 ≤ 1/α1 = δ1, let r = α1/α0 = δ0/δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Let t∗ be
a moment when an attacker’s move/flip occurs, then the next attacker’s move is
at time t∗ + δ1. Since the defender moves every period of δ0 and that δ0 ≤ δ1, it
must move exactly once at some t ∈ [t∗, t∗ + δ0] ⊂ [t∗, t∗ + δ1], as seen below:
time
tt∗
δ1
δ0
δ1 − δ0
Due to the assumption of random phase, t is uniformly distributed within [t∗, t∗+
δ0], yielding a gain (t
∗ + δ0 − t) + (δ1 − δ0) = t∗ + δ1 − t, and thus the defender’s
expected control time within [t∗, t∗ + δ0] is:
G∗0 =
∫ t∗+δ0
t∗
t∗ + δ1 − t
δ0
dt = δ1 − δ0
2
= δ1(1− r
2
). (2.2)
This implies that the defender’s average gain is γ0 = G
∗
0/δ1 = 1 − r/2; it also
means that the attacker’s average gain is γ1 = 1− γ0 = r/2. Therefore, we have
the players’ utilities as
u0(Pα0 , Pα1) = 1−
r
2
− α0k0 = 1− α1
2α0
− α0k0,
u1(Pα0 , Pα1) =
r
2
− α1k0 = α1
2α0
− α1k1.
• α0 ≤ α1: similar analysis gives the following
u0(Pα0 , Pα1) =
r
2
− α0k0 = α0
2α1
− α0k0,
u1(Pα0 , Pα1) = 1−
r
2
− α1k0 = 1− α0
2α1
− α1k1.
We note that when a player has lost the control due to the opponent’s move, it does
not immediately move to regain it but rather needs to wait for its periodic move. This
is because moves are presumably “stealthy”, and neither player knows at any time
who is controlling the resource. In addition to the periodic move scenario, [141] also
studies strategies involving randomised moves, as well as adaptive strategies based on
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the opponent’s past moves. Although we do not consider these here, we note that
the modelling presented in this chapter may be similarly applied to other scenarios
discussed in [141]. For reader’s convenience, we summarise the notion of FlipIt game
with periodic strategies, as well as important notations below.
Definition 2.1. Let k0 and k1 are per-move cost for player 0 and 1, respectively.
A FlipIt game is a strategic-form game 〈N, {Ai}, {ui}〉, denoted as FlipIt(A0, A1) with
utility functions as in (2.1). A FlipIt game with periodic strategies is of the form
FlipIt(P, P ) where P = {Pα|α > 0}, such that for every action profile (Pα0 , Pα1) ∈ P 2
players’ utilities are:
ui(Pαi , Pα−i) =

1− α−i
2αi
− αiki if αi ≥ α−i, or
αi
2α−i
− αiki otherwise.
Remark. We choose FlipIt with periodic strategies to base our work on due to several
reasons. FlipIt is a simple, though elegant, model of real-world IT security attacker-
defender interaction that emphasises the persistence aspect of the attacker. Also,
strategies for organisational security are often determined in the very early phase of the
business, and they are normally deterministic (quarterly assessments, periodic guard
patrolling, etc.) rather than being oblivious and temporary [101]. This suggests us
to consider periodic strategies, as it would be most applicable to reality. In another
aspect, the original model assumes complete “stealthiness” of players’ moves, since no
player obtain any information during the game. As will be described, our extension
proposes state-checking, indicating that a player might obtain useful information while
playing and thus might adapt its strategy. However, we do not consider the advan-
tage of adaptive strategies. Instead, we stick to a comparable model in order to reveal
more accurately the differences our extensions make to the original model. Finally, our
choice takes into account simplicity of modelling to enable effective analysis and useful
insights into the problem.
2.4 Test It before Flipping it
The original FlipIt game proposed by van Dijk [141] models different types of strategies
for a player to regain control of a resource (i.e. to move) based on some pre-defined or
on-the-fly tactics, which however possess some limitations. In particular, a player may
waste many moves if they happen while it is still controlling the resource. This becomes
more serious if its periodic movement is significantly faster than the opponent’s. Even
if a move really serves its purpose, i.e., to regain control, it may still be an “almost”
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Table 2.1: List of main notations
parameter definition
αi periodic moving/state-checking rate of player i
δi a period between two consecutive move/state check of player i
ki cost of each move/flip to player i
ci cost of each state check to player i
hi cost of each security hardening to player i
Pαi a periodic moving strategy with rate αi of player i
Sαi a periodic state-checking strategy with rate αi of player i
Hαi,hi a periodic state-checking strategy with rate αi and hardening cost hi of player i
p probability that a defender’s state check succeeds in finding a breach
f the function that updates the attack cost after each hardening
µ the maximum increase in attack cost after each hardening
λ the effectiveness of the hardening process
waste. This happens, for example, when the opponent’s move is immediately (but
coincidently) after such a move, rendering it ineffective.
Rather than blindly moving, an interesting question is whether knowing the state
of control would be more beneficial to a player. In terms of information security assess-
ment, this can be represented by the question “are we compromised?”. The intuition
behind this addition is rather simple. Knowing the state of control would prevent a
waste move while the resource is still at hand. Also, even though it may not prevent an
“almost” waste, it may suggest a timely response to a lost of control. This, of course,
depends on how regularly the knowledge of the control state is updated.
To model such situations, we introduce a new class of strategies to FlipIt, namely
the state checking strategies, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. As opposed to the ability to
move/flip, a player is now able to check the game state, and then move/flip if necessary.
In particular, we consider a strategy class S = {Sα|α > 0} such that, given a strategy
Sα ∈ S, with δ = 1/α, player i may:
• perform a periodic state checking with period δ and state-checking cost ci, with
the first check occurring at a uniformly random time phase, i.e., within [0, δ];
• if a state check indicates a loss of control, immediately perform a move/flip (at
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t
t0
t1
0
check
move
−c0 −(c0 + k0)
Figure 2.2: An example of a FlipIt(S, S) game with period state checking strategies.
cost ki) to regain its control.
In addition to the original game FlipIt(P, P ), several games might be introduced
given S, for example FlipIt(S, P ), FlipIt(S ∪ P, P ), and FlipIt(S ∪ P, S ∪ P ). To study
such games, it is important to notice that in all cases, the expected control time for
each player can be formulated in the same way as that in FlipIt(P, P ), using only δ0
(or α0) and δ1 (or α1). Indeed, at a time t, if a player −i is occupying the resource,
a blind move action (specified by Pαi) or a check-then-move action (specified by Sαi)
would yield the same effect, i.e., allowing player i to regain control. In contrast, if i
is in control of the resource, then neither action yields any change. As this happens
independently of the opponent’s strategy, Pαi and Sα′i would yield the same average
control time as long as αi = α
′
i.
The main difference between Pαi and Sαi are in the cost of operating. With a
strategy Sαi , the average state checking cost for player i is αici. There is however the
average cost of moving, which is much less than in periodic moving, since a move is
only made when a loss of control is confirmed. This means that player i’s number
of moves is at most player −i’s number of moves, i.e., min(αi, α−i). This allows the
construction of its utility to become
ui(Sαi , Pα−i ∨ Sα−i) =
1−
α−i
2αi
− ciαi − kiα−i if αi ≥ α−i, or
αi
2α−i − ciαi − kiαi if αi < α−i.
(2.3)
Given this new type of strategies S, a natural approach is to compare between S and P ,
that is, in which situations one is preferred over the other. The following proposition
provides such comparison based on the relation between the costs of moving and state
checking.
Proposition 2.1. In the game FlipIt(P ∪ S, P ∪ S), if ci ≤ ki/4, player i does not
prefer periodic moving. Otherwise, when ci ≥ ki player i does not prefer state checking.
Proof. This proposition is a special case of Proposition 2.2, when p = 1.
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Corollary 2.1. Consider the game FlipIt(P ∪ S, P ∪ S) with ki/4 < ci < ki. Player i
prefers a state checking strategy if and only if α1−i ≤ 2(
√
ki−√ci)2
k2i
.
Discussions. The above results point out that when the cost of checking is suffi-
ciently low, i.e., at most a quarter of the moving cost, it is always worth performing a
check-then-move strategy. Indeed, as a low checking cost suggests a frequent checking
schedule, a player is more closely up-to-date with its state of control of the resource.
This helps the player to improve its expected control time, while keeping the moving
cost at a reasonable level by eliminating wasted moves. Conversely, it is also intuitively
clear that when the cost of checking exceeds that of moving, it is unreasonable to per-
form check-then-move. Interestingly, Corollary 2.1 also indicates that, when the two
cost are comparable, the best response for the opponent playing too fast (exceeding
threshold t =
2(
√
ki−√ci)2
k2i
) is to either simply move at every step or not play at all,
because at every step it is likely that without state checking the player is aware of
its loss of control of the resource. Because ∂t/∂c < 0 and ∂t/∂k > 0, such threshold
also agrees with the fact that state checking is more preferable when the checking cost
ci is low and the moving cost ki is high. In the realm of information security, many
situations may suggest that state checking strategies indeed outperform their moving
counterparts. Consider an information system as the resource; the defender’s act of
moving/flipping is often expensive, as it might involve resets and restores of the system.
This becomes more serious for large organisations, or those that require uninterrupted,
real-time system availability and reliability, such as e-commerce, large computing fa-
cilities. On the other hand, checking for successful take-over of the system might be
significantly cheaper and thus can be performed frequently, using intrusion detection
systems (IDSs), auditing schemes, logging, etc. In such cases, it is recommended that
funds are allocated for more frequent auditing of the system security to maximise the
organisational benefit from the information system.
2.5 Dealing with Complex Systems
In this section, we study a different extension to the previous model to capture situa-
tions in which the control of a resource might be difficult to measure, and that state
checking might be inaccurate. This disregards an inherent but hidden assumption that
with a cost ci, player i can always determine who is in control of the resource. Again,
it addresses another important issue with organisational information security by exac-
erbating the question “are we compromised?” by “how certain are we whether we are
compromised?”. An answer to such question reflects not just how often security should
41
2.5. Dealing with Complex Systems
be assessed, but also how the assessment should be done. We extend the previous state-
checking model with a probability p that the state check succeeds in determining a loss
of control, applied to the defender only. The reason for such bias is obvious: while the
defender must examine every component of its system as a mean of state checking, the
attacker only needs to consider what it has previously compromised, which normally
happens with certainty. For the sake of analysis, we explicitly make two assumptions:
A1. There exists no false positive in state checking, i.e., no false alarm on attack
exists. In other words, the defender would only consider that a breach occurs if
an evidence is found in favour of it. 2
A2. Once a false negative occurs, it will persist until the attacker’s next interaction
with the resource, i.e., either via a state check, or a move/flip. 3
Based on these assumptions, we may reformulate the defender’s utility functions
from what is given in (2.3), with the help of Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Consider the game FlipIt(S, P ∪ S) in which the defender’s state check
succeeds with probability p, along with assumption A1 and A2. Then the defender’s
utility function is
u0(Sα0 , Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =

p
(
1− α1
2α0
)
− c0α0 − pk0α1 if α0 ≥ α1, or
p
(
α0
2α1
)
− c0α0 − pk0α0 otherwise.
(2.4)
Proof. Like in most other proofs, we consider two cases. The first case is α0 ≥ α1 which
implies δ0 ≤ δ1. In that case for every time interval [t, t+ δ1] between two consecutive
attacker’s moves/state-checks, the defender’s utility given that it performs the state
check at time t0 ∈ [t, t+ δ0] is p(t+ δ1− t0). For t0 > t+ δ0 it means that the defender
has already done a check before that for the same attack, and it has not succeeded,
then the check at t0 also fails (due to assumption A2). Thus the defender’s average
2 Although false positives are normal in intrusion detection (especially when automated), our rea-
soning is that, for the purpose of system reset, a careful investigation should be done both automatically
and manually to verify the alleged breach. For simplicity we therefore neglect the possibility of false
positive.
3 In defending this assumption, if the attacker’s move has been stealthy and that the defender fails
to detect it, then if the attacker takes no further action, the defender receives no useful information
to have a better chance in rediscovering the breach. Although in reality the state-checking process
may be probabilistic and would succeed without further information, we assume otherwise to take into
account the worst-case scenario.
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control rate is
1
δ1δ0
∫ t+δ0
t
p(t+ δ1 − t0)dt = p
(
1− α1
2α0
)
For every attacker’s move there is a probability p that it is discovered, which is the
only situation the defender might make a move (due to A1), and thus the defender’s
cost due to moving/flipping is pk0α1. For the case α0 < α1, which implies δ0 > δ1,
we consider interval [t0, t0 + δ0] between two consecutive defender’ state-checks. We
notice right before t0 the resource is controlled by the attacker, and if the state check
succeeds at t0 then the defender’s average control time is
1
2α1
, and otherwise it is 0.
However, every state check independently succeeds with probability p, and hence the
defender’s average control rate is pα02α1 . Because each check succeeds with probability p,
the defender’s move rate is thus α0p, yielding the cost pk0α0.
Similar to the its predecessor, with this model we are also interested in the con-
ditions under which state checking is preferred to mere flipping, and vice versa. This
concern is reflected in Proposition 2.2, which generalises the result given in Proposi-
tion 2.1, and thus emphasises a preference for strategies involving inexpensive state
checking, i.e., equal to at most a p/4-fraction of the flipping cost.
Proposition 2.2. Consider the game FlipIt(P ∪ S, P ∪ S) with the defender’s utility
(2.4). Let Pα1 or Sα1 be the attacker’s strategy. The defender prefers Sα0 over Pα0 if
c0 ≤ k0p
4
and α1 ≥ 1
2k0
min
(
1,
[
2(1− p)
p
]2)
. (2.5)
Proof. To compare between two classes of strategies, we first compute the best response
function for each class. For simplicity of presentation, we use BRP0 (·) = α0 to signify
that the best periodic flipping response is with rate α0, and similarly BR
S
0 (·) = α0
for the best periodic state-checking response. We reuse the best response for periodic
flipping strategies from the original model in [141] as follows:
BRP0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =

0, if α1 > α1[
0,
√
α1
2k0
]
, if α1 = α1√
α1
2k0
, if α1 < α1
(2.6)
where α1 =
1
2k0
. For periodic state checking, we consider two cases:
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• α0 ≥ α1: from (2.4) we compute the best response of α0 to α1 as
∂u0(α0, α1)
∂α0
=
pα1
2α20
− c0 = 0⇔ α0 = BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =
√
pα1
2c0
≥ α1
This is thus valid only when α1 ≤ p2c0 .
• α0 ≤ α1: since the derivative of u0 with respect to α0 is now
∂u0(α0, α1)
∂α0
=
p
2α1
− (c0 + k0p)
we can further divide this case to three sub-cases:
• p
2α1
− (c0 + k0p) > 0⇔ α1 < p
2(c0 + k0p)
: BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = α1
• p
2α1
− (c0 + k0p) = 0⇔ α1 = p
2(c0 + k0p)
: BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) ∈
[
0,
p
2(c0 + k0p)
]
• p
2α1
− (c0 + k0p) < 0⇔ α1 > p
2(c0 + k0p)
: BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = 0
We now combine these observations, this time by considering different values of α1:
• α1 ≥ p2c0 : for α0 ≥ α1, since
√
pα1
2c0
≤ α1, u0 decreases, thus it maximises at
α0 = α1. For α0 ≤ α1, since α1 ≥ p2c0 ≥
p
2(c0+k0p)
, u0 maximises at α0 = 0. Thus
in overall, BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = 0.
• p2(c0+k0p) < α1 <
p
2c0
: we consider two cases
– α0 ≤ α1: since α1 > p2(c0+k0p) , we have BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = 0 and u0 = 0.
– α0 ≥ α1: since BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =
√
pα1
2c0
we have the defender’s utility
u0 = p
1− α1
2
√
pα1
2c0
− c0√pα1
2c0
− pk0α1 = 0
⇔ α1∗ = p
c0 + k0p+
√
c0(c0 + 2k0p)
∈
[
p
2(c0 + k0p)
,
p
2c0
]
,
so that u0 < 0 (resp. u0 > 0) when α1 > α1
∗ (resp. α1 < α1∗).
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Compare these two subcases we may conclude that
BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =

0, if α1
∗ < α1 < p2c0
0 or
√
pα1
2c0
, if α1 = α1
∗√
pα1
2c0
, if p2(c0+k0p) < α1 < α1
∗
• α1 ≤ p2(c0+k0p) : again, two sub-cases exist:
– α0 ≥ α1: u0 maximises at α0 =
√
pα1
2c0
> α1
– α0 ≤ α1: u0 maximises at α0 = α1
Since u0 is continuous over α0, it thus maximises at
√
pα1
2c0
= BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1).
The above analysis concludes the defender’s utility function for state checking as
BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =

0, if α1 > α1
∗
0 or
√
pα1
2k0
, if α1 = α1
∗√
pα1
2k0
, if α1 < α1
∗
(2.7)
where α1
∗ = p
c0+k0p+
√
c0(c0+2k0p)
. To compare between BRP0 (Pα1 ∨Sα1) and BRS0 (Pα1 ∨
Sα1) we first notice that since c0 ≤ k0p/4, we also have α1∗ ≥ α1:
α1
∗ − α1 = p
c0 + k0p+
√
c0(c0 + 2k0p)
− 1
2k0
=
√
4c20 + 4c0k0p+ (k0p)
2 −
√
4c20 + 8c0k0p
2k20p
≥
√
4c20 + 4c0k0p+ 4c0(k0p)−
√
4c20 + 8c0k0p
2k20p
= 0
We are now ready to compare BRP0 and BR
S
0 for different choices of α1:
• α1 ≥ α1∗: since BRP0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = 0 and BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) = 0 or
√
pα1
2c0
, both
yielding 0 utility, and thus periodic state checking is as good as periodic flipping.
• α1 ≤ α1 < α1∗: since BRP0 (Pα1 ∨Sα1) = 0, thus periodic flipping achieves at most
0 utility, hence periodic state checking is preferred.
• α1 < α1: we compare the optimal utility between two types of strategies:
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– BRP0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =
√
α1
2k0
, the defender’s utility is:
u0 = 1− α1
2α0
− k0α0 = 1−
√
2k0α1
– BRS0 (Pα1 ∨ Sα1) =
√
pα1
2c0
, the defender’s utility is:
u∗0 = p
(
1− α1
2α0
)
− c0α0 − pk0α1 = p− k0pα1 −
√
2c0pα1
We then study the condition under which u∗0 ≥ u0:
u∗0 − u0 = p− 1 +
√
2α1(
√
k0 −√c0p)− k0pα1
≥ p− 1 +√2α1(
√
k0 −
√
k0
p
2
)− k0pα1 (2.8)
The right-hand side of (2.8) is non-negative if and only if α1 satisfies
1
2k0
min
(
1,
[
2(1− p)
p
]2)
≤ α1 ≤ 1
2k0
max
(
1,
[
2(1− p)
p
]2)
Since we only consider α1 < α1 = 1/(2k0), we thus conclude that u
∗
0 ≥ u0, that
is, periodic state checking is preferred, whenever α1 satisfies (2.5).
Corollary 2.2. Consider the game FlipIt(P ∪ S, P ∪ S) with the defender’s utility
function (2.4). Let α1 (resp. α1
∗) be the minimum value for the attacker’s move rate
α1 to drop a periodic-moving (resp. state-checking) defender from the game. Then,
α1
∗ ≥ α1 if and only if c0 ≤ k0p/4.
Discussions. Proposition 2.2 points out a simple condition under which the defender
would prefer state-checking over periodic flipping, involving only the costs of checking,
flipping and the checking effectiveness p. It also emphasises in (2.5) that state-checking
is only efficient against frequently active attackers. Otherwise, if the attacker infre-
quently interacts with the resource, then by assumption A2 the defender receives little
information to improve its chance of attack detection, thus periodic flipping would be
more desirable even if it is excessively expensive. The need for c0 ≤ k0/4 is further
strengthened by Corollary 2.2 which addresses the situation when the attacker plays
too fast, e.g., α1 > 1/(2k0), and periodic moving cannot afford for positive payoff, lead-
ing to the system being indefensible [141]. This issue becomes more realistic when the
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attacker is given chances to perform state checking, since in the information security
realm, the attacker’s state checking can be inexpensive, e.g., reconnecting to backdoors,
re-logging in with stolen passwords, etc. In this case, periodic state checking is more
robust as they survive higher attack rates.
Another intrinsic part of Proposition 2.2 is its implication over what is the right
cost for state checking. Indeed, flipping in security often involves procedures with
high certainty (system reset, backup restores, failovers, etc.), hence their costs are
normally determined rather than decided. In contrast, an organisation may choose to
invest arbitrarily in administering its security, for example through guard patrolling,
antivirus software, firewalls, etc., subject to how much it desires the situation to be
in control. While the goal is to satisfy the condition c0 ≤ pk0/4, it is hindered by
an inherent constraint that p typically decreases/increases with c0, that is, less efforts
for state checking yields less certainty on its effectiveness. We study this issue by
modelling the connection between c0 and p, along with an environment parameter v > 0
specifying how effectively the amount c0 might be spent. For example, this parameter
may deteriorate as the resource becomes increasingly more sophisticated. On the other
hand, it may increase with the skills of the team performing state checking. We model
p as the function of c0, parameterised by v in the following way
pv(c0) = 1− 1
vc0 + 1
. (2.9)
It is not difficult to see that, by modelling the probability of successful state checking
as in (2.9), the value 1/v represents the cost required for detection of attacks to succeed
with a fair coin-flipping chance, i.e., 50%. Note that this does not mean state checking
with cost c0 ≤ 1/v can be replaced by “coin-flipping detection” of attacks, as it may
violate assumption A1 to create many false positives, and hence waste moves would
become a credible threat to the net utility. We now analyse the threshold under which
the cost for state checking suggests it to overpower merely periodic flipping strategies.
Corollary 2.3. Consider the game FlipIt(P ∪S, P ∪S) with the defender’s utility func-
tion (2.4), where p satisfies (2.9). Then, if c0 ≤ k0/4−1/v and α1 ≥ 12k0 min
[
1, 4
(c0v)2
]
,
it is better for the defender to perform periodic state checking.
From the threshold for state-checking cost given in Corollary 2.3, we may also
evaluate whether state checking is at all justifiable given specific characteristics of
the environments. Indeed, if the productivity of information security is too low, i.e.,
v ≤ 4/k0, the use of state checking in most cases would not improve the overall utility,
as too much cost is required to produce little benefit. This refers to situations when
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there is a mismatch between the scope of the resource being administered, and of the
team performing administration, which means either the resource is too complex, or
the administration is immature. In turn, such situations may apply to fast-growing
organisations with slower catching-up with technology as well as security evaluation.
Another example is with small to medium-sized firms whose businesses strongly rely
on information systems, as many of them would spend little research in foreseeing the
non-trivial impact of low security administration to the net income.
In overall, Corollary 2.3 recommends firms not just about hiring an administration
team with highest quality-price ratio, but also to spend their concerns on easing the
administration of their resource. In reality, the latter can be accomplished in a variety
of ways, such as removing redundant components, restructuring the system toward
simplification, avoiding complicated dependencies using separation of duties, etc. Oth-
erwise, even the most desirable administration team might still be insufficient for a
positive return on investment.
2.6 Hardening Control over Time
Besides reactive measures such as state checking and moving, a proactive concern is on
how to prevent losses of control from happening. In many cases this is more desirable
because it is possible that consequences from attacks might have been overlooked, and
thus it is better that attacks are prevented given the current realisation of potential
losses. In the context of FlipIt, it may mean, for example, preventing a player from
participating in the game, or to stop it after the game has run for some time. Follow-
ing the analysis of the original FlipIt game, as well as those involving state checking
strategies, it is not difficult to see that in order for a player to stop its opponent from
participating in the game, it needs to play quick enough. Assume in the best case that
state checking succeeds with probability p = 1, and based on the best response func-
tions for periodic moving (2.6) and periodic state checking (2.7), player i should pick
a strategy Pαi or Sαi with αi exceeding the following threshold in order to discourage
the opponent’s moves altogether:
αthresholdi = max
(
1
2k−i
,
k−i + c−i −
√
c−i(2k−i + c−i)
k2−i
)
.
While this is desirable, it is sometimes infeasible to play fast enough if the state
checking or moving costs are high. A different preventive approach for a player is to
somehow make it increasingly more difficult for its opponent to take over the resource
over time. When the level of difficulty reaches some threshold, its opponent will au-
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t
−k1,0 −k1,1 −k1,2 −k1,3 −k1,4
t0
t1
0
check
move
harden
−c0 −(c0 + k0 + h0)
Figure 2.3: A FlipIt(H,P ) game with the attacker’s flipping cost over time k1,i < k1,i+1.
tomatically cease playing, and thus resulting in a long-term benefit for the player. In
FlipIt type of games, this can be modelled by having a player spending an additional
periodic hardening cost hi every time it regains control, so that the opponent would
have to spend more and more whenever trying to take over the resource. In particular,
we define a new class of strategies, called periodic hardening, denoted by
H = {Hα,h|α, h > 0}
where Hαi,hi represents player i’s strategy in which it performs state checking at rate
αi and every time it regains control, player i also spends a cost of hi to make subse-
quent take-overs by the opponent more difficult/costly (Figure 2.3). This cost hi could
feature, for example, some penetration testing process that results in vulnerabilities
being patched, similar to that modelled in [23]. It modifies the net utility of player i
who performs state checking with hardening as follows, with mi(t) being the number
of state checks occurred prior to t:
Bi(t) = Gi(t)− (ki + hi)ni(t)− cimi(t).
Our focus in the section is to study how the defender may efficiently spend the
budget for control hardening in response to the attacker’s strategy. Because of the
hardening process which aims at stopping the attacker’s moves/flips at some point in
time, players’ expected utilities do not remain the same over time, and thus the use of
average benefit as players’ preferences over outcomes does not accurately reflect reality.
It is rather suggestive that we represent such preferences via either players’ net benefit
or net loss over a finite time interval (long enough to practically capture “infinity”).
The following result establishes the net loss of the defender, which entails the cost of
all security operations and the loss of control over the resource (to the attacker). We
inherently use this as the defender’s “utility” in order to capture its preferences over
the set of hardening strategies H.
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Lemma 2.2. Consider the game FlipIt(H,P )4. Let (Hα0,h0 , Pα1) ∈ H×P be an action
profile, and s be the number of effective5 moves/flips that the attacker makes following
(Hα0,h0 , Pα1). The defender’s expected net loss at time t ≥ (s+ 1) max( 1α0 , 1α1 ) is:
L0(t) = G(α0, α1, t) +

s
[
1
2α0
+ k0 + h0
]
if α0 ≥ α1, or
s
[(
1− α0
2α1
)
1
α0
+ k0 + h0
]
+ z(s, α0, α1) otherwise,
for some function G independent of s, and z such that for all s, s′ ∈ N+ it holds that
|z(s)− z(s′)| ≤ α0
6α21
.
Proof. We first notice that the defender’s net loss comes from several factors: the loss
of control over the resource, the cost of state checking, the cost of moving, and the cost
of hardening. We compute such loss in two cases:
• α0 ≥ α1: this also implies δ0 = 1/α0 ≤ 1/α1 = δ1. Let t1 ∈ [0, δ1] be the
first moment when the attacker makes a move/state-check. We use the same ar-
gument as in (2.2) to show that the defender’s expected control time within
[t1 + iδ1, t1 + (i+ 1)δ1] is δ1(1 − r/2) for i ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1} and r = α1/α0.
This means that the defender’s expected loss in control time over the period
[t1, t1 + sδ1] is
Lcontrol0 = s
(
δ1 − δ1
(
1− r
2
))
= s
(
δ1 − δ1
(
1− α1
2α0
))
=
s
2α0
On the other hand, the defender’s expected number of state-checks over the same
period is Lcheck0 = sδ1α0c = s
α0
α1
c. Because each period of the form [t1 + iδ1, t1 +
(i+1)δ1] is preceded by a state-check (and move if necessary) by the attacker, such
period starts by the attacker’s control over the resource, i.e., C1(t1 + iδ1) = 1.
Also, since δ0 ≤ δ1, it is guaranteed that within such period the defender will
certainly perform a state-check, and subsequently a move/flip. Despite (possibly)
many state-checks, only one move would be made by the defender within this
period. Therefore, the total number of defender’s moves/flips within [t1, t1 + sδ1]
is s, and thus its loss due to moving/flipping is Lflip0 = k0s. Finally, the same
argument yields the loss due to hardening, which is Lharden0 = h0s. The defender’s
4Since our main focus is on the defender’s strategies, in this section we omit the attacker’s state-
checking strategies since Sα1 and Pα1 bring identical effect to the defender’s utility.
5By effective move we mean a move that results in a change of control from one player to another.
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net loss within [t1, t1 + sδ1] is
Lcontrol0 + L
check
0 + L
flip
0 + L
harden
0 = s
[
1
2α0
+ k0 + h0 + c0
α0
α1
]
(2.10)
Taking the expected value of the above over the choice of t1 yields the same value
as it does not depend on t1. For the defender’s loss over other time periods, i.e.,
[0, t1) and (t1 + sδ1, t), we notice that they end and start with the defender’s
control of the resource, respectively. In other words, C0(t
′) = 0 for t′ < t1 or
t′ > t1 + sδ1. Also, since the attacker makes no move within these periods, the
defender’s expected loss is only in the cost of state checking, i.e.,
g(t1, α0, α1, t) = c0(t1 + t− sδ1)α0 = c0(t1 + t− s
α1
)α0
Due to uniformly random phase selection in the attacker’s first move/state-check,
the defender’s expected net loss before the attacker’s first move and after its last
move is :∫ δ1
0
1
δ1
g(t1, α0, α1, t)dt = c0tα0 +
c0α0
2α1
− c0sα0
α1
= G(α0, α1, t)− c0sα0
α1
.
Summing the above with (2.10) we get the lemma statement for α0 ≥ α1.
• α0 < α1: this also implies δ0 = 1/α0 > 1/α1 = δ1. We first notice that because
t ≥ (s + 1) max(δ0, δ1), the number of defender’s moves is exactly s in response
to s flips by the attacker. Hence the expected loss due to flipping, state-checking,
and hardening are the same as before, i.e.,
k0s+ tc0α0 + h0s (2.11)
Let t0 be the first moment the defender performs a state-check. We notice that
within [0, t0] the attacker moves/flips at most once because the defender’s first
move is at t0, meaning that there are at least s − 1 attacker’s moves after t0.
Therefore, using the same argument as in (2.2) we may infer that the defender’s
expected loss in control time between its two consecutive state-check [t0 +iδ0, t0 +
(i+ 1)δ0] for i ∈ [0, s− 2] is δ0(1− α02α1 ). The defender’s expected loss in control
time within [t0, t0 + (s− 1)δ0] is thus
(s− 1)δ0
(
1− α0
2α1
)
=
s− 1
α0
(
1− α0
2α1
)
. (2.12)
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Next we consider the defender’s expected loss within the interval [t0+(s−1)δ0, t0+
sδ0]. Unlike previous intervals of the same length, an attacker’s move does not
occur in this interval with certainty. Indeed, if the attacker makes a move before
t0, then it has already finished s moves before reaching this interval. We thus
only consider the case in which the attacker does not move before t0, which also
means that t0 ∈ [0, δ1] and that the attacker’s first move is t1 ∈ [t0, δ1]. This
allows us to capture the loss of control in [t0 +(s−1)δ0, t0 +sδ0] by the following:
z(s, α0, α1) =
∫ δ1
0
1
δ0
∫ δ1
t0
1
δ1
(
sδ0 + t0 −
(
t1 +
⌈
(s− 1)δ0 + t0 − t1
δ1
⌉
δ1
))
dt1dt0
(2.13)
where t1 +
⌈
(s−1)δ0+t0−t1
δ1
⌉
δ1 is the first attacker’s flip/state check within [t0 +
(s − 1)δ0, t0 + sδ0]. It is not difficult to see that z(s, α0, α1) is bounded by the
following expressions, to which their difference is:
1
δ0δ1
∫ δ1
0
∫ δ1
t0
(δ0 + t0 − t1) dt1dt0 − 1
δ0δ1
∫ δ1
0
∫ δ1
t0
(δ0 − t1) dt1dt0 = δ
2
1
6δ0
=
α0
6α21
The remaining interval to be considered is [0, t0]. It is easy to see that the
defender’s expected loss within this interval is independent of s, and hence we
denote it as Lcontrol0 (t0) > 0. Based on (2.11) and (2.12) define G as
G(α0, α1, t) = L
control
0 (t0)−
1
α0
(
1− α0
2α1
)
+ tc0α0
and we thus succeed in constructing G and z that satisfy the lemma for α0 < α1.
In the next step we model the correlation between the hardening cost and the num-
ber of attacks that would eventually happen. Such correlation captures the effectiveness
of the hardening process, and is vital to measuring the optimal hardening cost in any
situation. Particularly, the value of s is influenced by the attacker’s benefit from a
move, the original move cost, and the hardening cost. We model the relation among
these variable by a a cost update function f , such that at the i-th attack (attacker’s
move), the attack cost becomes f(k1, h0, i − 1). Attacker’s moves/flips stop at the
(s+ 1)-th attempt if the cost involved is greater than the attacker’s expected control,
which is expressed below.
Lemma 2.3. Consider the game FlipIt(H,P ). Let Hα0,h0 and Pα1 be strategies of
the defender and attacker, respectively. Let f be a cost update function such that the
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attacker’s move cost after i moves is f(k1, h0, i). Suppose that the attacker stops at
the first attack of which the cost is greater than the expected gain, then the attacker’s
actual number of moves is minimum s such that :
f(k1, h0, s) ≥
δ0/2 if α0 ≥ α1, orδ0 − δ1/2− z(s, α0, α1) + z(s+ 1, α0, α1) otherwise, (2.14)
where z is same as in Lemma 2.2.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the same line as that of Lemma 2.2. Consider
the case α0 ≥ α1. The attacker’s (s+ 1)-th attack/move/flip is followed by the period
[t1 + sδ1, t1 + (s + 1)δ1], where t1 is the time of the attacker’s first move. Because
δ0 = 1/α0 < 1/α1 = δ1 and due to uniformly random phase, the attacker’s expected
control time would be δ0/2 based on (2.2). This proves to the lemma statement for
α0 ≥ α1. For the case α0 < α1 we notice from the proof of Lemma 2.2 that within
the period [t0 + (s− 1)δ0, t0 + sδ0] the attacker’s expected control time is z(s, α0, α1).
However without limit on attacks it should normally be δ0− δ1/2 following (2.2). This
means that δ0−δ1/2−z(s, α0, α1) is the attacker’s expected control time resulted from
the (s+1)-th attack within the same time interval. However, the (s+1)-th attack may
also occur in the next interval, i.e., [t0+sδ0, t0+(s+1)δ0], which yields z(s+1, α0, α1) as
the attacker’s expected control time. Summing up the two expressions give the lemma
statement for α0 < α1.
In reality, the structure of f strongly depends on how control of the resource can
be hardened. For demonstration, we consider two distinct examples of constructions
for f as below:
f1(k1, h0, i) = k1 + iλh0 and f2(k1, h0, i) = k1 + i
µh0
h0 + λ
. (2.15)
The former construction captures a linear relation between the hardening cost and the
attack cost, with λ ≥ 0 being the effectiveness of the hardening process. In the context
of information security, this happens, for instance when the resource contains a large
number of identical but also independent subsystems, so that the control becomes more
secure as more subsystems are hardened. In that case, the attacker would only control
the resource if it manages to compromise most (if not all) of these subsystems. A real-
world example of such resource is a multi-party system used for secret-sharing [118].
The attacker might only get the secret if it compromises most of parties involved in
the secret-sharing scheme. The latter construction f2 follows an idea similar to that
from Gordon and Loeb [63], in which the cost of attack is also raised (f ′2(h0) > 0),
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but at a decreasing rate (f ′′2 (h0) < 0). In other words, it becomes increasingly difficult
to raise attack cost as security approaches optimality. The continuous decrease in the
increasing rate implies an upperbound on the maximum achievable attack cost. This
is facilitated by µ ≥ 0, the maximum increase in attack cost after each attack, whereas
λ > 0 represents the effectiveness of the hardening process. Construction f2 also agrees
with [24] and [23] which suggest a weakest-link model in which attack cost increases
linearly to the number of steps. This means that optimisation of security is more
effective if it is done over many steps/attacks because the defender receives information
that would be useful for the hardening process: the exploited vulnerabilities. We
express this property of f2 in the lemma below, in which the former statement indicates
that knowledge about exploited vulnerabilities makes the process of hardening easier,
whereas the latter signifies that such knowledge also contributes directly to increasing
the attack cost.
Lemma 2.4. Let f2(k1, h0, i) = k1 + i
µh0
h0+λ
, then for all k1, h, h
′, µ, λ ∈ R+ and i, i′ ∈
N+ then the following hold:
f2(k1, h, i) = f2(k1, h
′, i′) ∧ i > i′ =⇒ i′ ∂f2
∂h0
(h, i) > i
∂f2
∂h0
(h′, i′) ∧ h < h′ (2.16)
h · i = h′ · i′ ∧ i > i′ =⇒ f2(k1, h, i) > f2(k1, h′, i′) (2.17)
Proof. We prove the first statement by showing that h < h′. Indeed,
f2(k1, h, i) = f2(k1, h
′, i′) ∧ i > i′ ⇒ i µh
h+ λ
= i′
µh′
h′ + λ
∧ i > i′ ⇒ µh
h+ λ
<
µh′
h′ + λ
However, µh0h0+λ is increasing in h0 since its derivative is
λµ
(h0+λ)2
> 0, and hence h < h′.
The other part of the first statement follows straightforwardly:
i′
∂f2
∂h0
(h, i) = i′i
λµ
(h+ λ)2
> i′i
λµ
(h′ + λ)2
= i
∂f2
∂h0
(h′, i′)
The second statement is also straightforward, as hi = h′i′ and i > i′ implies h < h′,
therefore
f2(k1, h, i) = k1 + i
µh
h+ λ
= k1 + i
′ µh′
h+ λ
> k1 + i
′ µh′
h′ + λ
= f2(k1, h
′, i′).
Next we study the optimal hardening strategy of the defender given its chosen rate
of assessment α0 as well as that other attacker, i.e., α1. We give two results respectively
for our two construction of cost update function f1 and f2.
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Proposition 2.3. Consider the game FlipIt(H, P ) with cost update function f1(k1, h0, i) =
k1 + iλh0. Let α0 and α1 be the rates of chosen by the defender and the attacker, re-
spectively. The defender’s optimal choice of h0 is such that the attacker stops after at
most one attack.
Proof. Let B(s, α0, α1) := RHS((2.14)) denote the right-hand side of (2.14). In this
case B(s, α0, α1) is the attacker’s expected gain as the result of the s-th attack/move.
Suppose that s is the number of attacker’s moves, then
f1(k1, h1, s) ≥ B ⇐⇒ k1 + sλh0 ≥ B ⇐⇒ h0 ≥ B − k1
λs
From the expression of the defender’s expected net loss as in Lemma 2.2 it is easy to
see that the defender should select h0 =
B−k1
λs as the optimal hardening cost given
s. Consider a different number of attacker’s moves s′ > s with corresponding optimal
hardening cost h′0 =
B−k1
λs′ . Consider the case α0 ≥ α1, we have
∂L(t)
∂s
=
∂
(
G(α0, α1, t) + s
[
1
2α0
+ k + B−k1λs
])
∂s
=
1
2α0
+ k0 > 0
Therefore it is optimal that s = 1 and h0 =
B−k1
λ . For the case α0 < α1 we have
L0(t, s
′)− L0(t, s) = (s′ − s)
[
2α1 − α0
α1α0
+ k0
]
+ h′0s
′ − h0s+ z(s′, α0, α1)− z(s, α0, α1)
= (s′ − s)
[
2α1 − α0
α1α0
+ k0
]
+ z(s′, α0, α1)− z(s, α0, α1)
≥ (s′ − s)2α0 − α0
α21
+ z(s′, α0, α1)− z(s, α0, α1)
≥ (s′ − s) α0
6α21
+ z(s′, α0, α1)− z(s, α0, α1)
≥ α0
6α21
− α0
6α21
= 0
This again concludes that it is optimal for the defender to pick h0 such that s = 1, in
which case h0 =
B−k1
λ .
Proposition 2.4. Consider the game FlipIt(H,P ) with cost update function f2(k1, h0, i) =
k1 + i
µh0
h0+λ
. Let α0 and α1 be the rates chosen by the defender and the attacker, respec-
tively. Define the following:
na =
RHS((2.14))− k1
µ
and L∗ = k0 +
1
α0
max
(
1
2
, 1− α0
2α1
)
.
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Assume that z(s, α0, α1) is identical
6 for all s ∈ N+, the following hold:
• the number of attacker’s moves is at least dnae.
• the optimal hardening cost is
h0 =
naλ
s− na where s =
⌈
na +
1
2
(√
L∗ + 4n2aλ√
L∗
− 1
)⌉
(2.18)
is the corresponding number of attacks.
Proof. Let B(s, α0, α1) := RHS((2.14)) we formulate the number of attacks s:
f2(k1, h0, s) ≥ B ⇐⇒ k1 + s µh0
h0 + λ
≥ B =⇒ s =
⌈
(B − k1)(h0 + λ)
µh0
⌉
Note that similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3, it is optimal to choose h0 such that
the above satisfies and that s ∈ N+. The minimum number of attacker’s moves is:
lim
h0→∞
s(h0) = lim
h0→∞
⌈
(λ+ h0)(B − k1)
µh0
⌉
=
⌈
B − k1
µ
⌉
= dnae
For the second statement of the proposition, we notice that
L0(h0, t) = G(α0, α1, t)+(h0+L
∗)
⌈
(λ+ h0)na
h0
⌉
+
0 if α0 ≥ 0, orz(s, α0, α1) otherwise. (2.19)
which is minimised when h0 = (λ + h0)na/m, or equivalently h0 =
λna
m−na for some
positive integer m ≥ dnae due to the fact that l′(h0) < 0 for l(h0) = (λ+h0)nah0 . In this
case, m is the number of the attacker’s moves. Minimisation of L0(h0, t) over h0 ∈ R+
is equivalent to minimisation of the following over m ∈ N+:
L0(m) = (h0(m) + L∗)m = m
(
λna
m− na + L
∗
)
.
Since L′0(m) = L∗ − n
2
aλ
(m−na)2 with m ∈ R has at most two roots, L0(m) has at most
one globally minimum point. A solution m∗ ∈ R+ of the equation L0(m) = L0(m+ 1)
would (if exists) allows minimisation of L0(m) at m = dm∗e ∈ N+. We thus proceed
6 We assume this in order to simplify the result and proof. Later on in the discussion we will
reconcile the result with the fact that z(s, α0, α1) is not identical for all s ∈ N+, which in fact will point
out interesting insights.
6This loss includes the attacker’s occupation of the resource and the cost spent on protecting the
resource.
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to compute m in the following
L0(m∗) = c0(m∗ + 1)⇐⇒ m∗
(
λna
m∗ − na + L
∗
)
= (m∗ + 1)
(
λna
m∗ + 1− na + L
∗
)
⇐⇒ n
2
aλ
(m∗ − na)(m∗ + 1− na) − L
∗ = 0
⇐⇒ m∗ = na + 1
2
(
±
√
L∗ + 4n2aλ√
L∗
− 1
)
=⇒ m = dm∗e =
⌈
na +
1
2
(√
L∗ + 4n2aλ√
L∗
− 1
)⌉
which completes the proof of Proposition 2.4. Note that we only take the greater
solution of m∗ because limm→±∞ L0(m) = ±∞ implies that the greater solution of m∗
is the minimum point whereas the other is the maximum point.
Discussions. The above propositions stress a need for appropriate decision over the
investment for hardening the resource control. In information security, hardening may
mean, for example, system patching, penetration testing, adding security layers, etc.
Proposition 2.3 suggests that when the attack cost can be raised linearly to the hard-
ening cost, then it is best for the defender to spend enough in improving security (after
a breach) of the resource once and for all, so that attacks no longer occurs. In the
provided example, this means hardening all involved subsystems even if only some of
them were breached in the previous incident. This is due to the fact that the effec-
tiveness of hardening remains constant over time, and thus the sooner it is done the
better. On the other hand, Proposition 2.4 provides different insights into the effects
of non-linear cost update function f2 on hardening strategies. First of all, Proposition
2.4 assumes the homogeneity of z(s, α0, α1) over s ∈ N+. While the expression of z is
given in (2.13), it essentially captures the potential advantage of the defender in terms
of “better-than-uniform” knowledge about the attacker’s phase, which was chosen at
uniformly random before the game. Indeed, if the defender’s phase is t0 ∈ [0, δ1], and
if a state check at t0 does not reveal an attack, then the defender can infer that the
attacker’s phase is t1 ∈ [t0, δ1] rather than t1 ∈ [0, δ1]. By allowing homogeneity of
z(s, α0, α1) over s, Proposition 2.4 provides optimal hardening strategies whilst ignor-
ing the advantage of “better-than-uniform” knowledge. It consequently allows us to
emphasise the effect of such knowledge to hardening strategies, which we demonstrate
in Figure 2.4. This figure points out three important insights:
• By increasing the bound µ, the defender tends to perform more aggressive hard-
ening and aims at stopping sooner. One may think of µ as an indicator of the
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Figure 2.4: Example number of attacks under optimal hardening strategies taking into
account (red plot) and ignoring (blue plot) z(s, α0, α1), given parameters α0 =
1
15 , α1 =
1
14.5 , k0 = 2, k1 = 0.1, with (a) λ = 0.3 and µ ∈ [1, 5], or (b) µ = 1 and λ ∈ [0, 5].
potential of the hardening process, in which case the figure agrees with the fact
that the defender should “squeeze” such potential as much as possible to stop
attacks as soon as possible.
• By raising the parameter λ, the defender becomes more relax and tends to prolong
the hardening process, thus suffering from more attacks. As an explanation, we
notice that λ has significant contribution to the effectiveness of hardening at low
hardening cost h0. This can be thought of as “boost” in security improvement at
the beginning of every step, and starts to fade as more is invested. Such a boost
is mainly due to discovery of a vulnerability following an exploit/breach, which
in this case is the attacker’s move.
• The knowledge about attacker’s phase as represented by z(s, α0, α1) has consid-
erable effects on the optimal hardening strategies, which in this case results in
the number of attacks being reduced in many cases.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate the concern on the choices of long-term strategic security
plans for protecting organisational assets. These choices are represented by questions
such as “are we vulnerable?” and “are we compromised?” This concern has become
increasingly more important for large businesses as well as governmental units in the
era where attackers are advanced, and have the resources to be persistent. To do so,
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we extend the FlipIt game between an attacker and a defender periodically taking
over a resource from each other, with the trade-off between the cost of taking over,
and the duration of the control. In our model, in addition from taking over, we allow
players to check who is controlling the resource. We compare between blind take-over
strategies and those that involve “check first, then take over”, and show a threshold
for the checking cost, under which the latter tactic is preferred.
In further extensions, we study strategic plans on how organisations would ratio-
nally invest in security improvement to discourage attackers. Our analysis on specific
models proposed suggests that there are cases in which a system must suffer from many
attacks to become sufficiently secure to deter attackers. In reality, this is because secu-
rity breaches serve as valuable information for improving system security. In another
aspect, we relax our hidden assumption so that state checking might be incorrect, and
study not just the frequency of security assessment, but also how quality-price-ratio
may even discourage assessment of security. Since our models mostly deal with the de-
fender’s utility, the lessons learned may apply to not just advanced persistent threats
(APTs), but also a pool of non-persistent threats that occurs with known frequency,
e.g., from a community of underground hackers.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Information Sharing in
Competitive Environments
In this chapter, we study incentives behind investments by competing companies in
discovery of their security vulnerabilities and sharing of their findings. Specifically,
we consider a game between competing firms that utilise a common platform in their
systems, where the goal is to unveil and fix vulnerabilities of this platform. The game
consists of two stages: firms must decide how much to invest in researching vulnerabil-
ities, and thereafter, how much of their findings to share with their competitors. We
fully characterise the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this game, and translate
them into realistic insights about firms’ strategies. Further, we develop a monetary-
free sharing mechanism that encourages both investment and sharing, a missing feature
when sharing is arbitrary or opportunistic. This is achieved via a light-handed medi-
ator: it receives a set of discovered bugs from each firm and moderate the sharing in
a way that eliminates firms’ concerns on losing competitive advantages. This research
provides an understanding of the origins of inefficiency and paves the path towards
more efficient sharing of cyber-intelligence among private companies.
3.1 Introduction
Businesses across different sectors of the economy, from telecommunication and finance
to energy, healthcare and transportation, increasingly rely on cyberspace and IT ser-
vices. Past incidents of cyber-attacks and consequent damages have left little doubt in
the minds of business managers and policy makers about the importance of investment
in cyber-security. Gathering and exchange of security intelligence is identified as a key
factor in enhancing the effectiveness of individual cyber-security measures.
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Steps have been taken by governments to provide the environments to galvanise
and coordinate exchange of cyber-security information across private companies: UK
launched the “cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership” [117] after a pilot pro-
gram in 2011/12 as a “joint, collaborative initiative between industry and government
to share cyber threat and vulnerability information in order to increase overall situa-
tional awareness of the cyber threat”. In the US, the “National Coordinating Center
for Communications (NCC)” acts as the “Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC)” for telecommunications [108].
While “Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)” – such as Information
Technology (IT)-ISAC and Financial Services (FS)-ISAC – can provide the platform for
exchange of cyber-intelligence, the role of incentives cannot be ignored. Providing the
means of communication in the presence of strategic and competing profit-maximising
entities does not necessarily lead to exchange of their cyber-security information. In
order to understand the incentives of firms in creating and sharing information secu-
rity knowledge, it is important to identify the distinct nature of the security infor-
mation being shared. Some example categories of the type of cyber-intelligence to be
shared are: (a) steps, protocols and measures a firm has taken to improve its secu-
rity; (b) past incidents of successful or unsuccessful attacks and the resulting privacy,
intellectual property and financial losses; and (c) discovered security vulnerabilities.
Sharing each of these types of information have specific incentive implications. For
instance, “public disclosure” of security breach incidents can harm the consumers and
investors’ confidence and lead to a statistically significant decreases in the market value
of firms [29,34,60]. In this work, we particularly focus on the third type of information:
sharing discovered security vulnerabilities, or bugs for short.
From the societal point of view, sharing knowledge of security vulnerabilities among
firms is a positive move: it improves the overall efficiency of discovery efforts of the
vulnerabilities. It moreover enhances the cyber protection of an entire industry against
future cyber-attacks by reducing the common exploitable threats. It is often the case
that different organisations of an economic sector bear similar vulnerabilities and face
similar threats in their information systems [90]. This is partly due to the adoption of
common implementations, libraries or operating systems across different organisation.
For instance, the Heartbleed bug (formally, CVE-2014-0160), a buffer-over-read vul-
nerability in the OpenSSL cryptographic library exposed in April 2014, affects around
half a million certificates issued by trusted certificate authorities [102]. Another reason
why different technological companies face common threats is the incorporation of dis-
covered vulnerabilities into hacking toolkits which enables even less sophisticated users
to configure the same malware to attack across different organisations [90].
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Recognising the need for cyber-protection, different companies invest in finding
their security vulnerabilities. These can be “bugs” for example in their application
level software, operating system or implementation of a network protocol, which we
will generally refer to as the common platform. No company knows exactly how many
bugs there are in a software they are using. More investment and effort in security
research increases the chances of discovering them, but there is always a factor of
luck involved. Each company patches and rectifies the vulnerabilities it finds, which
is usually the much easier part than finding them in the first place. Each bug that
is not discovered by a company, and hence not rectified, is potentially exploitable by
cyber-attackers.
When a bug is indeed successfully exploited, the victim suffers direct losses. These
can include outage of their service, recovery costs, losses of important data, user com-
pensation, legal fines, etc. However, a company may also be affected by incidents of
cyber-attacks on other companies in that economic sector: On one hand, the whole
sector of economy may suffer a blow: as customers may lose confidence in the whole
“service” and seek alternative “safer” means. For instance, if one or a few major online
banking companies are hit by a cyber-attack, then some customers may lose confidence
in the whole sector and switch to traditional banking altogether. Moreover, investors
and stock holders may too lose confidence in the whole industry in favour of alternative
options for investment. These two effects translate to a net market value loss of the
whole sector, which bites all of the companies upon a successful attack on anyone of
them. However, on the other hand, if (and once) a bug is exploited in competitor(s)
that a company has discovered before (and has hence taken care of), it can have the op-
posite effect of boosting the confidence of customers as well as the investors: customers
may switch to use and investors redirect their capital to the “safer” company. In other
words, discovering a bug in a common software may give a company a “competitive
edge” compared to others.
The two effects work in the opposite direction of each other in terms of incentives for
sharing the found vulnerabilities. The sharing strategies, in turn, affect the investment
decisions to discover the bugs in the first place: On the one hand, sharing information
translates to a more effective discovery process and hence encourages investment, as
the findings of one company is fortified by another’s since the process of finding the
bugs is probabilistic in nature. But on the other hand, there can be a tendency of
free-riding on the discovery investment of other companies and hence get away with
less investment. Further complicating the problem is the presence of uncertainty and
information asymmetry: companies ought to make their discovery investment decisions
in the face of uncertainties about the total number of bugs, and they need to make
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decision about sharing of their findings not knowing the number of findings of the other
company.
This chapter is organised as follows: In Section 3.3, we model the interdependent
security research investment and information sharing decisions of two strategic and
competing firms as a two stage Bayesian game. We fully determine the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria of the game in closed-form in Section 3.4. Specifically, in Subsection 3.4.1,
we derive the Bayesian equilibrium strategies of the firms about sharing of their finding
for a given investment pair, and given their findings. In particular, we establish that
sharing strategies are unique and dominant strategies in the simple forms of “full-
sharing” or “no sharing”, completely determined by the competitive nature of the
security findings. In Subsection 3.4.2, we derive the investment strategies of the firms
knowing their subsequent sharing strategies. We show how “full sharing” leads to free-
riding and inefficiently low investments. Also how “no sharing” is socially inefficient
by preventing mutual benefit of sharing, double-efforts and potential over-investment.
Finally, in Section 3.5, we provide a light-weight mediation mechanism free of monetary-
transfers that enable (partial) sharing of the information when the firms fail to achieve
any sharing on their own.
3.2 Related Work
Information sharing in general has appeared very early in modern economic research,
particularly on trade associations (e.g. in [52,136,143]) where the effect of information
sharing is captured as improvement in the efficiency of production, i.e., reducing the
marginal cost of production, or improving demand, or both. On the other hand, affects
of security and security breaches on organisations also receive extensive attention from
academics with different focus, for example, privacy [36], data integrity [8], password
security [154], and secure applications [139]. In a seminal work, Gordon and Loeb [63]
present a model for optimising security investment, taking into account potential loss
due to security breaches on different vulnerabilities.
Information sharing in the context of cyber-security is investigated in several notable
works. As an example, Gordon et al. [64] consider a game in which two firms must
decide how much to invest in security and how much information to share. Their work
examine incentives to information sharing, as well as how it affects both expenditures
in security and the overall level of security in presence of freeriding alongside cross-
firm cooperation. In an extension, Gal-Or and Ghose [53] study the effects of the
same problem, however on competing firms trying to sell their products. Here they
add to the firms’ strategies a choice of product price after investment of security and
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information sharing. With such model their work produce several implications on how
information sharing and security investment affect demands and price competition on
firms. Another recent work is by Liu et al. [89] with a focus on designing an information
sharing network such as FS-ISAC that encourage firms to participate, using mechanisms
such as member fees and insurance plans. Other works also exist, e.g., by Xiong and
Chen [147] for repeated games, Hausken [71], and Gao et al. [54] on games between the
social planner, firms and the attacker.
Our contributions. As a common feature among aforementioned models, there is
no specification of the type of security information to be shared. The decision of how
much information to share is modelled as a normalised continuous variable between zero
and one, zero corresponding to no sharing and one corresponding to full sharing. Also,
these works consider investment on perimeters/mechanisms that harden the security
of firms’ information infrastructures.
In contrast, we consider the question of how much firms should invest security re-
search, i.e., gaining information about the security of their platforms. An example of
such investment is by Google, especially on its Project Zero [50]. The reason why firms
(especially large ones) should make such investment is rather obvious. As outstanding
targets for zero-day exploits [97], large firms should actively uncover their vulnerabil-
ities instead of waiting for the community which largely involve potential attackers.
Nevertheless, this type of investment is more connected to information sharing, as such
research results can be shared among firms that utilise the same platforms (e.g., Linux
OS, Apache web server). Indeed, the relation between security investments and infor-
mation sharing is rather loose in the previous literature. For instance, the effective
amount of shared information is heuristically chosen as the product of the investment
decision and sharing decision [64].
In order to meaningfully capture sharing of information and connection investment,
we do not model information by the [0,1] scale as in other works, but as the discovered
security vulnerabilities by each player, and hence, the sharing decisions in our model is
the “number” of bugs to be shared. Our work specifically models the relation between
the investment strategies for “generation” of security information (via security research)
and that of sharing them. Moreover, we develop a mediation mechanism that enables
sharing in the face of competition as a novel contribution.
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3.3 Model
Our model considers a game between firm i and firm j, denoted by N = {i, j}, where
each decides how much to invest in security research on a common “platform”, and
subsequently how many of their found security vulnerabilities to share with the other.
The platform has an unknown number of security vulnerabilities, or “bugs”, which,
if not discovered and rectified, may be exploited with ramifications for both firms.
Before the game starts, the nature determines the total number of bugs following some
distribution. Let the random variable representing the total number of bugs be B with
the sample space of N+1 and known mean value λ. The realisation of B is not observed
by any of the firms. The game play consists of two stages: investment and sharing, as
described in the following:
1. Investment: In this stage, the players, while unaware of the total number of bugs
in the platform, “simultaneously” decide how much to invest in bug discovery,
and make it publicly known. Note that simultaneous move in the context of game
theory just implies that neither one of the players can assume pre-commitment to
a decision by the other players. A player’s investment c determines the probability
p ∈ [0, 1) that each bug is discovered. For simplicity, we assume that the bugs are
homogeneous, in that they are equally difficult to discover. Moreover, we assume
discovery of each bug is independent across the bugs and across the firms. The
research investment c and discovery probability p are related through function pi
as p = pi(c), with limc→∞ pi(c) = 12. We naturally assume that ∂pi(c)/∂c > 0,
as well as ∂2pi(c)/∂c2 ≤ 0: The chance of finding bugs should be improved
with more investment, and it is increasingly more difficult to improve the success
of bug discoveries. In general we assume that the two firms have distinct cost-
probability relations, denoted as pii(c) and pij(c). Because we assume both pii
and pij are strictly increasing, there is a one-to-one mapping between investment
and discovery probability. Indeed, ci = pi
−1
i (pi) and cj = pi
−1
j (pj). Hence, we
can equivalently represent each player’s strategy in this stage by its choice of
discovery probability, i.e., pi and pj .
2. Sharing: After investments are made, each player privately and independently
“discovers” some bugs in the platform. Also both players are informed of each
1We adopt the convention that random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realisations
by lower case. Also, N+ := N ∪ {0}.
2 This constraint captures a famous consensus: there is no such thing as perfect security [129].
Indeed, the fact that pi(c) = 1 would imply that all security vulnerabilities are discovered, which
should not be possible in reality. Hence we let this happen at the cost c at ∞.
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others’ investment decisions 3. Subsequently, each independently decides how
many of its findings to share with the other. Note that the discoveries are not
part of the strategies of the players and is rather determined probabilistically
–by “nature”– once the investments are made. Since the discoveries are private,
they cause an “incompleteness of information” of players about each other. From
game-theoretic viewpoint this sharing stage appears naturally as a Bayesian game.
In particular, firms i and j respectively discover Ni and Nj bugs in the platform,
which are random variables with the common sample space of {0, 1, . . . , B}.4
The set of discovered bugs may have an overlap, i.e., some identical bugs may be
discovered by both firms. We denote the number of common bugs by Nij . The
sample space of Nij is {0, 1, . . . ,min(Ni, Nj)}. Given the total number of bugs
B and investment levels ci and cj , the nature determines the number of bugs
discovered by each firm and the number of commonly discovered bugs Ni, Nj
and Nij . The quadruple (B,Ni, Nj , Nij) is the random variable over the set of
possible “states of the world” Ω. Note that due to the revelation of investments
pi and pj at the end of the first stage, the probability distribution D(λ, pi, pj) of
(B,Ni, Nj , Nij) over Ω is publicly known. For each nature state (b, ni, nj , nij) ∈
Ω, firm i (resp. j) observes ni (resp. nj), i.e., the number of bugs it has discovered,
as its “type”. For each realisation of the number of found bugs and announced
investments, a firm must decide how many of its found bugs to share with the
other. Due to the homogeneity assumption of bugs, the bugs to be shared can be
assumed to be picked uniformly randomly. A (pure) strategy of firm i is thus a
mapping si(pj , ni) : [0, 1]× N+ → N+ such that si(pj , ni) ≤ ni.5 Let σi = (pi, si)
denote the pure strategies of player i for the whole game. After both σi and σj
are decided, the overall utilities of each player is determined as the result of its
investment together with the expected losses/gains from security incidents.
In what follows, we describe the expected utility of the two players after two stages
of actions. We assume risk-neutral players, that is, the players care equally about their
utility of expected outcome and their expected utility. Hence, the utilities are linear
sums of the (negative of the) expected costs per each bug minus the investment cost
for discovery of the bugs. Note that at the time of taking the decision about sharing
the discovered bugs, the investments for discovering the bugs are “sunk” costs, i.e.,
they are already spent and will not affect the cost to go of different actions to take.
Each bug, if not discovered by or informed to a player, will be successfully exploited on
3 This feature of our model also reflects reality in which organisations inform the public about their
investment in security research, e.g., Microsoft [13], IBM [73].
4By {0, 1, . . . , B}, it is meant that given the realisation B = b, the set is {0, 1, . . . , b}.
5Since pi is part of player i’s strategy, it needs not be included as an argument to si.
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that player by attackers with a probability, which without loss of generality, we take
to be one. We assume that the exploitation probabilities and the severity of bugs are
homogeneously distributed. For each bug there are three types of losses/damages:6
• Direct loss l > 0 : affecting only the compromised firm (e.g. outage/denial of
its services, compromise/corruption of its data, etc.).
• Market shrinkage τ ≥ 0 : the common loss as a result of a successful attack
that affects both, even the firm that is not compromised. This is the effect of the
market shrinkage after a successful attack as a result of a portion of both demand
and investment moving away from (abandoning) the whole service/technology in
favour of “safer” alternatives, or simply relinquishing that sector altogether.
• Competitive loss δ ≥ 0 : when only one firm is compromised by attackers, the
compromised firm loses δ while the other gains δ. This represents the shifting of
demand and/or public investment (stocks) upon a successful attack.
Given the notions described above, there are four possibilities of net cost for each
bug that a player may incur: (a) The bug is known by both players (either through
own discovery or through the information shared by the other firm). In this case, the
utility of the players is (0, 0), as neither one of the players loses anything.7 (b) The bug
is known by player i, but not player j. In this case, the utility pair is (δ−τ,−δ−τ − l):
the bug will be exploited at firm j, which causes its direct loss l and a competitive
advantage δ for firm i, while both of them will lose τ due to market shrinkage. (c) The
bug is known by player j, but not player i. This is the mirror situation to case-b: the
utility pair is (−δ− τ − l, δ− τ). (d) The bug is known by neither player. Here, there is
no competitive advantage of one over the other, but there is still the market shrinkage
effect, besides the direct losses to both. Hence, the utilities are (−τ − l,−τ − l).
To facilitate the computation of the expected utilities, we define the following aux-
iliary random variables (as also depicted by a Venn diagram in Figure 3.1): let Bi,j ,
Bi,¬j , B¬i,j and B¬i,¬j represent the number of bugs that, respectively, both players,
only player i, only only player j, and neither player knows about. Let the (expected)
utility of players be denoted by u, which is a function from the strategy profile of the
players and the state of the world to the set of real numbers. The expectation is taken
with respect to the realisation of Bi,j , Bi,¬j , B¬i,j and B¬i,¬j given B, Ni, Nj and
Nij , and the sharing strategies. We are now ready to compute the expected utility of
6For simplicity of exposition, we assume the losses and damages are symmetrical; it is straightfor-
ward to generalise the results to non-symmetric cases.
7The assumption is that once the bug is discovered, its “fix” is immediate and costless.
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Table 3.1: List of main notations
Parameter Definition
B, b Random variable for the total number of bugs, and a realisation
Ni, ni Random variable for the number of bugs discovered by i, and a realisation
Nij Random variable for the number of common bugs discovered by both
ai Action of player i: how many discovered bugs to share
λ Expected number of the total number of bugs
pi, pj Probability that each bug is discovered by player i,j
ui, uj Expected utilities of player i, j
ci, cj Discovery investment cost of player i,j
l Direct loss upon exploitation of an (undiscovered) bug by attackers
δ Loss (gain) in utility of the player who is the only one attacked (not attacked) –
capturing the market competition effect
τ Loss in utility of both players if a bug is exploited in either one of them – capturing
the total market section shrinkage effect
p = pi(c) The relation relating the level of investment c to the discovery probability of a bug p.
In this work, we use p = pi(c) = 1− e−θc.
player i given a realisation of the state of the world ω = (b, ni, nj , nij), and σi = (pi, si),
σj = (pj , sj):
ui(ω, σi, σj) = −ci(pi) + 0 ·Bi,j + (δ − τ) ·Bi,¬j
+ (−δ − τ − l) ·B¬i,j + (−τ − l) ·B¬i,¬j (3.1)
In what follows we analyse further the structure of this utility function and derive the
“outcome” of the game and study its properties. For readers’ reference, we summarise
our game notion below.
Definition 3.1. A vulnerability sharing game is a game played between players in the
set N = {i, j} consisting of two stages:
1. Investment: i and j independently select pi, pj ∈ [0, 1), respectively.
2. Sharing: players are informed with pi, pj and participate in a Bayesian game
〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 with N = {i, j}, Ω = {(b, ni, nj , nij) | b, ni, nj , nij ∈
N+∧ni, nj ≤ b∧ni,j ≤ min(ni, nj)}, Ai = Aj = N+, Ti = Tj = N+, Ci = Cj = C :
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B Nij
B¬i,¬j Ni Nj
Bi,¬j B¬i,j
si(Ni) sj(Nj)
Bi,j
Figure 3.1: Venn diagram illustration of the sets of bugs.
N+ → 2N+ such that C(t) = {0} ∪ [t], τi : Ω→ Ti such that τi(b, ni, nj , nij) = ni
and similarly τj(b, ni, nj , nij) = nj, pi = pj following a probability distribution
D(λ, pi, pj) over Ω, and ui as in (3.1).
3.4 Analysis of the Game
When dealing with strategic entities with inter-dependent utilities, investigating equi-
libria, most notably Nash Equilibria, is a method of predicting their decisions. Our
game contains sequential moves, and thus an ordinary Nash equilibrium concept would
potentially cause the problem of “non-credible threats”. Also note that our game con-
tains simultaneous actions in each stage, and hence is of “imperfect information”. We
therefore examine possible perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), a solution concept that
effectively eliminates non-credible threats in sequential games with incomplete and
imperfect information.
In short, a PBE is a strategy profile such that, given any player’s belief about the
game history that is consistent with that profile, then that player’s remaining part of
strategy (from the belief onward) is its best response. To find the set of PBEs, we
notice from Definition 3.1 that since the investment decisions are announced before
sharing, each Bayesian game in the second stage is a proper subgame of the whole
game. This means that we can use backward induction and first construct (si, sj)
as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the Bayesian game in the second stage for
all choices of pi and pj . This in turn determines the utility of the players for each
choice of (pi, pj), which allows us to build a simple strategic-form game with actions
pi and pj corresponding to the first stage of the game. The remaining task will be
to find a Nash equilibrium for this game, which will lead to a proper PBE for the
whole two-stage game. We thus proceed by studying the second stage of the game
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(information sharing), and then proceed to analyse players’ investments given their
equilibrium sharing strategies.
3.4.1 Second Stage: Sharing the Bug Discoveries
The first step of the analysis is to construct the expected values of players’ utilities (3.1)
from the probability distribution D(λ, pi, pj) over the states of the Nature. This can
effectively be done by computing the expected values of Bi,j , Bi,¬j , B¬i,j and B¬i,¬j .
Since E(Bi,j) is multiplied by zero, we can safely ignore it. For the rest, we have:
E[Bi,¬j |ω, σi, σj ] = (ni − nij)(1− si(pj , ni)
ni
) (3.2a)
E[B¬i,j |ω, σi, σj ] = (nj − nij)(1− sj(pi, nj)
nj
) (3.2b)
E[B¬i,¬j |ω, σi, σj ] = b− ni − nj + nij (3.2c)
In (3.2a),(3.2b), we have in part used the fact that the bugs to be shared are chosen
uniformly randomly across the discovered bugs. Replacing in (3.1), we obtain:
E [ui(ω, σi, σj)] = −ci(pi) + (δ − τ)(ni − nij)(1− si(pj , ni)
ni
)+
(−δ − τ − l)(nj − nij)(1− sj(pi, nj)
nj
) + (−τ − l)(b− ni − nj + nij) (3.3)
We are looking for strategy profiles (strategy pairs (si, sj) in our two-player context)
that are simultaneous best responses to each other, given the information that each
player has, notably including its number of discovered bugs. In the Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the game, each candidate strategy for a player must be a maximiser of
its expected utility given the strategy of the other player and given its observed type
(number of discovered bugs).8 Formally, for a given pi and pj , we are looking for the
strategy pairs (s∗i , s
∗
j ), such that:
∀ni∈N+, s∗i (pj , ni) ∈ arg max
si(pj ,ni)
E[ui(ω, (pi, si(pj , ni)), (pj , s∗j (pi, nj)))|ni] (3.4)
and simultaneously vice versa for j. Such pairs constitute the (pure) Bayesian Nash
Equilibria of the second stage of our game. The pair (s∗i , s
∗
j ) is further, a Dominant
8To analyse the game, each player must specify its actions for all of its possible types, and not just
the realised (and observed) type. This is because, the expected utility of each player depends on the
possible actions of the other player(s) weighted against their potential types, since the type of other
player(s) are not directly observed.
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(pure) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium iff:
∀ni∈N+,∀sj , s∗i (pj , ni)∈arg max
si(pj ,ni)
E[ui(ω, (pi, si(pj , ni)), (pj , sj(pi, nj)))|ni] (3.5)
and simultaneously vice versa for j. We are now ready to express the main result of
this section:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose pi, pj < 1. If δ < τ , the unique dominant pure Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium of the second stage of the game is (s∗i (pj , ni), s
∗
j (pi, nj)) = (ni, nj),
i.e., sharing all the discovered bugs. If δ > τ , it is (s∗i (pj , ni), s
∗
j (pi, nj)) = (0, 0), i.e.,
sharing no information at all. When δ = τ , any strategy pair becomes a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium. This proposition holds irrespective of the distribution of the total number
of bugs.
Proof. According to (3.5), a pair (s∗i , s
∗
j ) constitutes a Dominant Bayesian Equilibrium
if, for each type of a player, its corresponding action is the best (provided the knowledge
of its type), irrespective of the strategy of the other player. From (3.3), the only term in
the expression of ui(ω, σi, σj) that involves si is the second term: (δ− τ)[(ni−nij)(1−
si(pj , ni)/ni)]. Hence, with the assumption of pj < 1 in mind, the maximisation of
E[ui(ω, σi, σj)|ni] with respect to si(pj , ni) reduces to maximising (δ−τ)(1−si(pj , ni)),
which yields the proposition.9
Discussion. The proposition makes intuitive sense: when δ > τ , each bug that is only
known by a player wins it a strictly positive (expected) competitive gain of (δ − τ),
as the competitive shift in the demand and public investment outweighs the overall
drop in the demand and fall in the stock market of the whole market section. Hence it
rather not share any of its findings, irrespective of what the other player chooses. This
is because the players have no means of making their decisions “contingent” on the
decision of the other.10 Similarly, when δ < τ , the competitive shift in the demand and
capital, falls short of the whole market section shrinkage. Therefore, the players prefer
to share all their findings to (selfishly) keep themselves from being hurt. Perhaps
the surprising result is that the dominant strategy of the players turned out to be
9Although the proposition leaves out the cases in which the condition pi, pj < 1 are not satisfied,
they are not difficult to analyse: suppose pj = 1, then E[(ni − nij)(1 − si(pj , ni)/ni)|ni] = 0, and
hence the expression for E[ui(ω, σi, σj)|ni] will not depend on si at all. Hence, in any Bayesian Nash
Equilibria, the choice of si becomes arbitrary. Similar situation happens for sj when pi = 1. Intuitively,
if the other player “knows every bug for certain”, then a player cannot affect its utility through its
action: it cannot gain any competitive advantage if δ > τ , or help prevent market shrinkage when
δ > τ . Note that realistically, we can safely assume pi, pj < 1, as no practical amount of investment
leads to absolute certainly of finding all bugs.
10We will see in §3.5 how this situation can be altered in the presence of a mediator.
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completely determined by the relative values of only two parameters δ and τ . This
proposition fully determines the sharing strategy of the firms. Notably, aside from the
special case of δ = τ , the equilibrium is unique and hence, there is no ambiguity in
selection of the equilibrium.
Apparently, our result only serve as relaxed prediction of firms’ behaviour in reality.
This is mainly due to the simplicity of our model along with its assumptions. For
example, if losses (l, δ, and τ) associated with different vulnerabilities are not identical,
the conditions in Proposition 3.1 might need to be stricter. Likewise, changes to this
result might be observed if losses between two firms are not symmetric as in our model.
Next, we investigate how each firm invests for discovering the bugs knowing the
subsequent sharing strategies.
3.4.2 First Stage: Investment for Bug Discovery
In the first stage of the game, each player decides about its investment amount for the
discovery of bugs, heeding the strategy of the other player in the second stage. To
obtain closed-form results, we need to model the relation between investment decision
and the chance of finding bugs. A simple candidate for such relation is the following:
p = pi(c) = 1−e−θc, where θ represents a measure of the efficiency of the investment: a
larger θ corresponds to a higher efficiency of the investment. As the level of investment
increases to infinity, the probability of discovery of each bug asymptotically approaches
unity. The two firms may be different in how “efficient” they are in their investment. A
firm with more prepared talents can expect higher chances of discovery with less invest-
ment. To capture the potential heterogeneity in the investment efficiencies, we consider
two potentially different θi and θj . Our investment-discovery probability relation has
the extra property that the relative efficiency of the investment stays constant for all
investment values, specifically: (∂pii/∂c)/(∂pij/∂c) = θi/θj . This relation can also be
equivalently represented in its inverse form: ci(pi) = − ln(1− pi)/θi for pi ∈ [0, 1), and
likewise for j. Note that the condition of Proposition 3.1 pi, pj < 1 is automatically
satisfied when limp→1 c(p)→∞, as is the case in our example.
To analyse this stage, we note that Proposition (3.1) fully determines (s∗i , s
∗
j ) for
each profile of (pi, pj). This allows us to treat the first stage as a “one-shot” game of
investment with action profiles of the form (pi, pj).
3.4.3 The Case of δ < τ
For the case of δ < τ , from Proposition 3.1, the dominant strategy of both players is
to share all of their findings, i.e., si(pj , ni) = ni and sj(pi, nj) = nj for all ni, ni ∈ N+.
72
3.4. Analysis of the Game
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pBR(pi)
pBR(pj)
p∗i = 1−
1
κθi
pj
p i
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
θj = 0.02θj = 0.0056
θi = 0.04
θi = 0.0052
pj
p i
(b)
Figure 3.2: (a) Example best response curves for the case of δ < τ , investigated in
§3.4.3. In the figure θi > θj . The intersection gives the simultaneous best response pair
in the first stage of the game as: (p∗i , p
∗
j ) = ([1 − (κθi)−1]+, 0). The parameters used
are: λ = 100, τ = 0.5, l = 1, θi = 0.04, θj = 0.02. (b) Example best response curves
for the case of δ < τ and different θis and θjs.
Then, the second and third terms in (3.3) become zero, and we get:
E[ui(ω, (pi, s∗i ), (pj , s∗j ))] = −ci(pi) + (−τ − l)E[B −Ni −Nj +Nij ]
= −ci(pi) + (−τ − l)λ(1− pj)(1− pi)
The best response pBRi as a relation over pj is hence:
pBRi (pj) = [c
′−1
i (κ(1− pj))]+, 11 where κ := λ(τ + l). (3.6)
Note that when pBRi > 0, ∂p
BR
i /∂pj = −κ/c′′i (pBRi ) < 0, i.e., more investment
by the other player leaves less incentive for a player to invest. Similarly, we have:
E[ui(ω, (pi, s∗i ), (pj , s∗j ))] = −cj(pj) + (−τ − l)(1 − pi)λ(1 − pj), and hence: pBRj (pi) =
[c′−1j (κ(1 − pi))]+. The fixed points of the best response correspondence (pi, pj) ⇒
([c′−1i (κ(1 − pj))]+, [c′−1j (κ(1 − pi))]+) constitute the outcome of the first stage. For
our example cost function c(p) = − ln(1 − p)/θ, the simultaneous best response in
(3.6)translates to the following (Figure 3.2a):
pBRi (pj) = [1−
1
θiκ(1− pj) ]
+, pBRj (pi) = [1−
1
θjκ(1− pi) ]
+.
11We use the conventions: f ′(x) := df(x)/ dx and a+ := max{0, a}.
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This, together with Proposition 3.1, lead to the following result:12
Proposition 3.2. If δ < τ and θi > θj, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of
the two-stage game is ((p∗i , s
∗
i (pj , ni)), (p
∗
j , s
∗
j (pi, nj))) = (([1−
1
κθi
]+, ni), (0, nj)) for all
ni, nj ∈ N+ and all pi, pj ∈ [0, 1), where κ := λ(τ + l). That is, only the more efficient
firm invests in discovery of the bugs to achieve discovery probability of [1 − (κθi)−1]+
– and all the findings are then shared.13
Discussion. The less efficient firm free-rides on the bug discovery investment of the
more efficient company, knowing that all the findings will be shared. This might leap
the reader to the conclusion that the PBE outcome is socially inefficient simply because
of the existence of “free-riding”. However, a social planner may also prefer that the
investment is done by the more efficient firm as opposed to distributing the investment
among both, hence garnering a higher social return on the aggregate investments. In
what follows, we will evaluate the social utility and the socially efficient outcome and
compare the two.
Investigating social welfare:
Let W represent the expected (utilitarian) social utility, defined simply as the sum of
the expected utilities of the two firms, i.e., W := ui+uj .
14 First off, it is straightforward
to argue that in the socially optimal outcome, all the findings are shared (the social
utility can only be improved by sharing the findings, as the investment decisions are
now disentangled from the sharing decisions). The expected optimal social utility is
hence as follows:
E[W ]=−ci − cj − 2(τ + l)E[B¬i,¬j ]=−ci(pi)− cj(pj)− 2κ(1− pi)(1− pj) (3.7)
In our sample cost function, maximising E[W ] hence yields: (pˆi, pˆj) = ([1−(2κθi)−1]+, 0).
Comparing the socially optimal solution with the PBE outcome, we have pˆj = p
∗
j = 0,
and when 2κθi > 1, we have: pˆi > p
∗
i . That is, to maximise the social utility (sum of
the expected utilities of the two firms), the less efficient firm, as in the PBE outcome,
makes no investment free-rides on the investment of the more efficient firm. However,
12The exact values of the investments depend on the cost function adopted, however, the qualitative
observations hold for a wide class of such functions.
13 When θi = θj = θ, i.e., the two firms are homogeneous in terms of their efficiencies of bug
discovery investments, the equilibrium point is not unique and becomes the set: {(p∗i , p∗j ) ∈ [0, 1]2, p∗i =
[1− (θκ(1− pj))−1]+}.
14Other notions of social welfare exist, e.g., the egalitarian objective W := min(ui, uj).
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Figure 3.3: Example depiction of the optimal and achieved social welfare (3.3a) and
security utility (3.3b) for the case of δ < τ as functions of κ = λ(τ + l).
compared to the PBE outcome, the more efficient firm invests more. This makes intu-
itive sense: the less efficient firm offers a lower return on investment (offers less “return”
in turning investment into probability of bug discovery) and hence should not invest
at all. Instead, the investments must be made by the more efficient firm and all the
findings be shared. Moreover, the more efficient firm must consider the aggregate losses
and invest more carrying the burden of the two, compared to the PBE, where it only
considers the effect of its investment on its own losses. Note that even when the players
are homogeneous in terms of their efficiencies, i.e., when θi = θj , the socially optimal
investment turns out to choose only one of the firms to invest. This is because if both
firms independently research, they may waste efforts if the results turn out to be the
same, e.g., they discover the same bugs. The value of the optimum social welfare is:
W (pˆi, pˆj) = − ln(2κθi)/θi − 1/θi for κθi > 1/2, and: − 2κ for κθi ≤ 1/2. (3.8)
The social welfare that is achieved at the equilibrium outcome of the game is:
W (p∗i , p
∗
j ) := − ln(κθi)/θi − 2/θi for κθi > 1, and: − 2κ for κθi ≤ 1. (3.9)
An example comparison between the two is depicted in Figure 3.3a.
Here, we define another metric of social welfare in the context of economics of
network security. Let the security utility uS of a player be the negative of the costs of
security attacks. Security utility, such defined, is related to the utility of a player as
uS = u + c, that is, it includes all the security damages but excludes the investment
cost. Now, let the security welfare S, as a metric of the aggregate security of the two
firms, be the sum of their security utilities: S := uSi + u
S
j . The security utility is
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related to the utilitarian social welfare in the following way: S = W + ci(pi) + cj(pj).
The optimal S is achieved by picking pi = 1 and sharing all the findings, which yields
S = 0. Figure 3.3b illustrates a comparison between the achieved security utility at
the equilibrium and the optimal S.
Comparative statics
15 Recall from Proposition (3.2), that for δ < τ , in part we have: (p∗i , p
∗
j ) = ([1 −
1/(κθi)]
+, 0). Hence, as long as δ < τ , θi > θj and p
∗
i > 0 (i.e., for 1 < κθi), we have
the following straightforward observations:
∂p∗i
∂τ
,
∂p∗i
∂l
,
∂p∗i
∂λ
,
∂p∗i
∂θi
> 0,
∂p∗j
∂τ
,
∂p∗j
∂l
,
∂p∗j
∂λ
,
∂p∗j
∂θj
= 0.
We also have ∂p∗i /∂θj = 0, and perhaps most interesting of all ∂p
∗
i /∂δ = 0; intuitively,
player i shares all of its findings and thus removes any dependence of its utility (and
hence its best strategy) on δ. Also, note that even though ∂p∗i /∂θi > 0, i.e., more
efficiency in investment means higher choice of probability of discovery, this does not
necessarily translate to higher choice of investment. In fact, we have: ∂ci(p
∗
i )/∂θi < 0
for 1 < κθi < e, and ∂ci(p
∗
i )/∂θi > 0 for κθi > e. Moreover, from (3.9), for p
∗
i > 0
we have: W ∗ := W (p∗i , p
∗
j ) = − ln(κθi)/θi − 2/θi and S∗ := S(p∗i , p∗j ) = −2/θi. Hence,
when δ < τ , θi > θj and 1 < κθi, we have:
∂W ∗
∂τ
,
∂W ∗
∂l
,
∂W ∗
∂λ
< 0,
∂W ∗
∂θi
> 0,
∂S∗
∂τ
,
∂S∗
∂l
,
∂S∗
∂λ
= 0,
∂S∗
∂θi
> 0.
3.4.4 The Case of δ > τ
Following Proposition 3.1, the dominant strategy of the players in the second stage is
to share none of their findings, i.e., si(pj , ni) = 0 and sj(pi, nj) = 0 for all ni, ni ∈ N+
and all pi, pj ∈ [0, 1). Then from (3.3), we obtain:
E[ui(ω, (pi, s∗i ), (pj , s∗j ))] = −ci(pi) + (δ − τ)λpi(1− pj)
+ (−δ − τ − l)pjλ(1− pi) + (−τ − l)(1− pj)λ(1− pi) (3.10)
The best response relation for player i is therefore:
pBRi (pj) = [c
′−1
i (λ(δ + l + pjτ))]
+.
15In economics, comparative statics is the study of the change in the “equilibrium” outcome when a
change in a parameter is/would be introduced.
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A point to observe is that for pBRi > 0, we have: ∂p
BR
i /∂pj = λτ/c
′′
i (p
BR
i ) > 0, i.e., more
investment by the other player leads to more investment by a player. This is in sharp
contrast to the previous case of δ < τ . Similarly: pBRj (pi) = [c
′−1
j (λ(δ+ l+ piτ))]
+. For
our example cost function, the simultaneous best response is therefore the solution the
following system (Figure 3.2b):
pBRi (pj) = [1−
1
θiλ(δ + l + pjτ)
]+, pBRj (pi) = [1−
1
θjλ(δ + l + piτ)
]+. (3.11)
Straightforward algebraic investigation reveals that the solution is unique and given as
follows:
If ∆ ≥ 0:

p∗i =
[
−λθiθj((δ + l)2 − τ2) + τ(θi − θj) +
√
∆
]+
2τθiθj(δ + l + τ)
p∗j =
[
−λθiθj((δ + l)2 − τ2)− τ(θi − θj) +
√
∆
]+
2τθiθj(δ + l + τ)
, (3.12)
and if ∆ < 0: (p∗i , p
∗
j ) = (0, 0), where ∆ :=
(
τ(θi + θj)− λθiθj(δ + l + τ)2
)2 − 4τ2θiθj .
This, along with Proposition 3.1, fully determines the PBE:
Proposition 3.3. When δ > τ , the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the secu-
rity information sharing game is unique, in which (p∗i , p
∗
j ) are provided in (3.12), and
(s∗i (pj , ni), s
∗
j (pi, nj)) = (0, 0) for all ni, nj ∈ N+ and all pi, pj ∈ [0, 1). That is, both of
the firms may invest – to achieve discovery probabilities as given in (3.12) – and none
of the consequent findings are shared.
Discussion. When δ > τ , the competitive gain outweighs the market shrinkage of
not sharing the found bugs. Knowing that the found bugs will not be shared, both
players, notably even the less efficient player, invest in discovery of the bugs on their
own. This is because of two facts: 1- Since the findings are not shared, the firm would
be exposed in its bugs if it does not discover and rectify them if it does not invest. 2-
Since the other firm invests and expectedly discovers some bugs, the firm will further
suffer through the competitive effect of being the sole victim of such bugs if it does not
invest.
Comparison to socially optimal outcome:
The social optimal outcome certainly shares the found bugs. Compared to the case of
δ < τ , both players invest strictly more in discovery of the bugs. The social inefficiency
of the outcome for the case of δ < τ was due to underinvestment. Here, it is primarily
due to lack of sharing of the found bugs: if a player would receive information of a
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bug that has not discovered itself, the social utility would have improved by preventing
the potential direct losses in that player as well as the market shrinkage losses in
both players. Another source of social inefficiency is the fact that “both” players
make discovery investment: there is a positive probability that the same bug can
be discovered independently by both firms. The investment could have been more
efficient by preventing such cases of “duplicate effort”, if directed to only one player
and the subsequent findings are shared. Anther source of social inefficiency, which is
again rooted in lack of information sharing of the players, is the possibility of “over-
investment” in bug discovery. The optimal expected social utility is the same as was
computed in (3.8). Note in particular that it does not depend on the value of δ. Sharing
the information in the social optimal removes the competitive effect of δ. However, in
the case of δ > τ , the investment value of both players increases with δ. This means
that the threat of competitive losses due to being the sole victim of a security attack
can drive both firms to invest inefficiently large values in bug discovery, when they
know the discoveries, as competitive advantages, will not be shared. A combination of
all of these three effects is responsible for a high social inefficiency in this case.
Comparative Statics
Given δ > τ and our example cost functions, we note that players’ best response
functions as in (3.11) are increasing and concave. Investigating the best-response ex-
pressions in (3.11) further reveals:
∂pBRi
∂τ
,
∂pBRi
∂l
,
∂pBRi
∂λ
,
∂pBRi
∂θi
,
∂pBRi
∂δ
> 0,
∂pBRj
∂τ
,
∂pBRj
∂l
,
∂pBRj
∂λ
,
∂pBRj
∂θj
,
∂pBRj
∂δ
> 0.
This means that player i is willing to invest more as any of the following parameters
increases: τ , l, λ, θi, and similarly for player j (with θi replaced by θj). Investigating the
effect on the equilibrium point is a bit trickier. For simplicity of exposition, we illustrate
the “shift” in the equilibrium pair pictorially. In Figure 3.4, the effect of increasing δ is
depicted. Note that, on the “pi–pj” plane, p
BR
i (pj) shifts “up” and p
BR
j (pi) shifts “right”
as the value of δ increases. Hence, the intersection, which indicates the equilibrium,
moves towards up and right. The algebraic details of the analysis is removed for brevity.
Analysing the effect of each parameter in turn reveals:
∂p∗i
∂τ
,
∂p∗i
∂l
,
∂p∗i
∂λ
,
∂p∗i
∂δ
,
∂p∗i
∂θi
,
∂p∗i
∂θj
≥ 0, ∂p
∗
j
∂τ
,
∂p∗j
∂l
,
∂p∗j
∂λ
,
∂p∗j
∂δ
,
∂p∗j
∂θj
,
∂p∗j
∂θi
≥ 0.
In words, the above inequalities indicate that if any of the following parameters in-
creases, then firms would invest more: τ , l, λ, and δ. Indeed, the higher these parame-
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Figure 3.4: Example illustration of the comparative statics for the case of δ > τ . The
parameters used are λ = 1.5, l = 0.5, θi = 1, θj = 0.9, τ = 0.9, and the value of δ is
increased from δ = 1 to δ′ = 1.2. Notice the shift in the equilibrium value towards
“up” and “right” as a result.
ters, the more severe impacts of security incidents would be, and thus both firms have
to secure themselves, especially when they receive no aid from the other. An interest-
ing result is the effect of improvement in the investment efficiency of the competitor:
If θj is improved, then firm i invests more in vulnerability research. Intuitively, this
is due to the fact that an improvement in the discovery probability of the competitor
firm j means more competitive pressure on firm i. This is because each bug that is
discovered exclusively by firm j brings it a net advantage of δ− τ at the cost of firm i.
Thus the increase in efficiency of firm j forces firm i to also improve its probability of
discovery, which happens by increasing its investment. This means that the utility of
player i decreases as the result of an improvement in player j’s efficiency. Specifically,
∂ui(p
∗
i , p
∗
j )/∂θj < 0. This is while, ∂uj(p
∗
i , p
∗
j )/∂θj > 0. Due to these opposing effects of
efficiencies on individual utilities, in general, the equilibrium social welfare, W (p∗i , p
∗
j ),
which is the sum of the two utilities at the equilibrium, may increase or decrease as
θi or θj is improved. Note, however, that the equilibrium security welfare, S(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ),
always improves when θi or θj increases.
3.5 Mediation: Encouraging Information Sharing
Our analysis in the previous section characterised the players’ behaviour in equilibria.
For the case of δ < τ , which pertain to a the case where security acts effectively as a
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“common good”, sharing of security findings becomes inevitable, and exactly because
of that, free-riding emerges, which in turn leads to underinvestment. In contrast,
when δ > τ , which represents cases where security effectively becomes a “competitive
advantage”, firms would individually strive for their security and refrain from sharing
their findings. We observed that none of these outcomes are in line with desirable social
planning.
In this section, we make a preliminary attempt to remedy one of the sources of social
inefficiency, specifically, failure in information sharing in the “competitive advantage”
case. We develop a mediation mechanism that partially removes the negative incentives
of sharing the information while allowing the players to gain from its positive effects.
Informally put, our mediation plan states that if a firm wants to be informed about n
bugs that it failed but the other firm succeeded to discover, it must reveal in exchange n
bugs that the other firm is not aware of. Note that this was not possible in the previous
sections, as there was no means of making the sharing actions of a firm “contingent”
on the action of the other. The mediator effectively ensures that no net “competitive
advantage” is lost by sharing the vulnerability findings, as any leakage of an “exclusive”
discovery is matched by an “exclusive” discovery of the competitor. We will hence refer
to our mediation plan as “matched sharing”.
Matched sharing operates in two steps: (i) each player/firm submit its set of found
bugs to the mediator, along with a specification of a “threshold” as the maximum
number of bugs it is willing to exchange with the other firm. (ii) Subsequently, based
on the reported sets and the players’ thresholds, the mediator moderates the exchange
of as many bugs as possible in the following manner: the mediator marks the bugs
that are exclusive to each player, i.e., that the other player has not discovered them.
Then the information of a bug is transferred from player i to player j iff a) there is an
exclusive bug to match, i.e., to transfer from player j to i, and b) if the total number of
bugs transferred so far does not exceed either one of the players’ requested maximum
threshold. Note that the mediator is not a strategic player, and its behaviour is known
to and trusted by both players.
From the above description, a sharing action of a player entails the selection of
the threshold on exchange number. Note specifically, that we can without loss of
generality assume that both players submit all of their findings to the mediator.16
This is because the players can restrict the sharing of their findings by specifying the
16 Assuming that both parties have established trust with the mediator. Although out of the scope
of our work, it is worth mentioning that trust establishment is non-trivial, and may itself be a research
problem, e.g., incentive analysis. A potential solution for this might come from cryptography, namely
multi-party computation. In this case, the two firms can themselves securely simulate the mediator (if
the mediator’s algorithm is known), so that no trust is needed. This can itself be a topic for future
research.
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threshold. For instance, no sharing corresponds to requesting a threshold of “zero”.
Note that due to the nature of the Bayesian game, each player must pick this bound
for every realisation of bugs it discovers (given the investment decisions). Formally,
we can reuse the notations si(pj , ni) and sj(pi, nj) to represent the sharing strategies,
with the different interpretation that si and sj denote the threshold, i.e., the maximum
number of their bugs to be shared by the mediator to the other player. Hence, the
expressions in (3.2) in the presence of the mediator and the new interpretation of the
strategies become:
E[Bi,¬j |ω, si, sj ] = ni − nij −min{si(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj − nij}
E[B¬i,j |ω, si, sj ] = nj − nij −min{si(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj − nij}
and, as before, E[B¬i,¬j |ω, si, sj ] = b − ni − nj + nij . In words, the term represented
by the min function determines the number of bugs that are exchanged between the
players, which should be no more than the bounds set by both firms, as well as what
each firm individually has to offer. This in turn gives:
ui(ω, σi, σj) =− ci(pi) + δ(ni − nj)− τ(b− nij)− l(b− ni)
+ (2τ + l) min{si(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj − nij} (3.13)
As we can see, the only term that involves si(pj , ni) is the last term. Maximisation
of the expected utility of player i given the strategy of player j therefore translates to
maximising min{si(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj − nij}. Hence, we have the following
result:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose pi, pj < 1. The weakly dominant pure Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium of the second stage of the game is (s∗i (pj , ni), s
∗
j (pi, nj)) = (ni, nj) for all
ni, nj ∈ N+ and pi, pj ∈ [0, 1), i.e., asking the mediator to share the maximum number
of exclusive bugs. This proposition holds irrespective of the distribution of the total
number of bugs, or correlation in the discovery of bugs.
Proof. First, note that irrespective of the choice of sj , si(pi, ni) = ni maximises the
expression min{si(pj , ni), sj(pi, ni), ni − nij , nj − nij}, and likewise for sj(pi, nj) = nj .
Hence (si(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj)) = (ni, nj) for all ni, nj ∈ N+ and pi, pj ∈ [0, 1) belongs to
the set of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria of the second stage of the game. To see the
weak dominance, consider the cases where nj > ni > 0 and nij = 0. Note that Pr[Nj >
ni ∧ Nij = 0 | Ni = ni] > 0. Consider the strategy of player j as sj(pi, nj) = nj for all
nj ∈ N+. Then ui(ω, (pi, ni), (pj , sj)) > ui(ω, (pi, s′i), (pj , sj)) for any s′i(pj , ni) < ni,
because: min{ni, sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj − nij} > min{s′i(pj , ni), sj(pi, nj), ni − nij , nj −
nij} for any s′i(pj , ni) < ni when nj > ni, nij = 0 and sj(pi, nj) = nj .
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3.5.1 Game’s First Stage: Investment in the Presence of the Mediator
Given the weakly dominant equilibrium in Proposition 3.4, min{s∗i (pj , Ni), s∗j (pi, Nj), Ni−
Nij , Nj −Nij} = min{Ni, Nj} −Nij . Hence, the utility of player i in (3.13) becomes:
E
[
ui(ω, pi, pj , s
∗
i , s
∗
j )
]
= −ci(pi) + δE[Ni −Nj ]− τE[B −Nij ]− qlE[B −Ni]
+ (2τ + l)(E[min{Ni, Nj}]− E[Nij ])
= −ci(pi) + λδ(pi − pj)− λτ(1− pipj)− λl(1− pi) + (2τ + l)(E[min{Ni, Nj}]− λpipj)
The term E[min{Ni, Nj}] depends on the specific distribution of the total number of
bugs. A good candidate is the Poisson distribution. The presence of this term in the
utility function prevents a closed-form solutions for the best responses and the equilib-
rium points. Instead, we pictorially illustrate in Figure 3.5 the potential usefulness of
the mediator when δ > τ , i.e., when players are motivated more by competition than
aggregate security. Figure 3.5a depicts the equilibrium points of players’ investments
in two cases: sharing in the absence of the mediator (which leads to no sharing) and
our “matched sharing”. These are set in the context of low security damage (l) com-
pared to competitive advantage (δ) and inefficient investment (θi = θj = 0.1). The end
result is that with matched sharing, both players invest more in finding vulnerabilities,
which guarantees a better security for both. However, the social welfare, as well as
the individual utilities of both players, worsens with the introduction of the matched
sharing, as it exacerbates the already inefficiently high investments of the players in
this example.
In contrast, Figure 3.5b shows the effect of our mediator plan in situations with
either a significant security damage value (large l) or efficient investments (high θi, θj),
or both. In such scenarios, equilibrium points of the two cases are relatively close to
each other, i.e., they make similar levels of investments. With the help of the mediator,
players would share their intelligences and thus gain extra value in security, making
mediation a superior solution to opportunistic sharing. This suggests the potential
of our matched sharing mediation scheme, and that it should be in the interest of
the social planner to monitor environment parameters and establish trusted mediation
among firms whenever appropriate for players/societal benefits.
Remark. In explaining the adverse effect of the mediator to social welfare and indi-
vidual utilities in Figure 3.5a, we notice that following our model, the expected number
bugs commonly discovered by both firms are relatively high (taken straightforwardly
from the probabilistic model). As a result, this indicates that matched sharing would
not be very useful, since both firms would actually not exchange much information, al-
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of opportunistic sharing vs. matched sharing when δ > τ , with
δ = 10, τ = 1, θi = θj = 0.1, with (a) l = 1 and (b) l = 10.
though they would be willing to share everything. In reality however, numerous factors
might be introduced that affect this figure. For example, large and complex software
systems are likely to possess a large number of unknown vulnerabilities, thus reducing
the chance for common discoveries. Further, different research teams have different
methodologies and procedures, making their chances of uncovering each bug unidenti-
cal. All these together would hopefully lessen the expected number of vulnerabilities
found by both firms, and thus encouraging the presence of the mediator. Also, efforts
in maintaining tight cooperation in the security community (conferences, seminars, dis-
cussion groups) might prove useful to eliminating common discoveries of bugs at an
early phase of the research procedure.
3.6 Conclusion
In this work, we focused on the problem of sharing cybersecurity information, as an en-
visioned pillar of cybersecurity planning for a more secure infrastructure. We analysed
the strategic decisions of two competing firms with regards to investment for discovery
of security vulnerabilities (generating valuable cyber-intelligence) and subsequently, to
share their findings. We showed that sharing becomes a dominant strategy when secu-
rity tends to behaves as a common good, i.e., when the common losses as a result of
security attacks outweigh the competitive gains of being protected. We analysed how in
turn this leads to free-riding of less efficient firm and the under-investment of the more
efficient firm. We also established that when security effectively becomes a competitive
advantage, i.e., when there is a net positive gain when a competitor is a sole victim of
an attack, then sharing no information becomes the dominant strategy, with negative
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implication on the social efficiency. Finally, we provided a monetary-free light-weight
mediation mechanism that (partially) enables sharing of the found vulnerabilities in
cases where they fail to achieve any sharing on their own.
Future Research This work has the potential to be extended in many directions.
We have already made some grounds in extending our results to the multi-player sit-
uation. An interesting addition is considering “features” for the found bugs, such as
severity (seriousness of the potential damage), sophistication (exploitability), etc., and
hence letting the sharing strategies depend on the type of the found bug as well. Inves-
tigating the behaviour of risk-averse players – as opposed to risk-neutral in this work
– is another problem. Identifying other types of “security information” to share is an-
other interesting direction, for instance, revealing past incidents of successful attacks
and resultant losses carries some market implications that sharing merely discovered
security vulnerabilities does not. Also, we assumed that both firms use a common im-
plementation (the “platform”). If instead, for instance, the firms are using a common
protocol but with their private implementations of it, then “some” of the discovered
bugs may be just exclusive to that party’s implementation. Sharing found bugs now
requires a modified analysis. Investigating other means of encouraging sharing is an-
other important direction. An example is “bargaining”: A player starts by sharing one
bug, then the other player matches with a bug of its own findings, and so on, until one
stops. Another example is a generalisation of the “matched sharing” mechanism in this
work by allowing unequal number of matching that may involve some randomisation
as well. An exchange market of vulnerabilities is another idea, although it may suffer
from adverse selection and moral hazard.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Contracts for
Outsourced Computations
While expensive cryptographically verifiable computation aims at defeating malicious
agents, many civil purposes of outsourced computation tolerate a weaker notion of se-
curity, i.e., “lazy-but-honest” contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop
optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards,
punishments, auditing rate, and “redundancy”. Our contracts provably minimise the
expense of the outsourcer (principal) while guaranteeing correct computation. Further-
more, we incorporate practical restrictions of the maximum enforceable fine, limited
and/or costly auditing, and bounded budget of the outsourcer. By examining the
optimal contracts, we provide insights on how resources should be utilised when au-
diting capacity and enforceability are limited. Additionally, we consider the effect of
side-channel information and collusion among contractors. Through careful design of
incentives, we demonstrate that it can still be optimal to use multiple contractors even
if they are to collude. Finally, we present a light-weight cryptographic implementation
of the contracts to mitigate the double moral hazard problem between the principal
and the agents.
4.1 Introduction
The idea of outsourcing complex computation tasks has been proposed and imple-
mented in a variety of applications. Research projects involving complex analysis on a
huge multitude of data have utilised parallel processing of their computations on the
processors of millions of volunteering Internet users. These include search for extra-
terrestrial life (SETI@Home), investigation of protein folding and computational drug
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design (Folding@Home and Rosetta@home). Businesses from different sections includ-
ing finance, energy infrastructure, mining and commodities transport, technology and
innovation [107] have also realised the benefits of outsourcing (data, computation, etc.)
and “moving to the cloud”. The cloud, as a dedicated infrastructure with specialised
man-force and powerful computing capabilities, along with the ability to pool demands
from different clients and dynamic assignment of the resources can reduce the cost of
computation. On the other hand, the outsourcer is also relieved from the dedicated
investment in its computing infrastructure and in addition, has the total flexibility of
pay-per-use paradigm, to flex-on or to flex-off services effortlessly [107]. The growing
trend of outsourced computing have made possible small virtualised computers and
smart devices with powerful computational power, with applications in critical mission
scenarios as well as everyday use.
In all of these scenarios, there is a concern for the outsourcer (client) about the
correctness of the returned results. The provider of computation services (the servers)
have an economic incentive to return guessed results as opposed to performing the com-
putation completely and honestly, and thereby save on the computation work. Hence,
to make this paradigm viable and guarantee soundness of the results, there must be
an auditing mechanism in place. The auditing however is not free: it either creates
computational overhead for the client, the server, or both. For example, cryptographic
verification methods, such as homomorphic encryption [56] and Probabilistically Check-
able Proofs (PCPs) [132,134], have been developed (and are being improved upon) that
provide a proof of correctness for each and every outsourced computation task. Audit-
ing can also be done through a trusted third party for a fee, say, via re-computation.
Alternatively, a redundancy scheme can be employed in which the same job is out-
sourced to multiple servers and the results are checked against each other. Here it is
important to assume that these servers are totally uncorrelated.
Irrespective of the auditing mechanism, the outsourcer can set an extremely large
fine for detected wrong results, and make cheating theoretically impossible. However,
in practice, an extremely large fine is a non-credible threat. A more reasonable as-
sumption is a cap on the maximum enforceable fine, with the special interesting case
where the cap is zero. In this work we provide a concrete and general approach based
on Principal-Agent modelling from game theory to optimal contract designs for out-
sourcing from the client (principal) to the servers (agents). Specifically, we assume a
general maximum enforceable fine, maximum budget, and costly and/or limited au-
diting rate. We formulate the utilities of both the principal and the agents, as well
as essential constraints that guarantee honest computation (incentive compatibility)
along with their acceptance of the offer (participation). This allows us to effectively
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and systematically compute the optimal contract such that the principal’s expense is
minimised. Our work hence provides a benchmark enabling meaningful comparison
among different deployments of computation outsourcing.
In a further step, we relax the assumption that multiple servers in the redundancy
scheme are uncorrelated, and instead address two main threats that previous research
neglect to point out: side-channel information leakage and collusion. In particular, we
firstly notice that irrespective of the method of auditing (directly or through redun-
dancy), it is critical that the tasks for which the auditing occurs are not earmarked, or
else the contractor would know when it could get away with cheating. In cases where
the contractors cannot communicate, this is a good assumption. However, the agents
may be able to find a side channel that enables them to find out whether the same task
is outsourced to multiple agents for redundancy check or not. Second, the contractors
may further collude to report the same guessed result and hence undermine the whole
scheme. It is thus questionable whether the outsourcing scheme can still provide any
benefit in the face of these two challenges, and if so, how exactly. Specifically, we
consider an outsourcer that can use a hybrid of direct auditing and auditing through
redundancy. We develop the optimal contracts in closed-form in the presence of a side
channel and compare its characteristics with optimal contracts in the absence of such
side information. Moreover, we develop two “bounty” schemes and provide sufficient
conditions to make redundancy scheme a preferred method over direct auditing even
in the presence of collusion.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, we briefly overview previous
results in relation to our approach and describe our contributions. This is followed by
a detailed motivation of our contract model in Section 4.3, along with descriptions of
important constraints that make the problem non-trivial. In Section 4.4, we compute
optimal contracts involving only one agent, and explore related improvements. In Sec-
tion 4.5, we allow the principal to also potentially outsource the same task to multiple
non-colluding agents as an alternative means of auditing and develop optimal hybrid
contracts. We further establish the global optimality of our hybrid two-agent contracts
among all possible contracts involving any number of non-colluding agents with respect
to the notion of Nash Equilibria. In Section 4.6, we develop optimal contracts when
the outsourcer suspects that the agents may find out (through leakage of information)
about whether the same task is sent to another agent. Subsequently in Section 4.7,
we focus on the case where the agents potentially collude with each other. We then
comment in Section 4.8 the cryptographic implementation of our contracts, i.e., how
to enforce the terms and policies in an automated way. This section addresses the
problem of double moral hazard, in which not only the agents/contractors can cheat,
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but also the principal/outsourcer. Finally, in Section 4.9, we conclude the chapter with
a summary of the results and remark on some potential future directions.
4.2 Related Work
A line of research is focused on designing reliable verification techniques for outsourcing
of special-purpose computations. For instance, [144] investigates outsourcing of linear
optimisations. Another notable examples are queries on outsourced databases, includ-
ing typical queries [7,37] and aggregation [149]. Their main paradigm is for the querier
to rely on trusted information directly given by the data owner (outsourcer) to verify
the results returned by the servers.
Verification methods for general-purpose computing also appear in several remark-
able works. In [99] verification is performed by re-executing parts of the computation.
A variation is presented in [31] in which the authors utilise redundancy over multiple
agents, assuming that at least one of them is honest. Outsourced computation has also
caught attraction in cryptographic research: in a seminal work, the authors of [55] for-
mally define verifiable computation and give a non-interactive solution. Their solution
uses Yao’s garbled circuits to represent the computation and homomorphic encryption
to hide such circuits from the agents. More efficient but interactive solutions that
use probabilistically-checkable proofs (PCPs) have since been developed such as Pep-
per [131] and Ginger [133]. All of these verification techniques are, however, costly
in terms of computation, memory, incentive rewards, etc., either to the prover or the
verifier, or both. For example, the scheme in [99] requires partial re-execution of the
tasks, and the verification in [31] incurs cost in the redundancy of the number of com-
puting agents. Also, efficient protocols like Pepper still incurs a cost in the order of
m3 [131] on the principal, where m is the size of the problem. The cost of employing
verifiable computing across these different schemes hence raises the important question
of how to use them economically, especially when there is a flexibility in parameters
that govern the overall cost to the outsourcer.
Incentive-based solutions such as [14,104] have studied contracts that the outsourcer
may offer to the agents and through a combination of auditing, fines and rewards, honest
computation is enforced. They make use of principal-agent model to design contracts
that the agents would accept and become honest. In [14], Belenkiy et al. focus on
designing contracts for distributed computing projects with a large pool of agents.
They focus on minimising the fine-to-reward ratio as a mean to attract agents/workers,
as well as consider the case of irrational/malicious agents. However, their work do not
emphasise on ensuring/incentivising complete honesty of agents. Nix and Kantarcioglu,
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on the other hand, attempt to design contracts that incentivise complete honesty of
agents. They employ redundancy as a mean for detecting cheating agents.
On the other hand, the problems of information leakage and collusion among players
have also been studied in the game-theoretic community. Many notable works on
information leakage focus on the games with espionage [93]. Here espionage means
that a player is able to observe (with noise) the strategy of another before deciding on
his own. While Matsui [93] considers repeated games of this form, Solan and Yariv [137]
study the normal form game in which a player is able to purchase espionage information.
The most well-known concept of collusion in non-cooperative games is cheap talk [94].
A game with cheap talk allows players to take part in arbitrary communication with
each other before they pick their own strategies. This gives an opportunity for them to
coordinate their decisions beforehand. One main problem with cheap talk, as explained
by Farrell [51], is that players can lie about their supposed strategy. For example,
Croson et al. [41] show that lies and non-credible threats together influence bargaining
offers and responses. Further, the whole cheap talk process may itself be a bargain.
From another perspective, a subfield of game theory is dedicated to collusion, namely
cooperative game theory [26]. However, the main goal of cooperative game theory is
to form stable coalitional structures, and which is more applicable at societal level
problems than in strategic environments.
Regarding the problem of double moral hazard in principal-agent model, [42] sug-
gests that it could be resolved if the principal owning an enterprise can force the agent
to purchase that enterprise at prenegotiable price. This serves as a threat to both the
principal and the agent, given that at the time of making the efforts, the principal
has observed the agents’ efforts, but not the eventual profit of the enterprise. Other
mechanisms have also been proposed to address this problem in different situations,
such as incomplete insurance [39] and money back [92].
Our contributions. Motivated by lack of feasibility in current techniques for veri-
fiable computation, we abstract the verification techniques as an auditing tool with a
exogenous cost and provide incentive-based contracts that minimise the expected cost
of the principal. Our model can be applied to any special-purpose or generic verifica-
tion scheme. Our contributions generalise the results in [14, 104] by (1) extending the
feasibility of honesty enforcing schemes for any bound on the enforceable fines and any
auditing capacity; (2) explicitly accounting for the cost of auditing and treating the
auditing rate as one of the choice variables; and (3) providing optimal contract that
minimise the aggregate cost of the principal as a combination of incentive payments
and auditing costs. In short, our work extends efficiency of incentive-based solutions
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by minimising the expense of the outsourcer. It also extends applicability by employ-
ing a general abstraction of verification method that can be captured by the notion
of cost and auditing capacity. We also address the problem of leakage of information
about task allocation during contract implementation, and that agents can collude in
cheating the principal through a simple bounty hunter scheme. Finally, we also address
the problem of double moral hazard commonly seen in principal-agent models. Our
situation is slightly harder than others in economic context, in that the principal has
complete advantage in cheating, as its utility can be completely realised before spend-
ing any efforts. To resolve this, we make use of cryptographic mechanisms to allow
agents detect that the principal has cheated and punish it accordingly.
4.3 Problem Definition: General Setup
In this section, we describe the general setting of the problem and basic assumptions
behind our model. A list of notations is provided in Table 4.1 for reference.
The outsourcer, which we refer to as the principal1 has a deterministic computation
task to be executed to obtain the output (result). Instead of executing the task itself,
the principal hires a set of agents2 to do this. The principal aims to enforce fully honest
computation of the task through setting a contract, involving rewards, auditing, and
punishments (fines).
The principal and the agents are each selfish non-cooperative expected utility max-
imisers. Initially, we assume that everybody is risk-neutral, i.e., they have no strict
preference between their expected utility and their utility of expected reward, and
hence [58, ch.2.4], their utilities are linear function of the costs (with negative sign)
and the rewards (with positive sign). Moreover, we assume that agents are “lazy but
not malicious”, that is, they do not have any interest in potentially reporting dishonest
computations other than saving in their computation cost. Suppose the range and the
probability distribution of the computation result is known. Generating a guessed out-
put according to this distribution has zero computation cost and accuracy probability
of q0 (which can be negligibly small if the range of the output is large). For the sake
of generality, as in [15], suppose each agent also has access to a private and indepen-
dent tricky algorithm Alg that generates the correct output with probability q1, where
q0 < q1 < 1, at the cost of c(q1) ≥ c(q0) = 0. The cost of honest computation is c(1),
which is strictly greater than c(q1).
3 To enforce honesty of the agents, the principal
1Also called the boss [15], master [38], outsourcer [32], client [56], data owner [105], etc.
2Also referred to as the workers, servers, clouds, or contractors.
3 Using the same method in [15], we will explain at the end of this section how to discourage the
use of this tricky algorithm Alg, and thus eliminating the need for q0 and q1 in our analysis.
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audits the returned result with probability λ. We assume that auditing is perfect, i.e.,
if the output is indeed correct, the audit definitely confirms it (no “false positives”),
and if the output is incorrect, the audit surely detects it (no “false negatives”). In the
most basic contract, the principal decides on an auditing rate λ, sets a penalty (fine)
f for detected erroneous answers and reward r otherwise. What make the problem
non-trivial are the following observations:
1. Costly detectability of cheating: that auditing all of the results is either
infeasible or undesirable. Regarding the infeasibility, suppose that in the long
run the principal has a continuous demand (e.g. the Folding@Home project) of
tasks awaiting computation, appearing at a rate ρ tasks per unit time. Also,
suppose that each audit takes the principal ν machine cycles, and the compu-
tation capacity of the principal’s machine is κ cycles per unit time. Then the
maximum feasible rate of verification is κνρ .
4 Moreover, auditing (e.g. through
re-computation) may be costly as it will consume the computation power of the
principal’s machine and slow it down, or it will require obtaining additional hard-
ware. The principal chooses the probability of auditing of a task λ ∈ [0,Λ], where
0 < Λ ≤ 1 is associated with the computational capacity of the principal. The
principal incurs the cost Γ(λ) which is non-decreasing in λ. For simplicity of ex-
position, we assume a linear relation: Γ(λ) = γλ for a given γ ≥ 0. An alternative
to the occasional redoing of the whole computation by the principal can be using
a third-party cloud that is highly reliable but costly (with per access cost of γ).
For this scenario, the maximum auditing rate Λ is one, i.e., all of the tasks could
be audited, albeit at an excessive cost.
2. Limited enforceability of the fines: The problem of verifiable computing
could become trivial if there is no bound on the fine that can be practically
levied on a wrongdoer: as long as there is even a tiniest probability of detection,
then the principal can make the expected utility of the smallest likelihood of
cheating become negative by setting the fine for erroneous results large enough.
The issue with this argument is that such a fine may be extremely large and
hence, become an incredible threat, in that, if the cheating of an agent is indeed
caught, the fine is practically or legally non-collectable. Thus, existence (fea-
sibility) results of honesty enforcement that rely on choosing a “large enough”
4Note that even when the principal is verifying at full capacity, it should not pick the next immediate
task to verify after finishing the previous one, since it may create a “learnable” pattern of audited tasks,
which the agent can use to only be honest when computing them. This however can be avoided if the
principal picks uniformly randomly tasks at the rate of κ
νρ
and store them in a queue. However, the
practical buffer has a storage limit. Consequently, the maximum feasible auditing rate with no essential
pattern is strictly less than the full capacity rate κ
νρ
.
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fine are rather straightforward and uninteresting. In particular, such approaches
leave unanswered the question of whether honest computation is still attainable
for a bounded enforceable fine below their prescriptive threshold. Moreover, such
results do not provide a good metric of comparison between alternative incentive
schemes, or across different choices of parameters for a particular scheme. We
will explicitly introduce F ≥ 0 in our model to represent the maximum enforce-
able fine and obtain the optimal contracts subject to f ≤ F . This can be the
“security deposit”, prepaid by the agent to the principal, that is collectible upon
a provable detection of an erroneous result. A special case of interest is F = 0,
i.e., when the only means of punishment is refusal to pay the reward.
3. Limited budget: As with the maximum enforceable fine to make it a credible
threat, the maximum instantaneous “budget” of the principal leads to a bound
on the reward to make it a credible promise. Let the maximum instantaneous
payable reward by the principal be R. Thus, we require: r ≤ R.
In the language of game theory, the contract offering and computation process above
can be conveniently captured using the notion of Stackelberg game [82]. The general
notion of game can be expressed as follows:
Definition 4.1. Let P denote the principal and A denote the set of agents. Let O be the
a set of possible contract offers, and {Di}i∈A be the set of agents’ decision spaces, with
H ∈ Di denotes the decision to accept the contract and perform honest computation.
Let {bi}i∈A with bi : O × (×i∈ADi) → R be the set of agents’ benefit functions, and
C : O × (×i∈ADi) → R be the principal’s cost function such that C(o, (di)i∈A) = ∞5 if
some di 6= H . With respect to the above, an outsourced computation game consists
of the following stages:
1. Leader: the principal P picks a contract offer o ∈ O, and
2. Followers: the agents A participate in a strategic-form game Γo = 〈A, {Di}i∈N ′ ,
{ui}i∈A〉 with ui((di)i∈A) = bi(o, (di)i∈A). Suppose the agents select a strategy
profile (di)i∈A, the principal P receives utility uP (o, (di)i∈A) = −C(o, (di)i∈A).
The main objective of this work is to find an optimal contract for the principal,
which implies its minimum expense whilst guaranteeing agents’ participation and fully
honest computation. This can be translated to finding an equilibrium point of the
above game involving a principal’s offer o ∈ O and the agents’ strategy profile d ∈
×i∈ADi such that d = {H , . . . ,H }. Indeed, from standard techniques for analysing
5This emphasises that the principal strictly aims at having its offer accepted and honestly executed.
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Stackelberg games, an effective way to find such equilibrium is to look for a contract
offer that yields minimum cost to the principal, given that the contract terms are
attractive enough to guarantee agents’ participation and honesty. In other words, it
means to solve the following optimisation problem:
min
o∈O
C(o,H , . . . ,H )
s.t. d = (H , . . . ,H ) is a Nash equilibrium of Γo.6 (4.1)
For the rest of the chapter, we strictly rely on the above optimisation problem to
compute the desirable contracts for the principal under various settings.
4.3.1 Eliminating Clever Guesses
An inherent problem of outsourced computation is that the agent can be lazy and
cleverly guess (using a tricky algorithm Alg) the result, instead of honestly computing
for it. Even worse, if the guess is correct, it is unlikely to be distinguishable from an
honestly computed one. For instance, consider the question of whether a large natural
number is a prime: the deterministic guess of “no” is most likely correct. When the
principal receives an answer, it then performs recomputation to check if a number is
prime, then compare with the received answer. Thus, a correct guess would get away
with a reward. Since we want to ensure honesty, it is desirable to punish the agent
even if the returned output is correct. However, this might be infeasible if the principal
cannot bind the correctness of the result to the honesty of the agent.
One way to mitigate the possibility of “clever” guesses is to enlarge the output
range by requiring the agent to return not just the final computation output, but also
snapshots of intermediate steps of the computing process [15]. Consider the example
of computation that checks primarity of a number above. A completely random guess
would have success chance q0 = 0.5. A tricky algorithm that always answer “no” would
succeed with probability q1 increasing with the value of the input. If we require as
part of the output not just the answer, but also temporary data produced during the
primarity test, a completely random guess would have success chance q0 = 2
−b where b
is the size of the output in bits. On the other hand, a much more tricky and complicated
algorithm Alg′ is required to guess both the answer and the temporary data, if the agent
wants to keep up with the success probability q1 as previously. The principal, on the
other hand, also needs to perform recomputation and collects temporary data as well
as the answer to compare with the agent’s report.
6When there is only one agent, then the requirement effectively becomes H ∈ arg maxd∈D u(d).
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Table 4.1: List of main notations
parameter definition
λ probability of auditing an outsourced computation by the principal
Λ the physical upper-bound on λ
γ cost of auditing (incurred by the principal)
q probability of a correct computation by the agent
q0 the correctness probability of a random guess from the output space
q1 the correctness probability of a guess from the output space by tricky algorithm Alg
c(q) the expected cost of computation to an agent for the correctness level of q
c(1), c cost of an honest computation to an agent
f fine collected from agent upon detection of an erroneous computation
F the maximum enforceable fine
r reward to the agent for an unaudited or audited and correct computation
R the maximum feasible reward
z the reserve utility (a.k.a., fallback utility or aspiration) of the agent
H auxiliary coefficient defined as c(1) + z (§4.4)
K auxiliary coefficient defined as (c(1)− c(q1))/(1− q1) (§4.4)
C the expected cost of the contract to the principal
α probability of using two agents for the same computation (§4.5.1)
F0 auxiliary coefficient defined as c/Λ− c (Proposition 4.5, §4.5.1)
F1 auxiliary coefficient defined as c[c− γ]+/[2γ − c]+ (Proposition 4.5, §4.5.1)
β probability of auditing by the principal if the task is assigned to two agents and the returned
results are different
ν probability of auditing by the principal if the task is assigned to two agents and the returned
results are the same
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As borrowed from [15], we make an assumption that it is practically impossible to
design an algorithm Alg′ that can help the agent effectively and efficiently guess both
the temporary data and the answer accurately 7. In other words, we assume that for
all possible attempts to design a PPT algorithm Alg′ for any relevant computation
in reality, q1 = (b), where  is a negligible function, and b is the size of the output
required. Both q0 and q1 are thus assumed to be negligible in b, meaning that we can
set b arbitrarily large so that we can neglect q0 and q1 altogether. This means that for
convenience of our analysis, we may reasonably assume further that q0 = q1 = 0 for the
rest of this chapter. As an extra step, in Section 4.8.1 we will discuss the use of hash
function to resolve the case when the size b of output is large, which might be prohibitive
for transmission of result. Nevertheless, from now on we assume q0 = q1 = 0, which
suggest us to also assume the worst-case scenario that c(q0) = c(q1) = 0, that is, the cost
of making a totally incorrect guess is zero. As a result, we may also eliminate all agents’
strategies of employing any tricky algorithm other than a “completely” incorrect guess,
as they yield the same effect. We also denote c = c(1), the cost of honest computation.
4.4 Contracts for Single Agent
In this section, we consider the case where the contract is designed for and proposed
to only one computing agent. We provide the optimal contract for the basic model in
subsection 4.4.1. In subsection 4.4.2, we investigate what happens if the risk-neutrality
assumption of the agents is relaxed. We close the case of single-agent in subsection 4.4.3
by generalising our results to contracts in which the principal is allowed to reward
unaudited and verified tasks potentially differently. In Section 4.5, we will investigate
the multi-agent case.
In this first type of contracts, we consider an outsourced computation game having
the following set of contract offers
O = {(r, f, λ) | r ∈ [0, R] ∧ f ∈ [0, F ] ∧ λ ∈ [0,Λ]}
Since there is only one agent, the game Γo for o ∈ O effectively becomes itself an
optimisation problem. Denote the agent by A, we now construct its decision space and
utility function. In particular, the agent’s action given the parameters o = (r, f, λ) of
the contract set by the principal, is first whether to accept it, and if so, whether to
honestly compute it, or make a guess. This means that we can set the agent’s decision
7Although theoretically there exist computations whose temporary data can be easily guessed, but
we believe that real-world computations which require outsourcing are complex enough for guessing of
intermediate step data to be infeasible.
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to be D = {⊥, 0, 1}, that is, the agent is free to either reject (⊥) the contract or accept
it and be correct with chosen probability 0 or 1, respectively.
4.4.1 Optimal Contract for a Single Agent
The principal chooses the contract by setting the rate of auditing and reward and
punishment values, in order to maximise its own utility and ensure fully honest com-
putation. Following (4.1), the contract parameter o = (r, f, λ) should be chosen such
that 1 = arg maxD uA(q). This can be broken into two parts: uA(1) ≥ uA(0) and
uA(1) ≥ uA(⊥). The former guarantees that if the agent accepts the contract, it will
perform the computation honestly, and the latter ensures that the agent will accept
contract. With respect to the Principal-Agent modelling in game theory (e.g. [58, ch.7]
or [122, ch.6]), we will refer to the former as the incentive compatibility constraint,
which appears as follows:
uA(1) = r − c ≥ uA(0) = (1− λ)r − λf (4.2)
The agent accepts the contract if its expected utility is larger than its reserve utility, z ≥
0.8 Given incentive compatibility, the latter condition, called participation constraint,
is hence:9
uA(1) = r − c ≥ uA(⊥) = z. (4.3)
Given the above requirements and based on the general optimisation problem in (4.1),
the optimal contract for the case of single agent reduces to the solution of the following:
min
r,f,λ
C := r + γλ (4.4a)
s.t. r ≤ R, 0 ≤ f ≤ F, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, (4.4b)
r ≥ H, rλ+ fλ ≥ K (4.4c)
8The reserve utility (also referred to as the fall-back utility or aspiration wage) is the minimum utility
that the agent aspires to attain or can obtain from other offers. Naturally, z ≥ 0. Note that an implicit
assumption here is that the agent is replaceable by any other agent with the same fall-back utility, i.e.,
there are many agents available with the same reserve utility. Without this assumption, the agent has
negotiation power by refusing the contract knowing that it cannot be replaced. Alternatively, z can
be thought as to (exogenously) capture the negotiation power of the agents. This is an assumption we
make throughout this work.
9Participation constraint is sometimes also called Individual Rationality constraint.
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where (4.4c) is derived from (4.2) and (4.3) in which we have used the auxiliary coeffi-
cients H := c+ z and K := c for brevity. Then:
Proposition 4.1. With the parameters given in Table 4.1, the contract that enforces
honest computation and is accepted by the agent, and minimises the cost of the principal
is by setting f∗ = F and choosing λ∗, r∗ as given by the following:10
γ ≤ K
Λ2
:

[
K
Λ
−H]+ ≤ F : λ∗ = K
H + F
, r∗ = H, C∗ = H + γK
H + F
[
K
Λ
−R]+ ≤ F < [K
Λ
−H]+ : λ∗ = Λ, r∗ = K
Λ
− F, C∗ = K
Λ
+ γΛ− F
(4.5)
γ >
K
Λ2
:

[
√
Kγ −H]+ ≤ F : λ∗ = K
H + F
, r∗ = H, C∗ = H + γK
H + F
[
√
Kγ −R]+ ≤ F < [
√
Kγ −H]+ : λ∗ =
√
K
γ
, r∗ =
√
Kγ − F, C∗ = 2
√
Kγ − F
[
K
Λ
−R]+ ≤ F < [
√
Kγ −R]+ : λ∗ = K
R+ F
, r∗ = R, C∗ = R+ γK
R+ F
(4.6)
For F < [KΛ − R]+, the optimisation is infeasible, i.e., there is no honesty-enforcing
contract that is also accepted by the agent.
Proof. We present the proof for the case of γ > 0. The case of γ = 0 follows more
simply. For simplicity, let us fix a feasible fine and compute the solution in terms
of f . In the end, we will show that f = F is indeed optimal.11 We will ignore the
constraint of λ ≥ 0 since it is strictly implied by the constraints in (4.4c) (the incentive
compatibility). Furthermore, r ≥ H implies r > 0.
We use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [11] to solve the above nonlin-
ear (non-convex) programming.12 Note that our cost and constraint functions are all
continuously differentiable. We first use the Mangasarian–Fromovitz constraint quali-
fication (MFCQ) to establish that any minimum must satisfy the KKT conditions, i.e.,
KKT are necessary conditions of optimality. In the absence of equality constraints,
the MFCQ condition means that the gradients of the active inequality constraints are
positive-linearly independent at optimum points. For reader’s convenience, we sum-
marise the notion of KKT and MFCQ in Appendix A.
In the special case of R = H, the constraints r ≥ H and r ≤ R imply r = H = R,
and hence, the optimisation problem can be rewritten with only λ as a variable, which is
simple to analyse. When R > H, only one of the constraints r−R ≤ 0 and H − r ≤ 0
is ever active. We will investigate them one at a time. The gradients of the other
inequality constraints r − R ≤ 0, λ − Λ ≤ 0 and K − rλ − fλ ≤ 0 are respectively:
10The notation x+ := max{0, x}.
11Alternatively, the following simple argument shows from the beginning that f must be at its
maximum value F : Note that the principal can increase the auditing rate λ, or reward r or the fine f
in order to enforce the incentive compatibility constraint. Of these three variables, only increasing the
fine is costless to the principal.
12The nonconvexity arises due to the second inequality in (4.4c).
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(1, 0), (0, 1) and (−λ,−r − f). Note that only for f = K/Λ − R, the last three
inequalities can be all active. For this case, the domain of feasible solutions reduces to
the singleton point of r = R, λ = Λ. For f < K/Λ − R, no feasible solution exists.
For all other cases, at most two of the constraints are active at a time, whose gradients
can never be linearly dependent: (1, 0) and (0, 1) are clearly linearly independent, and
both elements of (−λ,−r − f) are strictly negative, hence it is linearly independent
from each of the other two. Now, consider the H − r ≤ 0 constraint whose gradient
is (−1, 0). Note that three of the constraints may be simultaneously active, but their
gradient will not be positive-linearly dependent, because both elements of (−λ,−r−f)
are strictly negative. Hence, the MFCQ normality condition holds.
To systematically obtain the KKT conditions, we introduce the dual multipliers µ1,
µ2, µ3 and µ4, and transform the problem in (4.4) as follows:
min
r,f,λ,µi
C¯ = r + γλ+ µ1(r −R)+µ2(λ− Λ) + µ3(H − r) + µ4(K − fλ− rλ)
s.t.: primary feasibility: r ≤ R, λ ≤ Λ, r ≥ H, rλ+ fλ ≥ K (4.7a)
duality feasibility: µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 ≥ 0, (4.7b)
complementary slackness: µ1(r −R) = 0, µ2(λ− Λ) = 0, (4.7c)
µ3(H − r) = 0, µ4(K − fλ− rλ) = 0. (4.7d)
The first order conditions of optimality are:
∂C¯
∂r
= 0⇔ µ4λ = 1 + µ1 − µ3, ∂C¯
∂λ
= 0⇔ µ4r = γ + µ2 − fµ4. (4.8)
The full solution as in the proposition with F replaced by f is now derived by straight-
forward investigation of the above conditions. This can be done algorithmically by
exhausting the possibilities in the complementary slackness. For readers’ interest we
provide the code to do this in Mathematica, which is given in Appendix B. This same
code is used for all optimisation problems in this chapter. The proof then concludes
by noting that the cost such found is strictly decreasing in f , and hence f∗ = F .
Discussion. The first observation is that the optimal contract should fully utilise the
maximum enforceable fine and punish at no less than F . For large values of enforce-
able fines, we note that r∗ is at H, the minimum value to ensure participation, and
limF→∞ λ∗ = 0, which yields limF→∞ C∗ = H. These are compatible with intuition as
a huge fine implies that honesty can be enforced with minimum compensation and mi-
nuscule rate of inspection. When auditing is cheap (γ ≤ K/Λ2), increasing the auditing
rate is the better option to compensate for lower values of F to maintain incentive com-
98
4.4. Contracts for Single Agent
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
λ∗
r∗
infeasible
Maximum enforceable fine (F )
Figure 4.1: Change of contract parameters r∗, λ∗ w.r.t. the maximum enforceable fine
F (Prop. 4.1, case of γ > K
Λ2
), where K = 450, γ = 1200, Λ = 0.7, and c = 400.
patibility (honest computation). This is unless the auditing rate is at its maximum Λ,
in which case, reward must increase above H to maintain incentive compatibility and
compensate for the low value of F . Note that in this case, the participation constraint
is not active and is satisfied with a slack, while the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied tightly. For yet lower values of enforceable fine F , even maximum reward
r = R and auditing rate λ = Λ might not impose a strong enough threat against
cheating, hence the infeasibility region. When auditing is expensive (γ > K/Λ2), in
order to retain incentive compatibility in the situation of very low fine F , the principal
should increase reward, and only consider more frequent auditing if the reward budget
R has been reached. Figure 4.1 depicts the optimal parameters of the contract versus
the maximum enforceable fine for the latter case (γ > K/Λ2).
Note that the infeasible region does not necessarily exist. Specifically, when the
principal’s instantaneous budget R is larger than K/Λ, then there is always a feasible
contract. Then even for F = 0, i.e., no enforceable fine, a contract that enforces
honest computing is feasible, albeit by using high values of reward and/or auditing
rate. In such cases, the principal “punishes” audited erroneous computations only
through not rewarding the agent. However, it is clear that honesty cannot be enforced
with zero auditing rate, and hence the case of Λ = 0 trivially leads to infeasibility.
Moreover, to satisfy the participation constraint at all, R has to be at least as large as
H. Hence, for R < H, likewise, there exists no feasible contract for any F . We also
show that except for the special case of γ = 0, the optimal contract has the feature
that it is unique. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b depict the change in the structure of the
optimal contract versus varying auditing cost γ and the maximum auditing capacity,
respectively. From Figure 4.2a, we can see that for larger values of γ, the optimal
contract utilises lower values of inspection rate λ∗ while using higher values of reward r
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Figure 4.2: Optimal contract parameters w.r.t (a) the auditing cost γ, with K = 450,
Λ = 0.8, c = 400, and (b) auditing capacity Λ, with K = 450, γ = 450, c = 450.
to enforce honest computation. This transition progress culminates when the payment
reaches its threshold R, after which the contract remains unchanged. In contrast,
Figure 4.2b shows how increasing the maximum auditing capacity affects the optimal
contract in the opposite trend: as the principal is more capable of auditing, it should
consider more frequent auditing and lessen the reward for honest computation. The
payment, however, can never be lowered below H to maintain participation.
4.4.2 A Risk-Averse Agent
So far, we modelled the agent as risk-neutral, i.e., one that is indifferent between its
expected utility and utility of expectation, leading to a linear utility function. However,
empirically, individuals tend to show risk-aversion regarding decisions that affect their
income. By definition, (strict) risk aversion is (strict) preference of expected utility over
utility of expectation. Following Jensen’s inequality, this is equivalent to assuming a
(strictly) concave utility function (ref. e.g. [58, ch.2.4]). We have the following simple
but re-assuring result:
Proposition 4.2. The optimal contract given in Proposition 4.1 developed for a risk-
neutral agent stays feasible for any risk-averse agent as well.
Proof. Assume that the agent values its utility uA by a (strictly) concave function u.
The only two constraints in the optimal contract that may change are the incentive
compatibility and participation: (4.2), (4.3). The new participation constraint is: u(r−
c) ≥ u(z). Due to the increasing property of u(·), this new constraints translates back
to r − c ≥ z, hence no change here.
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For analysing the new incentive-compatibility constraint, let us represent the mixed
action of the agent by L(x, y, 1 − x − y) which means making a random guess with
probability x, using the tricky algorithm with probability y, and doing the honest com-
putation with probability 1 − x − y. With a slight abuse of notation, let X[L] be the
random variable representing the utility of the agent given its mixed action L. Then
the risk-neutral incentive compatibility constraint as given in (4.2) is ensuring that
E [X[L(0, 0, 1)]] ≥ E [X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)]]. Because u(·) is increasing, this inequality
implies: u (E [X[L(0, 0, 1)]]) ≥ u (E [X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)]]). Further, following Jensen’s
inequality, since u is concave, u (E [X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)]]) ≥ E [u (X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)])].
Note that X[L(0, 0, 1)] is a deterministic random variable (specifically, payoff of r−c(1)
w.p. one). Hence: u (E [X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)]]) = E [u (X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)])]. There-
fore, we have shown that (4.2) implies: E [u (X[L(x, y, 1− x− y)])] ≥ E [u (X[L(x, y,
1− x− y)])], which is the incentive compatibility constraint for a risk-averse agent.
Note that even though the feasibility of our contract is guaranteed, its optimality
might no longer hold. This is because a lower value of fine and/or rewards could
potentially maintain incentive compatibility, as intuitively, cheating with a chance of
getting caught can be seen as a lottery. However, because the level of risk-averseness
of an agent is unknown, we argue that it is best practice to design the optimal contract
for the worst case with respect to risk, i.e., risk neutrality. Specially, if a contract
is designed assuming a particular degree of risk-aversion of the agent but the agent
turns out to be less risk-averse than assumed, then the incentive-compatibility for
honest computation may be violated, failing the principal’s intolerance of erroneous
computations. Accordingly, for the rest of this chapter, we will retain risk-neutrality
for agents.
4.4.3 Optimal Contract for a Single Agent: Two-Level Reward
In our contracts so far, verified correct results and unaudited results are rewarded iden-
tically at r. Suppose, alternatively, that the principal rewards r0 for accepted but not
audited results and r1 for corroborated correct answers, and as before, penalises f for
detected wrong computations. This way, the principal may hope to save significantly
by, for example, not paying for unaudited computations. The new incentive compat-
ibility and participation constraints are: (1 − λ)r0 + λr1 − c ≥ (1 − λ)r0 − λf and
(1 − λ)r0 + λr1 − c ≥ 0, respectively. The optimisation of (4.4) for a contract with
two-level reward changes to:
min
r0,r1,f,γ
C := r1λ+ r0(1− λ) + γλ
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s.t. r0, r1 ≤ R, f ≤ F, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, r1λ+ r0(1− λ) ≥ c, r1λ ≥ c− fλ.
Proposition 4.3. For F ≥ [c/Λ − R]+, the optimal single-agent contract for two-
level rewarding is given as: f∗ = F , λ∗ = c/(F +R), r∗1 = R, r∗0 = Fc/(R− c+ F ),
C∗ = c (1 + (γ + c−R)/(F +R)). For F < [c/Λ−R]+, the contract is infeasible.
Proof. The solution can be found by first verifying the MFCQ requirement, then con-
struction of KKT conditions, and finally solving these conditions using exhaustive
search to find the optimal regions. While we omit presentation of the last step as it
involves a large search, we detail the first two steps, and refer to the appendix for a
Mathematica program for searching the KKT conditions. For this we note that it is
obviously best to set f = F , and assume this from now on. Thus the minimisation
problem has only three variables r0, r1 and λ.
We verify the MFCQ conditions in the following. When R = c, it is obvious that
r0 = r1 = c, and hence there is only one variable left, i.e., λ, therefore the problem
becomes trivial. When R > c, the gradients of all inequalities on r0, r1 and λ are
v1 = ∇(r0 −R) = (1, 0, 0); v2 = ∇(r1 −R) = (0, 1, 0); v3 = ∇(−λ) = (0, 0,−1);
v4 = ∇(λ− Λ) = (0, 0, 1); v5 = ∇(c− r0(1− λ)− r1λ) = (λ− 1,−λ, r0 − r1);
v6 = ∇(c− fλ− r1λ) = (0,−λ,−f − r1)
We now show the MFCQ requirement: there exist no ai ≥ 0 with i ∈ 1, 6, not all
zero, such that
∑6
i=1 aivi = 0, in that ai > 0 implies the i-th inequality is active.
We proceed by going through each vector, and rule them out of the potential linear
dependencies one-by-one, until none is left. Consider a1 > 0 which implies r0 = R,
then to form linear-dependency, we need a5 > 0. Consequently, due to the negative
value −λ of the second component of v5, we need either a2 > 0 or a6 > 0 to form
a dependency. However, the second component of v6 is also negative, therefore it is
required that a2 > 0, which implies r1 = R. This, together with r0 = R, contradict
with the fact that c = r0(1− λ)− r1λ = R (due to a5 > 0) because we assume earlier
that R > c. This concludes that a1 = 0, and we thus ignore v1.
If a2 > 0, then to form dependencies we need either a5 > 0 or a6 > 0. The
former cannot be satisfied, because it would require a1 > 0, thus contradicting with
our conclusion above. In the latter a6 > 0, along with others, eventually implies
c = Λ(R+F ). In that situation, we have the incentive-compatibility constraint satisfied
only when r1 = R and λ = Λ, and thus the problem becomes trivial. Assuming
c < Λ(R + F ) nullifies the chance that a6 > 0, which consequently leads to setting
a2 = 0, since a2 > 0 leads to no positive-linear dependency.
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Next we set a3 > 0, which implies λ = 0. This is contradict with the incentive-
compatibility constraint, thus we must have a3 = 0. For a4 > 0, we need either a5 > 0
or a6 > 0. If we set a5 > 0, either we need both λ = 1 and λ = 0 since there is no
other available vectors that can form a dependency with v5, which is also not possible.
In case a6 > 0, we then need λ = 0, which does not satisfy incentive-compatibility.
Thus it also holds that a4 = 0. It is then trivial to show that v5 and v6 cannot be
positive-linearly dependent.
Given that the MFCQ requirement is satisfied, an exhaustive search in solving KKT
conditions would yield global minimums for our contract optimisation. The conditions
can be expressed as follows:
min
r,f,λ,µi
C¯ = r1λ+ r0(1− λ) + γλ+ µ1(r0 −R) + µ2(r1 −R) + µ3(−λ)
+ µ4(λ− Λ) + µ5(c− r0(1− λ)− r1λ) + µ6(c− fλ− r1λ)
s.t.: primary feasibility: r0, r1 ≤ R, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, (4.10a)
c− r0(1− λ)− r1λ, c− fλ− r1λ ≤ 0 (4.10b)
duality feasibility: µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6 ≥ 0, (4.10c)
complementary slackness: µ1(r0 −R) = 0, µ2(r1 −R) = 0, µ3(−λ) = 0, (4.10d)
µ4(λ− Λ) = 0, µ5(c− r0(1− λ)− r1λ) = 0, (4.10e)
µ6(c− fλ− r1λ) = 0. (4.10f)
The first order conditions of optimality are:
∂C¯
∂r0
= 0⇔ 1− λ+ µ1 − µ5(1− λ) = 0 (4.11)
∂C¯
∂r1
= 0⇔ λ+ µ2 − µ5λ− µ6λ = 0 (4.12)
∂C¯
∂λ
= 0⇔ (r1 − r0)(1− µ5) + γ − µ3 + µ4 − Fµ6 − r1µ6 = 0 (4.13)
Solving the above would give the solution as in the proposition statement.
Discussion of the two level reward contract. First, note that there is no im-
provement in terms of the infeasibility region compared with the single-level reward
contract. However, the achieved cost is always better. This was to be expected as the
single-level rewarding can be thought of as a special case of two-level. However, the
behaviour of the optimal contract now does not depend on the value of the auditing
cost γ. This is where the strength of the two-level rewarding lies: for high values of γ,
the two-level contract increasingly outperforms the single reward-level contract.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal contract expense with (a) c = 400, Λ = 0.7, γ = 1200, R = 500,
(b) c = 400, Λ = 0.7, R = 500, F = 600, and (c) c = 400, γ = 1200, R = 500, F = 600.
Note that the optimal reward for audited and correct results r1 is at the principal’s
maximum budget R irrespective of the value of F . The value of reward for unaudited
results r0 is always strictly less than c, i.e., the cost of honest computation (and hence
strictly less than r1 as well). The value of r0, unlike r1, depends on F : For higher values
of maximum enforceable fine, in fact somewhat unexpectedly, the optimal contract
chooses increasing values of reward r∗0. Still intuitively, a larger threat allows less
necessity for auditing, and thus the contract starts to behave as a “lottery”, in which
the low-chance “winner” receives r∗1 = R and the “loser” r0 < c < R. For completeness,
we visualise in Figure 4.3 the comparison between one-level and two-level reward in
terms of optimal contract expense of the principal.
4.5 Optimal Contracts for Multiple Agents
When there are more than one agent available, the set of possible contracts gets ex-
tended. Specifically, as e.g. [15] and [105] discuss, the principal has the option of
submitting the same task to multiple agents and comparing the outcomes. We will
refer to this option as the redundancy scheme. If the returned results do not match, it
is clear that at least one agent is cheating. Furthermore, as [105] assumes, if the agents
are non-colluding, and returning the intermediate steps along with the computation
result is required, then the probability that the results produced by cheating will be
the same will be negligible, which we again assume to be zero (for simplicity). Hence,
the returned results are correct if and only if they are the same.
In the next subsection, we develop optimal contracts considering two agents. Sub-
sequently, we establish the global optimality of two-agent contracts among any number
of agents with respect to the notion of Nash Equilibrium.
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4.5.1 Optimal Contracts for Two Agents
Consider the case that there are two agents available A = {1, 2}. As in the single-agent
case, consider a principal that has a computation task and a maximum auditing rate
of Λ. Then, in general, a principal can use a hybrid scheme: it may choose to send
the same job to both of the agents sometimes, and otherwise to one randomly selected
agents. Sending the same task to two agents provides a definite verification, however,
at the cost of paying twice the reward, since both agents must be rewarded for honest
computation. Hence, an optimal choice of redundancy scheme is not immediately
clear, even less so if this schemes is randomised with just choosing one agent and doing
independent audits. In this section, we investigate optimal contracts among all hybrid
schemes.
As the first step, we construct the set of possible contracts the principal P may offer
to the agents. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the principal utilises the redundancy
scheme, and hence with probability 1 − α it employs only one of the agents (selected
equally likely)13. If the principal chooses both agents to assign the computation, then
it will reward both agents r if the returned results are identical. Otherwise it with
punish both agents a fine f . In case only one agent if employed, then P audits with
probability ρ. Since auditing only occurs when a single agent receives the task, the
likelihood that the task will ever be audited is λ = ρ(1−α). If we consider α and λ as
parameters of the contract, then it must be the case that α+ λ ≤ 1. Also, because we
account for double rewarding, thus the maximum reward r for each agent must be no
more than R/2. This creates the following set of possible contracts:
O = {(r, f, α, λ) | r ∈ [0, R/2] ∧ f ∈ [0, F ] ∧ α ∈ [0, 1] ∧ λ ∈ [0,Λ] ∧ α+ λ ≤ 1}
To form the agents’ behaviours and the game Γo, we firstly assume that neither
there is any collusion between, nor any communication. Therefore, on the event that
any of the agents receives a task, it has no information about the busy/idle state of the
other agent. Excluding the option ⊥ to reject the offer, each agent must choose to be
honest with probability q ∈ [q0, 1] with q0 = 0 due to our argument in subsection 4.3.1.
This makes players’ decision spaces D1 = D2 = D = {⊥}∪[0, 1], where we denote 0 ∈ D
by C and 1 ∈ D by H . We then assume that if either of the agents rejects the offer,
then no contract is signed, and thus their utilities are 0, that is, ui(⊥, ·) = ui(·,⊥) = 0
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Otherwise, let d1, d2 ∈ [0, 1] be “non-rejecting” strategies of agent 1 and
2, respectively. The utilities of the agents can be expressed as follows:
13We will formally show through the proof of proposition 4.6 that equal randomisation is the best
option. Intuitively, this removes any information that the agents may infer upon receiving a task.
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Proposition 4.4. Let o = (r, f, α, λ) be a two-agent contract and d1, d2 ∈ [0, 1] be the
strategies of the agents, then their utilities are:
ui(di, d−i) =
1
2
(r + (2(−1 + did−i)f + (−1 + 2did−i)r)α− cdi(1 + α) + (−1 + di)(f + r)λ)
Proof. The utility of agent i comprises two parts: when it is the only employed agent,
and when both agents are employed. They occur with probabilities (1 − α)/2 and α,
respectively. Let ρ = λ/(1−α) be the probability that the agent will be audited given
that it is the only employed agent, then agent i’s expected utility for former case is:
1− α
2
((1− (1− di)ρ)r − (1− di)ρf − cdi)
=
1− α
2
((
1− (1− di) λ
1− α
)
r − (1− di) λ
1− αf − cdi
)
=
1
2
(cdi(−1 + α) + (−1 + di)fλ− r(−1 + α+ λ− diλ))
Similarly, agent i’s expected utility for the latter case is
α(did−ir − (1− did−i)f − cdi)
Summing the above two terms would give agent i’s net utility as in the proposition
statement.
An important point about the expression of ui(di, d−i) in the above proposition
is that ui is linearly in di. We then recall from our basic optimisation problem (4.1)
that we want (H ,H ) to be a Nash equilibrium, meaning that ui(H ,H ) ≥ ui(⊥, ·),
and that H = arg maxdi∈[0,1] ui(di,H ). Note that it is also possible that (C ,C ) is
another equilibrium, but such is a rather uninteresting because both agents would be
punished with higher chance, and thus receive worse utility than with (H ,H ), both
individually and socially. Due to the linearity of ui in di, the latter is satisfied when
ui(H ,H ) ≥ ui(C ,H ). Following the above proposition, the values of these two sides
are :
uA(H ,H ) =
1 + α
2
(r − c), uA(C ,H ) =(1− α− λ)r
2
− (α+ λ
2
)f.
Assume for simplicity that agents’ reserve utility is u(⊥, ·) = z = 0, we have the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints respectively as
r − c ≥ 0, r ≥ (1 + α)c/(λ+ 2α)− f.
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On the other hand, given that agents’ strategy profile is (H ,H ), the expected cost of
the contract to the principal is:
C = 2rα+ γλ+ r(1− α) = (1 + α)r + γλ.
Therefore, the optimal contracts for two agents that make (H ,H ) an equilibrium can
be found by soling the following optimisation problem, as given in Proposition 4.5:
min
r,f,α,λ
C := r(1 + α) + γλ subject to:
r ≤ R/2, f ≤ F, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, λ ≤ 1− α, α ≥ 0, r ≥ c, r ≥ c(1 + α)
λ+ 2α
− f.
Proposition 4.5. Let F0 = c/Λ − c and F1 = c[c − γ]+/[2γ − c]+,14 the optimal
one-level reward two-agent contract that makes (H ,H ) a Nash equilibrium is:
F1 ≤ F : f∗ = F, α∗ = c
2F + c
, λ∗ = 0, r∗ = c, C∗ = c(1 + c
2F + c
)
F0 ≤ F < F1 : f∗ = F, α∗ = 0, λ∗ = c
c+ F
, r∗ = c, C∗ = c(1 + γ
F + c
)
F < min(F0, F1) : f
∗ = F, α∗ =
c− Λ(c+ F )
c+ 2F
, λ∗ = Λ, r∗ = c, C∗ = c(c+ F )(2− Λ)
c+ 2F
+ γΛ
Proof. Similar to the optimisation of previous contracts, we use the KKT conditions to
find the optimal contract for two agents. For simplicity we assume that f = F , as this
does not affect the optimal solution. Then, we employ dual multipliers µi, for i = 1, 7,
such that
min
r,λ,α,µi
C¯ =r(1 + α) + γλ+ µ1(r −R) + µ2(c− r)
+ µ3(c(1 + α)− (f + r)(λ+ 2α)) + µ4(−α)
+ µ5(−λ) + µ6(λ− Λ) + µ7(λ− (1− α))
s.t.: primary feasibility: c ≤ r ≤ R, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, α ≥ 0, λ ≤ 1− α,
c(1 + α) ≤ (f + r)(λ+ 2α)
duality feasibility: µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 ≥ 0,
complementary slackness: µ1(r −R) = 0, µ2(c− r) = 0,
µ3(c(1 + α)− (f + r)(λ+ 2α)) = 0, µ4(−α) = 0,
µ5(−λ) = 0, µ6(λ− Λ) = 0, µ7(λ− (1− α)) = 0.
14We adopt the convention that x/0 = +∞ for x > 0.
107
4.5. Optimal Contracts for Multiple Agents
Along with these are the stationarity conditions:
∂C¯
∂r
= 0⇔ 1 + α+ µ1 − µ2 − µ3(λ+ 2α) = 0
∂C¯
∂λ
= 0⇔ γ − µ3(f + r)− µ5 + µ6 + µ7 = 0
∂C¯
∂α
= 0⇔ r − µ3(2f + 2r − c)− µ4 + µ7 = 0
Solving the system of these equalities and inequalities give us the solution as expressed
in the proposition. The last step is to prove that this solution is the global optimal.
Like in the previous contracts, our optimisation problem is not convex, therefore, we
rely on the MFCQ conditions to satisfy for all local minimisers. Recall that R ≥ c > 0,
γ > 0, F ≥ 0, and 1 ≥ Λ > 0. We first consider the case R = c, which implies r = c.
The optimisation problem now reduces to two variables λ and α, which is convex,
and hence can be effectively solved using the KKT method, which gives the optimal
contract identical to that in the proposition.
When R > c, we consider the gradients of all inequality constraints on three vari-
ables α, λ and r:
v1 = ∇(r −R) = (0, 0, 1); v2 = ∇(c− r) = (0, 0,−1);
v3 = ∇(c(1 + α)− (f + r)(λ+ 2α)) = (c− 2(f + r),−(f + r),−2α− λ);
v4 = ∇(−α) = (−1, 0, 0); v5 = ∇(−λ) = (0,−1, 0);
v6 = ∇(λ− Λ) = (0, 1, 0); v7 = ∇(λ− (1− α)) = (1, 1, 0).
We now prove that there are no positive-linear dependencies among these vector, i.e.,
there exist no ai ≥ 0 with i = 1, 7 not all zero, such that
∑7
i=1 aivi = 0, in that
ai > 0 implies the i-th inequality is active. We first starts with a1 > 0, which implies
r = R, and that either a2 > 0 or a3 > 0 to form a linear dependency. However,
a2 > 0 implies r = c < R, which is contradicting, and thus we have a3 > 0. However,
the first component of v3 is c − 2(f + r) < 0, therefore we need a7 > 0 for linear
dependency, giving λ = 1 − α. If no other vectors are involved, then it must be that
c−2(f+r) = −(f+r) (because v7 = (1, 1, 0)), implying c = f+r = f+R > c, which is
contradictory. Otherwise when c−2(f+r) < −(f+r), we need a5 > 0, as it is the only
remaining vector with the second component being negative, implying λ = 0 and thus
α = 1. Plugging this to the active third constraint would give 2c−2(f +R) = 0, which
is not possible. This concludes that a1 = 0 in all linear dependency. This also indicates
a2 = 0, as otherwise there is no vector (apart from v1) with the third component being
positive to form a linear dependency with v2.
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Meanwhile, a3 > 0 implies the last component of v3 is −2α− λ = 0, or α = λ = 0.
However, we recall that a3 > 0 implies a7 > 0, which means that λ = 1 − α, which is
impossible when α = λ = 0. This concludes that a3 = 0. For if a4 > 0 and α = 0,
then because the first component of v4 is negative, we need a7 > 0 and λ = 1 − α,
which likewise implies a5 > 0 and λ = 0, which is again contradicting, thus a4 = 0.
Finally, a5 and a6 cannot be both positive, because that means Λ = 0. This concludes
the proof that there is no positive-linear dependency in all possible contracts.
Corollary 4.1. If auditing is more expensive than the cost of honest computation
(γ ≥ c), the optimal contract only uses the redundancy scheme. When γ ≤ c/2, either
there is no redundancy scheme (α = 0) or the whole auditing capacity is used (λ∗ = Λ).
The first part of the corollary is quite intuitive: when γ > c, any instance of
outsourcing to a single agent and performing independent auditing can be replaced by
the redundancy scheme (job duplication) and strictly lower the cost by γ − c.
Further Discussion. First, note that in our optimal two-agent contract, as long as
R ≥ 2c, there is no infeasible region: there is always a contract that makes (H ,H ) an
equilibrium. Moreover, the payment to any of the agents is never more than the cost of
honest computation. Figure 4.4a provides a pictorial representation of the proposition
where c/2 < γ < c and Λ = 0.5. When the enforceable fine is large, the redundancy
scheme is preferable. This is despite the fact that the redundancy scheme is more
expensive than auditing: it costs an extra c as opposed to γ < c. In other words, for
high values of fine, the redundancy scheme is a more effective threat against cheating
than independent auditing. When F is less than F1, the independent auditing becomes
the preferred method. For lower values of F , when the auditing capacity is all used up,
the redundancy scheme is added to compensate for the low value of fine to maintain
incentive compatibility. Figure 4.4b depicts the effect of auditing capacity, Λ, on the
optimal contract where c/2 < γ < c. When Λ = 0, redundancy scheme is the only
means to enforce honest computation. If furthermore no fine can be enforced (F = 0),
then α = 1: the job should be always duplicated. As Λ increases, there is a gradual
transition from using redundancy scheme to independent auditing (F < F1).
4.5.2 Global Optimality of Two-Agent Contracts
In developing the optimal contracts for two-agent case, we made a few critical assump-
tions: (a) the independent auditing is perfect; (b) the agents are non-colluding and
non-communicating; (c) the range of intermediate steps is large enough that the prob-
ability of any two guessed results to be same, or the guessed result to be the correct
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Figure 4.4: Optimal contract (where c = 400, γ = 250) w.r.t. (a) max. enforceable fine
F (Λ = 0.5); and (b) auditing capacity Λ (F1 = 600). Recall ρ =
λ
1−α is the conditional
probability of auditing given the job is assigned to a single agent.
result, is negligible; and (d) the agents are lazy but non-malicious. It turns out that
these assumptions are sufficient to warrant global optimality of two-agent contracts
among contracts that engage any number of agents in the following notion:
Proposition 4.6. The contract that hires at most two agents and chooses its terms
according to proposition 4.5, is globally optimal, that is, it achieves the least cost to
the principal among all contracts that employ any number of agents and aim to make
honest computation a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Our approach in proving global optimality is to show that any other form of
contract gives neither a stronger mean of punishment, nor less cost of operation to the
principal. First, we provide an argument that if the optimal contract indeed assigns a
task to more than one agent, then it does not benefit from hiring them in a “sequential”
manner. Next, we prove that two-agent contract is the best solution among all “non-
sequential” contracts by converting any given contract to a two-agent contract and
improving the cost of the outsourcer.
Suppose that the optimal contract hired the agents sequentially for a given task.
If in the first step, more than one agent is hired, then there are two possibilities:
either (a) the returned results are the same, in which case, the computation is correct
and there is no point in hiring any more agents and any subsequent steps; or (b) the
returned results are different, which means that at least one of the agents has not
computed the task correctly, in which case, all of the agents can be punished which
includes the wrongdoer, and hence there is no need for any subsequent steps. If in the
first step only one agent is assigned the task, there are again two possibilities: (a) the
agent is audited, in which case the principal unequivocally knows whether cheating has
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occurred and hence, there is no need for subsequent steps; or (b) the returned result
is not audited. In the latter case, because agents never communicate, the agents that
are hired in the next immediate step can be combined with the single agent hired in
the first step as though they are all hired at the same time. Then, the argument for
multiple agents in the first step can be applied to remove the need for any subsequent
steps. Therefore, any optimal contract is either non-sequential or can be converted to
a non-sequential one.
Now, let αi be the probability that i agents are hired for i ∈ {2, . . . , N} where N is
the maximum number of agents. Let λj be the (unconditional) probability that agent
j is independently audited. Also let pji be the (conditional) probability that agent j
receives the task if i agents are assigned. The expected cost of the contract to the
principal is the following:
C = r
N∑
i=2
iαi + r(1−
N∑
i=1
αi) + γ
N∑
j=1
λj = r
N∑
i=2
(i− 1)αi + r + γ
N∑
j=1
λj
Let ϕj be the probability that agent j receives the task. Then: ϕj =
∑N
i=2 pjiαi +
pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi). The expected utility of agent j for honest computation given that it
has received the message, and given that the rest of the agents are honest, is simply
r − c. Now, let us define ψj to be the probability that agent j is rewarded given its
strategy is to cheat. Given the honesty of all other agents, agent j is rewarded only
if it is the only one that is assigned the task and it is not audited on. This gives:
ψj = pj1(1 −
∑N
i=2 αi) − λj . Therefore, the expected utility of agent j for cheating
given it is assigned the task and all other agents are honest is rψj/ϕj − f(ϕj −ψj)/ϕj .
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint, i.e., uj(H ,H ) ≥ uj(C ,H ) with H
representing the honest strategy of other N − 1 agents, becomes: r ≥ ϕj
ϕj − ψj c − f .
Taking into account the incentive compatibility of all agents, we have:
r + f
c
≥ max
j
∑N
i=2 pjiαi + pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi)∑N
i=2 pjiαi + λj
The participation constraint given that the honesty of all agents is established is simply
r − c ≥ 0. Thus, the optimal contract is given by the following optimisation:
min
αi,λj ,pji,r,f
C = r
N∑
i=2
(i− 1)αi + r + γ
N∑
j=1
λj
s.t. Nr ≤ R, f ≤ F, λj , pj1, αi ≥ 0, λj ≤ (1−
N∑
i=2
αi)pj1,
N∑
j=1
pji = 1 ∀i,
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N∑
j=1
λj +
N∑
i=2
αi ≤ 1,
N∑
j=1
λj ≤ Λ, r + f
c
≥ max
j
∑N
i=2 pjiαi + pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi)∑N
i=2 pjiαi + λj
, r − c ≥ 0.
Now, suppose there is a claimed solution in which αi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {3, . . . , N}.
In what follows we construct an alternative solution that improves the cost to the
principal in which αi = 0 for all 3 ≤ i ≤ N . Consider this alternative contract:
αˆ2 =
N∑
i=2
αi, αˆi = 0 ∀i ≥ 3, λˆj =
N∑
k=1
λk/N, pˆji = 1/N ∀i, j, rˆ = r, fˆ = f.
First, we show that given the feasibility of the claimed contract, this alternative contract
is also feasible, and subsequently, establish the improvement in the achieved cost. The
only non-trivial constraint to check for feasibility of the above contract is the incentive
compatibility constraint:
r + f
c
≥
1
N
∑N
i=2 αi +
1
N (1−
∑N
i=2 αi)/N
1
N
∑N
i=2 αi +
1
N
∑N
j=1 λj
=
1∑N
i=2 αi +
∑N
j=1 λj
(4.15)
From the feasibility of the claimed contract, we have:
r + f
c
≥ max
j
∑N
i=2 pjiαi + pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi)∑N
i=2 pjiαi + λj
⇒ r + f
c
≥
∑N
j=1
(∑N
i=2 pjiαi + pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi)
)
∑N
j=1
(∑N
i=2 pjiαi + λj
)
=
(∑N
i=2
∑N
j=1 pjiαi +
∑N
j=1 pj1(1−
∑N
i=2 αi)
)
(∑N
i=2
∑N
j=1 pjiαi +
∑N
j=1 λj
) = ∑Ni=2 αi + (1−∑Ni=2 αi)∑N
i=2 αi +
∑N
j=1 λj
which gives (4.15). This establishes that the new solution is also feasible. In the first
line of the above argument, we used the following simple lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If we have a ≥ maxj∈J bj
cj
where cj > 0 for all j ∈ J , then a ≥
∑
j∈J bj∑
j∈J cj
.
Now: Cˆ = rˆ∑Ni=2(i−1)αˆi+ rˆ+γλˆ = r∑Ni=2 αi+r+γ∑Nj=1 λj ≤ r∑Ni=2(i−1)αi+
r + γ
∑N
j=1 λj = C.
The above proposition shows that our contract for two agents is not just a special
case solution of multiple agents, but it is indeed the solution involving any number of
agents. In other words, given the stipulated assumptions, there is no advantage ever in
hiring more than two agents. Incidentally, we also show that the best contracts makes
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the probability of any of the agents to be hired equal. This makes intuitive sense, as
unequal probability of task assignment creates some “information” which the agents
can potentially exploit to their benefit, and to the detriment of the principal.
4.6 Side-Channel (Information Leakage)
One of the important assumptions we made in developing our optimal hybrid contract
was that the two agents do not communicate, and hence, upon receiving a task, an
agent is not aware whether the same task is assigned to another agent or not. The
principal uses this ambiguity in its favour to enhance the threat of auditing through
redundancy. However, if agents somehow gain access to this information, the threat
loses its efficacy. Specifically, if redundancy scheme is used, an agent can selectively be
honest if it finds out that the task is outsourced to another agent (hence the name side
channel), and be lax when it knows it is the only recipient of the task. If the principal
supposes such “information leakage”, then the contract optimisation problem must be
modified. Note that the agents now have two distinct information states: one in which
they are the only assignee and another in which, both of them have received the task.
We refer to them as lone recipient and redundancy information states, respectively.
The privacy of information states implies incompleteness of information, and thus the
game Γo played between the agents is no longer a simple “one-shot” game, but becomes
a Bayesian game. Particularly, Γo is of the form 〈A,Ω, 〈Di, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈A〉, with
Ω = {1, 2, both}, representing employment of agent 1, 2, or both, respectively. For
each (s1, s2) = ω ∈ Ω, τ1(1) = L, τ1(2) = 0, τ1(both) = R, implying the lone recipient
state, unemployment, or redundancy state. Also, agents’ view on Ω is public, i.e.,
p1(s1, s2) = p2(s1, s2) = p(s1, s2) for a probability distribution p induced by the choice
of α in the chosen contract offer o = (r, f, α, λ). The new (ex-post) utility function
effectively becomes, for agents’ strategies d1, d2 : {L, 0, R} → [0, 1]:
ui(ω = i, d1, d2) = (1− (1− di(L))ρ)r − (1− di(L))ρf − cdi(L)
ui(ω = −i, d1, d2) = 0
ui(ω = both, d1, d2) = di(R)d−i(R)r − (1− di(R)d−i(R))f − cdi(R)
The constraints for the general optimisation problem in (4.1) must then be modified, so
that (H ,H ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where H (·) = 1. Due to the fact that τi
is one-to-one, and that ui is linear in di, such requirement of equilibrium translates to
ui(·,H ,H ) ≥ ui(·,C ,H ) and ui(·,H ,H ) ≥ ui(·,⊥,H ) = 0, where C (·) = 0. The
new incentive compatibility constraint (preferring honest computation over cheating)
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for agent i in the lone recipient information state (ω = i) is thus:
r − c ≥ r(1− ρ)− fρ⇔ rλ ≥ c(1− α)− fλ (4.16)
For the redundancy information state, the incentive compatibility is: r − c ≥ −f ,
because if the agent cheats, the results will be different and the agent will definitely be
punished.15 This constraint is redundant, because the participation constraint is still
r − c ≥ 0, which also implies r − c ≥ −f . Here, we assume R ≥ 2c. This will allow us
to ignore the budget constraint, which is: r ≤ R if α = 0, and 2r ≤ R if α > 0. This
is because the optimal contract turns out to choose r∗ = c and hence, for R ≥ 2c, the
budget constraint is automatically satisfied. 16 Hence, the new optimisation problem
is the following:
min
r,f,α,λ
r(1 + α) + γλ subject to: (4.17a)
f ≤ F, 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, λ ≤ 1− α, α ≥ 0, r ≥ c, rλ+ fλ ≥ c(1− α). (4.17b)
The solution is given as the following proposition:
Proposition 4.7. The optimal two-agent contract with information leakage, i.e., where
the agents have access to the information of whether the same task is outsourced to the
other agent or not, enforces honesty in that makes (H ,H ) a Nash equilibrium sets
f∗ = F , r∗ = c, and:
γ ≥ c
Λ
:
F ≥ [γ − c]
+ : λ∗ =
c
c+ F
, α∗ = 0, C∗ = c+ γc
c+ F
F < [γ − c]+ : λ∗ = 0, α∗ = 1, C∗ = 2c
γ<
c
Λ
:

F ≥ [c/Λ− c]+ : λ∗ = c
c+ F
, α∗ = 0, C∗ = c+ γc
c+ F
[γ − c]+≤F < [c/Λ− c]+: λ∗=Λ, α∗=1−Λ(1+F
c
), C∗=c(2−Λ(1+F
c
))+γΛ
F < [γ − c]+ : λ∗ = 0, α∗ = 1, C∗ = 2c
Proof. We first argue that we can safely assume that the fine is at its maximum value,
i.e., f∗ = F : the principal can manipulate r, λ, α or f in order to enforce the incentive
compatibility constraint in the lone recipient information state. Among these variables,
only increasing the fine is costless to the principal. Moreover, the only two constraints
that f appears in is f ≤ F and the incentive compatibility constraint. Hence, any
15Note that even when the agents know that the redundancy scheme is being used, unless they
coordinate their reported results, guessed results will be the same only with negligible probability. We
will consider the case of collusion in the next section.
16Recall that for R < 2c, the outsourcer can never assign more than one agent with any positive
probability, and hence, the issue of information leakage is irrelevant.
114
4.6. Side-Channel (Information Leakage)
optimal contract can be transformed to one in which f = F , keeping all other pa-
rameters fixed. We use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [11] to solve the
above non-linear (non-convex) programming. The non-convexity arises due to the in-
centive compatibility constraint (the last constraint in (4.17b)). Note that our cost and
constraint functions are all continuously differentiable. We first use the Mangasarian–
Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ) to establish that any minimum must satisfy
the KKT conditions, i.e., KKT are necessary conditions of optimality. In the absence
of equality constraints, the MFCQ condition means that the gradients of the active
inequality constraints are positive-linearly independent at optimum points.
As we mentioned before, we assume R ≥ 2c, since otherwise, never more than one
agent can be hired. It will turn out that the optimal contract will always choose r∗ = c,
hence the budget constraint of r ≤ R for α = 0 and r ≤ 2R for α > 0 is automatically
satisfied. The remaining inequalities (written in standard form) are −λ ≤ 0, λ−Λ ≤ 0,
λ + α − 1 ≤ 0, −α ≤ 0, c − r ≤ 0, c(1 − α) − Fλ − rλ ≤ 0. The gradients of these
inequality constraints with the order of variables as (λ, α, r) are: (−1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0),
(1, 1, 0), (0,−1, 0), (0, 0,−1) and (−F − r,−c,−λ). We will consider the cases of α = 1
and α < 1 separately.
If α = 1, we must have λ = 0, which means the only possible active inequalities
are −λ ≤ 0, λ+ α ≤ 1 and c− r ≤ 0, with gradients (−1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0) and (0, 0,−1).
These gradients are clearly linearly independent and the MFCQ condition holds. If
α < 1, from the last constraint, we must have λ > 0. Now consider two cases: Λ = 1 or
Λ < 1. When Λ = 1, then the constraint of λ ≤ Λ is implied by λ+ α ≤ 1 and α ≥ 0,
and can be removed. Now, if α = 0, then the last inequality c(1 − α) − Fλ − rλ is
implied by c−r ≥ 0 and hence can be removed. The standing inequalities will therefore
be λ + α ≤ 1, c − r ≤ 0, along with the active inequality of −α ≤ 0. The gradients
of these inequalities are respectively (1, 1, 0), (0, 0,−1) and (0,−1, 0), and are clearly
linearly independent. If, on the other hand, 0 < α < 1, then the standing constraints
are: λ+ α− 1 ≤ 0, c− r ≤ 0 and c(1− α)− Fλ− rλ ≤ 0, with the gradients: (1, 1, 0),
(0, 0,−1) and (−F−r,−c,−λ). The last three vectors are linearly independent because
all the elements of the last vector are non-zero given λ > 0. When Λ < 1, first suppose
α = 0. Then, the constraint of λ + α ≤ 1 is inferred from λ ≤ Λ, and hence can be
removed. The standing constraints are λ− Λ ≤ 0, c− r ≤ 0, c(1− α)− Fλ− rλ ≤ 0,
along with the active constraint of −α < 0. The gradients of these constraints are
(1, 0, 0), (0, 0,−1), (−F − r,−c,−λ) and (0,−1, 0). Note that except for the singleton
point of F = c(1/Λ − 1), never all four of these constraints are active.17 Now note
that any three of the gradients are linearly independent given λ > 0. Finally, when
17The optimal contract for such a point can be derived using a continuity argument.
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Λ < 1 and 0 < α < 1, the standing constraints are λ − Λ ≤ 0, λ + α − 1 ≤ 0,
c − r ≤ 0 and c(1 + α) − Fλ − rλ ≤ 0, with gradients (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 0,−1) and
(−F−r,−c,−λ), respectively. As before, the only case that all four of these constraints
can be active is the single point of F = c− r. For all other values of F , at most three
of these constraints are active, whose gradients are linearly independent given λ > 0.
In summary, the MFCQ normality condition holds.
To systematically obtain the KKT conditions, we introduce the dual multipliers µ1
to µ6, and transform the problem in (4.17) as follows:
min
r,α,λ,µi
C¯ = r(1 + α) + γλ− µ1λ+ µ2(λ− Λ) + µ3(λ+ α− 1)
− µ4α+ µ5(c− r) + µ6 (c(1− α)− Fλ− rλ) (4.18)
subject to:
primal feasibility: 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, λ ≤ 1− α,
α ≥ 0, r ≥ c, rλ+ Fλ ≥ c(1− α) (4.19a)
dual feasibility: µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6 ≥ 0, (4.19b)
complementary slackness: µ1λ = 0, µ2(λ− Λ) = 0, (4.19c)
µ3(λ+ α− 1) = 0, µ4α = 0, (4.19d)
µ5(c− r) = 0, µ6 (c(1− α)− Fλ− rλ) = 0. (4.19e)
The first order conditions of optimality are:
∂C¯
∂λ
= 0⇔ γ − µ1 + µ2 + µ3 − µ6(F + r) = 0, (4.20)
∂C¯
∂α
= 0⇔ r + µ3 − µ4 − cµ6 = 0, (4.21)
∂C¯
∂r
= 0⇔ (1 + α)− µ5 − λµ6 = 0. (4.22)
The full solution is now derived as in the statement of the proposition by straightforward
investigation of the conditions (4.19) through (4.22).
Discussion Firstly, note that the cost of the above contract is clearly higher than
that of the contract with no information leakage, but lower than the cost of single-agent
contract. The latter is because the single-agent contract in (4.4) is a feasible solution
of the above optimisation by setting α = 0. In fact, the cost of the contract is capped
at 2c: when both agents are hired at all times (i.e., with probability one), the incentive
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compatibility constraint and participation constraint are clearly satisfied with r = c,
giving the contract cost of 2c. This makes the redundancy scheme still an appealing
option specially when the cost of auditing is high or there is little (or zero) capacity for
auditing. Secondly, note that for γ < c, the redundancy scheme is never used for any
value of maximum enforceable fine. When the cost of independent auditing γ is higher
than the cost of honest computation c, if the enforceable fine is below the threshold
of γ − c, it is best to only use the redundancy scheme, but it has to be done with
certainty, i.e., α∗ = 1. Note that with information leakage, never probabilistic usage of
redundancy scheme alone is optimal, because the agents will choose to be lazy when
they know they are not audited. Also like the two-agent contract with no information
leakage (but unlike the single-agent), the optimal reward r∗ is never higher than the
cost of honest computation c, irrespective of the value of the maximum enforceable
fine. Moreover, we observe that for large values of enforceable fine, in contrast to the
no information leakage case, it is the independent auditing mechanism that is now the
preferred method.
4.7 Colluding Agents
Suppose the agents not only know the state of the other agents with respect to the task
assignment, but they can also coordinate their response to report the same guessed
result. This can save them from the cost of honest computation and at the same time,
go undetected. Hence, unlike before, returned results from multiple agents that are
the same may not be correct. The principal can audit the returned results (through
re-computation of the task) when they are the same. Consider two agents. As in the
information leakage setting, each agent has two distinct information state: being the
sole recipient, and being one of the two recipients.
The Bayesian game Γo for collusion is similar to the case of information leakage,
with the exception of players’ utilities when ω = both. This is because when both
agents cheat, they would be rewarded instead of being punished, and hence
ui(ω = both, d1, d2) = (1− (di + d−i − 2did−i))r − (di + d−i − 2did−i)f − cdi (4.23)
Note that similar to the case of information leakage, the principal still has to enforce
honesty when an agent is in its lone recipient information state. This implies ((4.16)):
r ≥ c
ρ
− f (4.24)
In this setting it might still be possible to make (H ,H ) an equilibrium as in previous
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settings. However, it is also possible for (C ,C ) to be an equilibrium, in which case the
agents would receive utility ui(both,C ,C ) = r which is better than ui(both,H ,H ) =
r − c, as they manage to collude and cheat the principal whilst saving the cost of
computation. Thus the agents would prefer (C ,C ) over (H ,H ), and thus we might
fail to guarantee fully honest computation. One way to dissuade the agents from
colluding is to make collusion a less attractive equilibrium than honesty. To do so,
we add another threat: the returned results from the two agents are audited by the
principal with probability ν, (even) when they are the same. Note that the value of ν
enters the cost of the principal even if honest computation is indeed enforced. This is
because when honest computation is enforced, the returned results are the same too.
Specifically, there will be an additional term of γαν to the principal’s cost. With this
modification, agent i’s utility for redundancy changes from (4.23) to
ui(ω = both, d1, d2) = did−ir + (1− di)(1− d−i)(1− ν)r
− (di(1− d−i) + (1− di)d−i)f − (1− di)(1− d−i)νf
which implies ui(both,C ,C ) = r(1 − ν) − fν. Therefore, to make honesty a more
attractive equilibrium than collusion, in the redundancy scheme information state, we
must have:
r − c ≥ r(1− ν)− fν ⇔ r ≥ c
ν
− f (4.25)
Hence, the corresponding optimal contract is given by the following optimisation:
min
r,f,α,λ,ν
r(1 + α) + γλ+ γαν, s. t. : r ≤ R, f ≤ F, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 (4.26a)
and: ρ(1− α) + αν ≤ Λ, α ≥ 0, r ≥ c, r ≥ c
ρ
− f, r ≥ c
ν
− f. (4.26b)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4.8. The optimal contract that enforces honesty in lone information state
and makes collusion a less attractive equilibrium than honest computation in the redun-
dancy information state sets α∗ = 0, i.e., never uses the redundancy scheme at all. The
rest of the parameters of the contract are also according to the optimal contract for a
single agent provided in (4.6).
The result can be derived directly by examining the KKT conditions of the optimi-
sation problem in (4.26) after establishing that KKT conditions are indeed applicable.
However, we provide a simpler proof that delivers more intuition.
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Proof. Consider a claimed optimal contract that selects an α > 0. We will construct
an alternative feasible contract that employs only one agent (αalt = 0) and strictly
improves the cost, hence reaching a contradiction.
The claimed contract has to satisfy inequalities (4.24) and (4.25) to be feasible.
Now consider an alternative contract alt that only selects one agent and audits it with
probability λalt = ρ(1− α) + αν. The values of the reward and fine are the same. Fist
we examine the change in the contract cost: Calt−C = [r+γ (ρ(1− α) + να)]− [r(1 +
α) + γρ(1 − α) + γνα] = αr, which is strictly positive based on the assumption that
α > 0. Now if we show that this alternative contract is feasible, then we have reached
the contradiction we are after.
The only non-trivial constraint that we need to verify to establish the feasibility of
the alternative contract is the incentive compatibility: we must have:
r − c ≥ r(1− λalt)− fλalt ⇒ r ≥ c
λalt
− f that is: r ≥ c
ρ(1− α) + να − f
The last inequality can be inferred from (4.24) and (4.25) and the fact that for any
α ≥ 0, we have: ρ(1− α) + να ≤ min(ρ, ν). This completes the proof.
Intuitively, whenever the two agents are to be assigned, the principal can save the
reward to the second agent by assigning the task to only one of them. The principal
will audit the only agent as it would have audited the two agents. This works since
two colluding agents (so far) act as though a single agent anyway.
The above proposition is a negative result: the benefits of redundancy scheme seem
to be all lost if the principal suspects collusion between the agents. However, in what
follows, we introduce two schemes based on the idea of offering “bounties” that, at
least partially, save the redundancy scheme. These bounty schemes better utilise the
incentive of the agents against each other, creating a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation
to undermine collusion. That is, instead of trying to make collusion a less attractive
equilibrium, which we observed is futile in Proposition 4.8, these schemes make collusion
a non-equilibrium. The idea is as follows: when the returned results are different, with
probability β the principal can audit the task and reward the bounty in such cases to
the agent with the correct result (if any). The value of the bounty should be the largest
credible promise, i.e., R. The difference between the two schemes is how they treat the
unaudited cases when the returned results are different:
• Bounty scheme one: when the results are different and auditing does not occur,
both agents are punished at f , which implies,
ui(ω = both, d1, d2) = did−ir + (1− di)(1− d−i)(1− ν)r
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+ (di(1− d−i) + (1− di)d−i)βR
− (di(1− d−i) + (1− di)d−i)(1− β)f − (1− di)(1− d−i)νf
• Bounty scheme two: when the returned results are different and the task is not
audited, both agents are rewarded at r, i.e.,
ui(ω = both, d1, d2) = did−ir + (1− di)(1− d−i)(1− ν)r
+ (di(1− d−i) + (1− di)d−i)βR
− (di(1− d−i) + (1− di)d−i)(1− β)r − (1− di)(1− d−i)νf
A nice feature of both schemes is that, if they indeed succeed to enforce honesty,
the bounties will never in fact be paid: All that is necessary is the credible promise
of the bounties. In what follows we analyse these two schemes. For both schemes, we
have:
ui(both,C ,C ) = r(1− ν)− fν, ui(both,H ,H ) = r − c
In bounty scheme one:
ui(both,H ,C ) = −c+Rβ − f(1− β) ui(both,C ,H ) = −f
In bounty scheme two:
ui(both,H ,C ) = −c+Rβ + r(1− β), ui(both,C ,H ) = r(1− β)− fβ
Making (H ,H ) an equilibrium is automatic in scheme one: r − c ≥ −f for any
f ≥ 0, following the participation constraint r−c ≥ 0. Making (C ,C ) a non-equilibrium
requires the following:
−c+Rβ − f(1− β) ≥ r(1− ν)− fν (4.27)
Similarly, making (C ,C ) a non-equilibrium for scheme two requires:
−c+Rβ + r(1− β) ≥ r(1− ν)− fν. (4.28)
Moreover, to have (H ,H ) an equilibrium in scheme two, one must ensure:
r − c ≥ r(1− β)− fβ (4.29)
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In both cases, the value of β does not directly enter the cost of the contract to the
principal if honesty is indeed enforced. Hence, the principal can choose the maximum
possible value. In order to make it credible, the principal must have enough auditing
capacity. Specifically, λ+αβ ≤ Λ. Hence the maximum value of β is given as (Λ−λ)/α.
Replacing in (4.27) we obtain the following extra (incentive compatibility) constraint
for scheme one:
(R+ f)(Λ− λ) + (r + f)αν − (c+ r + f)α ≥ 0. (4.30)
Similarly, replacing β = (Λ− λ)/α in (4.28) and (4.29) yields the following for scheme
two:
(r + f)(Λ− λ)− αc ≥ 0, (R− r)(Λ− λ) + ν(r + f)α− cα ≥ 0 (4.31)
Hence, the contract optimisation for bounty schemes one and two are the same as in
(4.26) except that the last constraint in (4.26b), i.e., r ≥ c/ν − f , is replaced with
(4.30) and (4.31), respectively. It turns out, however, that these two innocuous-looking
optimisation problems do not lend easily to closed-form solutions.
In what follows we obtain partial solutions of these optimisations, which provide
insight on the applicability of redundancy scheme in the presence of collusion. First,
note that for any given set of parameters c, F , R, Λ, the best contract for the infor-
mation leakage setting yields a better cost than any feasible contract in the collusion
scenario (both bounty schemes). This is because, compared to (4.17), the optimisation
problem of finding the best contract for bounty schemes one and two each have: (A) an
additional non-negative term in the cost: γαν; and (B) an extra incentive compatibility
constraint, (4.30) in scheme one and (4.31) in scheme two. Therefore, in particular,
if a solution of the optimisation in (4.17) is a feasible solution for the optimisation of
schemes one and two, then it is also optimal for them as well. This happens for exam-
ple when the optimal information leakage contract chooses α = 0, as then, the extra
incentive compatibility constraint in (4.30) and (4.31) are trivially satisfied. Hence, in
the light of Proposition 4.7, we have the following result:
Corollary 4.2. For both schemes one and two, the optimal contract chooses α∗ = 0
for F ≥ [max(γ, c/Λ) − c]+. The rest of the parameters for such cases are f∗ = F ,
r∗ = c and λ∗ = c/(c+ F ).
The corollary shows that for large values of the enforceable fine F , assigning a
single agent is the preferred method of outsourcing. However, the corollary leaves
out the question of whether redundancy scheme is ever the preferred method in the
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presence of collusion with the introduction of the bounty schemes. The next result
provides a positive answer. In particular, we derive sufficient conditions under which,
the redundancy scheme is the preferred method even in the presence of collusion:
Corollary 4.3. In bounty scheme two, for F < [γ − c]+, if Λ ≥ c/min(c+ F,R− c),
the optimal contract chooses redundancy α∗ = 1. The rest of the parameters for such
a case are: r∗ = c, λ∗ = ν∗ = 0, f∗ = F .
The corollary is intuitive: the auditing capacity should be large enough to make
the promise of checking for bounty when the results are different a credible one.
Proof. The corollary follows from a similar logic as in the previous corollary: we will
find cases that the optimal solution of the information leakage contract optimisation in
(4.17) are feasible solutions of the optimisation problem for scheme two. An alternative
to α = 0 is α = 1: if ν = 0 is a feasible choice for scheme two with the parameters
that make α = 1 an optimal solution for the information leakage setting, then the
corresponding contract is optimal for scheme two. From Proposition 4.7, α∗ = 1 when
F < [γ − c]+. The rest of the parameters are λ∗ = 0, r∗ = c and f∗ = F . We
should investigate whether these parameters and ν = 0 satisfy (4.31), which becomes:
(c+ F )Λ ≥ c & (R− c)Λ ≥ c⇔ Λ ≥ c/min(c+ F,R− c), hence the corollary.
The following corollary provides a sufficient condition for scheme one to use the
redundancy scheme.
Corollary 4.4. In bounty scheme one, for F < [γ − c]+, if Λ ≥ 2c/R, the optimal
contract chooses redundancy α∗ = 1. The rest of the parameters for such a case are:
r∗ = c, λ∗ = ν∗ = 0, and notably f∗ = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 4.3, with the following exception: Note
from (4.30) that f plays a double edge sword role, and it is no more a priori clear that
maximum fine is the best option. In fact for this case it turns out to be exactly the
opposite. From Proposition 4.7, for F ≤ [γ − c]+, optimal contract is given by r∗ = c,
λ∗ = 0, α∗ = 1 and f∗ = F . However, the value of f ≥ 0 for this region does not affect
the cost and feasibility of the contract, and hence, any f ≥ 0 is in fact also optimal.
Replacing these parameters with a general f and along with ν = 0 in (4.30), we obtain:
(R+f)Λ ≥ 2c+f . Hence a sufficient condition for feasibility (and hence optimality) is
(R+ f)Λ ≥ 2c+ f . The value of f is arbitrarily, the best result is obtained for f = 0,
that is Λ ≥ 2c/R.
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4.8 Contract Implementation
For completeness of the solutions, in this section we discuss notable technical concerns
on the implementation of our contracts.
4.8.1 Intermediate Steps and Hash Functions
As we discussed in Section 4.3.1, the use of intermediate steps as part of the output
would prevent trivial/clever guessing. However, the data representing intermediate
steps could be large and thus cumbersome for transmission. [15] proposes the use of
cryptographic hash as a sufficient representation of intermediate steps: Instead of send-
ing a large amount of data detailing these steps, the agent can only send the crypto-
graphic hash of such data. On receiving the agent’s hash hA, the principal repeats the
computation, and computes its own hash hP from the intermediate steps, then verifies
that hA = hP .
Informally, the use of hash function is considered secure if it is unlikely that the
agent can come up with the correct hash without knowing the correct intermediate
steps. The authors in [15] require such hash function to be a “random oracle”, i.e., a
function mapping in which each output is chosen uniformly randomly regardless of the
input. While this is a sufficient condition, the notion of random oracle is rather im-
practical, and also an overkill. Indeed, we argue that for this purpose of hash checking,
it is necessary and sufficient that the hash function is “collision resistant”, that is, it
should be difficult to find two different messages with the same hash.
Lastly, note that the process of hashing the intermediate steps may itself carry a
considerable cost. For instance, if the computation task is to hash a large string, then
the cost of hashing the intermediate steps (if the same hash function is used) would be
at least as much as computation cost. Therefore, either the cost of hashing intermediate
steps must be negligible compared to that of the original computation task, or it must
enter the contract model.
4.8.2 Enforcing The Principal’s Auditing
With regards to legal enforcement of the contract, it is necessary that behaviours of
contract participants are observable and verifiable. Actions such as “assigning a job”
or “paying a reward” are of this type. However, the principal’s action of “auditing a
job” is not necessarily observable to the computing agent(s)/contractor(s), as it might
be carried out oﬄine by the principal. It is critical to ensure that the principal really
performs auditing, for two reasons. Firstly, the principal must establish to the agents
its commitment to auditing so as to make the threats credible. Secondly, the agent
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needs an assurance that the principal cannot cheat and thus take away some of its
benefits (in two-level rewarding). In this subsection we discuss a simple method for an
agent to verify whether the principal has indeed properly performed an audit, where
the auditing method is a simple re-computation. Of course such verification is only
useful if it is a credible threat that the principal will be punished if it claims to have
made an audit but is found otherwise. In this case we assume that the contract can be
legally enforced by an authority (e.g., a court), and thus punishment on the principal’s
cheating/lying is guaranteed if there is enough evidence for the accusation.
Our audit mechanism relies on the use of a non-malleable commitment scheme
(Setup,Commit, Open). Assume existence of a common reference string CK← Setup(k)
for some security parameter k > 0. In its operation, the agent performs the computa-
tion to get a result rA, then produces (cA, dA)← CommitCK(rA||“agent”). The principal
also perform the same operation, except that if it is meant not to audit, then it produces
a random message of the same length. Whether or not this message is the result, we
denote it as rP , along with (cP , dP ) ← CommitCK(rP ||“principal”). The principal and
the agent then exchange their commitment values cP and cA, respectively, followed by
the exchange of dP and dA. The principal and the agent then open the commitments
and learn the corresponding messages, say mA and mP , respectively. It is not difficult
to see that this mechanism has the following properties:
• Honest auditing: by checking if mP = rA||“principal”, an honest agent can verify
whether the principal has properly audited, since the use of intermediate steps as
part of the output in the previous subsection guarantees that the principal can-
not efficiently produce the correct output without honestly executing the whole
computation. The principal also does not receive any useful information from the
agent in creating mP due to the hiding property of commitment, and it cannot
produce a message mP related to mA due to the non-malleability of commitment,
and that mP cannot be the same as mA (due to the additional suffix).
• Honest computation: Due to the binding property of commitment, the agent
receives negligible advantage in producing a correct computation result from the
execution of this mechanism. Due to the hiding property of commitment, it also
cannot tell if the principal is meant to audit or not at the time of committing the
computation result.
Using the above mechanism, the principal has negligible advantage in cheating during
auditing, and thus for simplicity we assume from now on that the principal’s action of
“auditing a job” is securely observable and verifiable from the agent’s view.
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4.8.3 Enforcing Probabilistic Behaviours
Another problem with unobservable strategies is the principal’s probabilistic behaviours.
This becomes clear if we recall our Stackelberg game notion presented in Definition 4.1.
Indeed, in the second stage of the game, the agents (followers) are informed of the con-
tract offer, after which they must decide their course of action. While informing the
offer to the agents can trivially be done, the realistic problem is on how to ensure that
the principal sticks to its chosen strategy, i.e., whether it correctly follows the offer
after the agents’ acceptance. Indeed, an offer can be considered unobservable, as it
might contain probabilistic behaviours, e.g., “employing two agents with probability
α”, are usually unverifiable. Our contracts unfortunately rely on these probabilistic
actions of the principal as explicitly stated in the terms and policies for auditing, task
duplication and/or rewarding (the latter in two-level reward contracts of subsection
4.4.3). Without an appropriate security measure, this is usually not possible, e.g., the
fact that the principal does not audit tells little about whether its auditing probabil-
ity is indeed λ = 0.3 or λ = 0.6. This important implementation issue has not been
discussed in previous works.
Usually this could be achieved cryptographically using multiparty computation
(MPC) [95], in which a sampling function on the principal’s behaviour is accurately and
securely computed among the contract participants. However, MPC assumes pairwise
secure communication among participants, which in this case implies a need for direct
communication between the agents. This poses a potential threat to our model: if
agents can freely communicate, they may as well collude and give identically incorrect
result, thus fooling the principal. Therefore we seek a mechanism that requires no
agent-to-agent communication, in that it is easy for the agents to catch the principal
cheating whenever the principal benefits from doing so.
In order to provably design such mechanism, we need to formalise the underly-
ing security requirements, which capture concepts such as “behaviour”, “deviation”,
“cheating”, “catch”. Informally, the behaviour of the principal is characterised by how
it plans to act (and will eventually do so) in implementing the contract. A plan of
actions for the principal essentially captures the its deterministic choices for all pos-
sible decision-making situations which might arise while executing the contract. An
example of such plan could be: give the task to both agents; if the result coming back
is the same, then reward both. Another example is: give the task to agent 1, then
audit on return. For convenience we denote the set of all possible plans as Ω, which
also contains an element ⊥ representing an invalid plan. The principal P is supposed
to pick a plan ω ∈ Ω according to a contract-specific probability distribution ∆(Ω),
but the agents do not know if P actually follows this distribution, or a different one to
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its eventual benefit. As a result, we decide to let such a plan be picked by the agents
instead of the principal.
In order to pick a plan, the agents are required to communicate with each other,
with their messages routed through the principal. This requires a well-specified com-
munication protocol among the agents. Recall that our goal is to enforce the principal’s
behaviour to the contract terms. Essentially, the only way to ensure this is to employ a
mechanism that detects the principal’s cheating, as well as a viable option to punish the
principal (e.g., by a court) accordingly. This is one key requirement that our protocol
must satisfy. In addition, our communication protocol must ensure that it facilitates
the nature of the contract, that is, it should accurately emulate the actual action of
probabilistic sampling of behaviour by the principal itself.
More specifically, if the agents execute the protocol honestly, and that the principal
does not tamper with the protocol messages, then the plan picked at the end of the
execution must have probability measure according to ∆(Ω). We name this requirement
correctness. Also, if the principal is picking the plan on its own, the agents should not
know about this, at least until after running the computation task. By emulating such
event, the protocol must likewise ensure that, even though the agents pick the plan,
they should not be aware about such plan, until they have finished the computation
task and returned the result (if employed). We call this property hiding. Next, in order
to detect the principal’s cheating (if any), the agents (after finishing the computation)
need to be informed of the plan that was picked (before the computation) for the
principal. This must be done in a secure way, so that any attempt to inform the agents
of a different plan would be easily caught. We call this the revealing property. Finally,
if the expected punishment is not credible enough, then the threat of being caught
cheating would not deter the principal from deviating. Therefore, we need the last
property, called no revealing, that requires the execution to give the principal no better
benefit than being a honestly sticking to the protocol specification. We summarise
these properties below:
• Correctness: Honest execution of the protocol must ensure that the plan is
picked according to ∆(Ω).
• Hiding: Before the contract is executed, the agents must know nothing about
the plan they have picked for the principal.
• Revealing: After the contract is executed, there must be a secure way for the
previously picked plan to be revealed to the agents.
• No cheating: Suppose that the agents execute the protocol honestly, then the
principal receives no better benefit than being a honest principal.
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Informally, detection of deviation is a process in which an agent contrasts what
it obverses as the principal’s behaviour against a plan ω ∈ Ω that was picked by
the agents. An inconsistency between the plan and the observed behaviour would
indicate to that agent of the principal’s deviation. Next, we define Bi to be the set of
possible principal’s behaviours observable to agent i, along with consistency relations
∼i such that ω ∼i b ⇔ b ∼i ω for all pairs (ω, b) ∈ Ω × Bi, for i = 1, 2. Here
an observable behaviour is a collection of actions that could be easily and costlessly
reproduced (in front of the judges) for verification. For example, the action of assigning
a job to an agent, or giving a reward (shown in the bank statement) are observable.
In order to capture the principal’s benefit from deviation, we need to define its utility
for each outcome of the contract execution. Essentially this utility is a function uP :
Ω2×(B1×B2\{(∅, ∅)})→ R, in which a tuple (ω1, ω2, b1, b2) ∈ Ω2×B1×B2 indicates the
agents’ views on the chosen plan (i.e., ω1 and ω2), and the principal’s actual behaviour
from each agent’s view (i.e., b1 and b2). Here ∅ denotes the fact that an agent is not
employed, and hence (∅, ∅) should be excluded, since in that case the principal will
need to form a new contract (possibly with different agents).
Our protocol relies heavily on commitments, and hence can be described by a tu-
ple (S, C,D) of setup, commit, and decommit algorithms. The protocol starts by a
honest generation of a common reference string CK by a reputable trusted third party.
This string CK is given securely to all protocol participants. The agents then randomly
choose their plan-picking seeds, and produce commitment and opening values for them.
The agents then exchange their commitment values via the principal, who is able to
intercept and modify such values arbitrarily. After this exchange, the agents proceed
to exchange their opening values, again via the principal. The principal, whilst being
able to open the seeds committed by the agents, however will not pass on the opening
values to the agents (to prevent them from learning each other’s seed) until after it
has assigned the computation tasks and received results from them. Upon receiving
the exchanged opening values, each agent learns the other’s seed, then constructs the
principal’s supposed action plan, and check whether the principal’s behaviour agrees
with such plan. In our adversary model, we assume that only one party can be mali-
cious/curious at a time. We formalise the security requirements below:
Definition 4.2. A secure contract implementation mechanism for ∆(Ω), B1, B2, ∼1,
∼2, and uP : Ω2 × (B1 × B2 \ {(∅, ∅)}) → R is a tuple of PPT algorithms (S, C,D)
satisfying for some negligible function  the following properties:
• Correctness: an honest execution of the protocol must simulate the principal’s
action plan and the agents’ view in an ideal contract execution, i.e., given the
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following experiment for k ∈ N:
Prot(∆(Ω), k) :
CK← S(k)
(c1, d1)← CCK(∆(Ω), k)
(c2, d2)← CCK(∆(Ω), k)
ω ← DCK(c1, d1, c2, d2)
return ω
it must hold that Prot(∆(Ω), k) and ∆(Ω) are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
sup
ω∈Ω
|Pr[ω ← Prot(∆(Ω), k)]− Pr[ω ← ∆(Ω)]| ≤ (k),
• Hiding: an agent who receives a commitment value does negligibly better in
guessing the eventual action plan ω than the one without such value, i.e., for
every PPT algorithm A = (A1, A2) (curious agent), there exists a PPT algorithm
A∗ = (A∗1, A∗2) such that
Pr
CK← S(k); (c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω), k); (c′, d′,m)← A1(∆(Ω),CK);
ω ← A2(c,m,∆(Ω),CK);ω′ ← DCK(c, d, c′, d′) : ⊥6= ω = ω′

− Pr
CK← S(k); (c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω), k); (c′, d′,m)← A∗1(∆(Ω),CK);
ω∗ ← A∗2(m,∆(Ω),CK);ω′ ← DCK(c, d, c′, d′) : ⊥6= ω∗ = ω′
 ≤ (k),
(4.32)
• Revealing: after sending a commitment, the principal is only able to convince
the other (honest) agent of exactly one action plan ω, i.e., for all PPT algorithm
P (cheating principal)
Pr

CK← S(k); (c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω), k); (c′, d1, d2)←
P (c, d,∆(Ω),CK);ω1 ← DCK(c, d, c′, d1);
ω2 ← DCK(c, d, c′, d2) : ω1 6= ω2 ∧ ω1, ω2 6=⊥
 ≤ (k) (4.33)
• No cheating: any principal would gain at most negligibly better than a honest
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principal, i.e., given the following experiment
ΠPContract-cheat(∆(Ω), k) :
CK← S(k)
(c1, d1)← CCK(∆(Ω), k)
(c2, d2)← CCK(∆(Ω), k)
c′2 ← P (c1, c2)
c′1 ← P (d1)
if c′1 = c1 ∨ c′2 = c2 then return (⊥,⊥, ∅, ∅)18
(d′2, b1, b2)← P (d2)
ω1 ← DCK(c1, d1, c′2, d′2)
ω2 ← DCK(c′1, d′1, c2, d2)
return (ω1, ω2, b1, b2)
it must hold that for all stateful PPT algorithms P (cheating principal)
E[uP (ω1, ω2, b1, b2)|(ω1, ω2, b1, b2)← ΠPContract-cheat(∆(Ω), k); (b1, b2) 6= (∅, ∅)]
− E[uP (ω, ω, b1, b2)|(ω, b1, b2)← Prot(∆(Ω), k); (b1, b2) 6= (∅, ∅)] ≤ (k) (4.34)
Since the security definition above requires the notion of Ω, B1, B2, ∼1, ∼2, and
uP , we also need to specify them before designing our protocol. Note that since we
aim at designing a protocol that assumes no communication among the agents, our
protocol only needs to serve contracts against non-colluding agents. Therefore we do not
include action plans involving auditing when returned results are different (β-scheme)
or identical (ν-scheme), but instead focus on optimal contracts for non-colluding agents
as in Propositions 4.1, 4.3, and 4.5. In other words, we represent the set of plans as
Ω = {{A1, audit}, {A1, reward}, {A2, audit}, {A2, reward}, {A1, A2, reward},⊥}.
(4.35)
Particularly, a plan must specify the employed agent(s), as well as what to do when the
results are returned. The {A1, A2, reward} plan implies two-agent employment, and
that if the returned results are the same, then both agents are rewarded, or punished
18This is to prevent the cheating principal P from returning a commitment back to the same agent,
pretending that it comes from another one, as that would clearly nullify all the seeds for selecting
ωi ∈ Ω.
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otherwise. Similarly we have the set of agents’ view on the principal’s behaviours:
B1 = {{A1, audit}, {A1, reward}, ∅} and B2 = {{A2, audit}, {A2, reward}, ∅}
(4.36)
Our construction of Bi relies on the assumption that the acts of auditing and blind
rewarding are distinguishable and verifiable to the agents. Note that we do not consider
punish as an observable action because we only aim to protect honest agents from being
cheated by the principal. Next, the consistency relations follow straightforwardly, i.e.,
for all bi ∈ Bi and ω ∈ Ω:
bi ∼i ω ⇐⇒ ω ∼i bi ⇐⇒
bi = ∅ ∧Ai 6∈ ω, orbi 6= ∅ ∧ bi ⊂ ω (4.37)
Interestingly, it is easy to notice that for every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ {1, 2}, there is exactly
one b ∈ Bi such that b ∼i ω. Nevertheless, the principal’s utility is then either its cost
of executing the contract, or a fine from the court if being caught cheating by at least
one of the agents, i.e.,
uP (ω1, ω2, b1, b2) =
−r −max(r, γ) if b1 6∼1 ω1 ∨ b2 6∼2 ω2, orcontract executing cost otherwise. (4.38)
We are now ready to construct our contract implementation protocol. For each proba-
bility distribution ∆(Ω) assume that there exists a PPT contract-generation algorithm
Gen∆(Ω)(·) which efficiently samples ∆(Ω), that is, there exists a negligible function G
such that
sup
o∈Ω
∣∣∣Pr [r ←$ {0, 1}k;ω ← Gen∆(Ω)(r)]− Pr [ω ← ∆(Ω)]∣∣∣ ≤ G(k). (4.39)
Whilst the protocol construction can be seen in Figure 4.5, its security is described in
Proposition 4.9 and its proof.
Proposition 4.9. Let (Setup,Commit,Open) be a non-malleable commitment scheme.
Let Ω, Bi, ∼i and uP be as defined in (4.35), (4.36), (4.37), and (4.38), respectively.
Let ∆(Ω) be a probability distribution over Ω, and assume existence of Gen∆(Ω) as in
(4.39). Then there exists a secure contract implementation mechanism for ∆(Ω), Bi,
∼i and uP .
Proof. We show that ContractProtocol satisfies all the properties of a secure contract
implementation mechanism. The proof of correctness is rather trivial as it comes
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Protocol ContractProtocol
proc S(k) : proc DCK(c1, d1, c2, d2) :
CK← Setup(k) r1 ← OpenCK(c1, d1)
return(CK) r2 ← OpenCK(c2, d2)
if r1 =⊥ ∨ r2 =⊥ then
proc CCK(∆(Ω), k) : return ⊥
r ←$ {0, 1}k r ← r1 ⊕ r2
(c, d)← CommitCK(r) ω ← Gen∆(Ω)(r)
return(c, d) return ω
Figure 4.5: Communication protocol for the contract
straightforwardly from the design of the contract generation algorithm Gen∆(Ω). In-
deed, the correctness experiment Prot(CK, k) produces two uniformly random nonces
r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}k, and hence {0, 1}k 3 r = r1 ⊕ r2 is also uniformly random. Since
DCK(c1, d1, c2, d2) uses Gen∆(Ω) to generate ω, (4.39) directly implies the correctness
property.
For the hiding property, we assume that there exists a PPT algorithm A such that
no PPT algorithm A∗ can preserve (4.32) and construct an adversary A′ against the
hiding property of the commitment scheme. First, given the existence of A = (A1, A2),
let A∗ = (A∗1, A∗2) such that A∗1 = A1 and A∗2(m,∆(Ω),CK) = A2(c∗,m,∆(Ω),CK),
where (c∗, d∗)← CommitCK(0k). The fact that (4.32) does not hold thus implies
Pr
CK← S(k); (c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω), k); (c′, d′,m)← A1(∆(Ω),CK);
ω ← A2(c,m,∆(Ω),CK);ω′ ← DCK(c, d, c′, d′) :⊥6= ω = ω′

−Pr
CK← S(k); (c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω), k); (c′, d′,m)← A1(∆(Ω),CK);
ω∗ ← A2(c∗,m,∆(Ω),CK);ω′ ← DCK(c, d, c′, d′) : ⊥6= ω∗ = ω′
 = ′(k) (4.40)
for some non-negligible function ′. As a result, the attacker A′ against the commitment
scheme proceeds as in the following experiment:
ΠA
′
NM-hide :
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CK← Setup(k)
(c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω))
m0 ← OpenCK(c, d)
m1 ← 0k
(c′, d′,m)← A1(∆(Ω),CK)
ω ← D(c, d, c′, d′)
b←$ {0, 1}
(c∗, d∗)← CommitCK(mb)
ω′ ← A2(c∗,m,∆(Ω),CK)
if ω = ω′ then b′ ← 0
else b← 1
return b = b′
Denote (4.40) in short as p−q = ′(k) we notice that when b = 0, A2’s view in ΠA′NM-hide
is identical to the experiment associated with p. Thus, in that case Pr[ω = ω′] = p.
Similarly, when b = 1 we have Pr[ω 6= ω′] = 1− q. Therefore
Pr[true← ΠA′NM-hide] = Pr[b = 0, b′ = 0] + Pr[b = 1, b′ = 1]
= Pr[b = 0] Pr[b′ = 0|b = 0] + Pr[b = 1] Pr[b′ = 1|b = 1]
=
1
2
p+
1
2
(1− q)
=
1
2
(q + ′(k)) +
1
2
(1− q) = 1
2
+
1
2
′(k)
which contradicts with the hiding property of commitment since ′(k)/2 is non-negligible.
This thus proves that the hiding property of the commitment scheme is broken, which
contradicts with our assumption on its security.
In a similar way, we show that an attacker P on the revealing property of contract
implementation can be used to construct an attacker P ′ on the binding property of the
commitment scheme. The proof, however, is rather straightforward:
ΠP
′
NM-bind :
CK← Setup(k)
(c, d)← CCK(∆(Ω))
(c′, d1, d2)← P (c,∆(Ω),CK)
m1 ← OpenCK(c′, d1)
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m2 ← OpenCK(c′, d2)
return m1 6= m2 ∧m1,m2 6=⊥
By looking at the construction of D we notice that, ω1, ω2 6=⊥ from the experiment
in (4.33) implies m1,m2 6=⊥. Similarly, the correctness of the commitment scheme
guarantees that ω1 6= ω2 implies m1 6= m2. Thus, if P succeeds in breaking the
revealing property with non-negligible chance, then ΠP
′
NM-bind returns true with the
same probability, i.e., the binding property of the commitment scheme is broken.
What remains is to prove that the principal only gains negligibly better by cheating.
To show this, we notice that following (4.38), the principal’s utility is essentially its
cost in executing the contract, which includes the reward to the agents and the cost
of auditing. Denote by u1(ω1, b1) and u2(ω2, b2) the principal’s cost with respect to
agent 1 and 2, respectively. Since the contracts in Ω does not involve auditing both
agents, meaning that the auditing cost is always spent with respect to exactly one
agent, therefore we have:
uP (ω1, ω2, b1, b2) = u1(ω1, b1) + u2(ω2, b2)
Consider the experiment ΠPContract-cheat(∆(Ω), k) and utility function (4.38), we notice
that the principal would avoid making either ω1 =⊥ or ω2 =⊥, as it would cer-
tainly receive utility −r − max(r, γ) which is the maximum realisable expense for
executing the contract. It would also avoid making either b1 6∼1 ω1 or b2 6∼2 ω2
for the same reason. Let r1 ← OpenCK(c1, d1), r′2 ← OpenCK(c′2, d′2). Due to the
non-malleability property of commitment, r1 and r
′
2 are statistically independent, and
since r1 is generated uniformly randomly by CCK(∆(Ω), k), therefore r1 ⊕ r′2 is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from uniform randomness. Consequently this implies that
ω1 ← DCK(c1, d1, c′2, d′2) is statistically indistinguishable from ∆(Ω). A similar argu-
ment also applies to ω2 ← DCK(c′1, d′1, c2, d2). We thus have for some negligible function
2 such that:
E
[
uP (ω1, ω2, b1, b2)|(ω1, ω2, b1, b2)← ΠPContract-cheat(∆(Ω), k); (b1, b2) 6= (∅, ∅)
]
=
∑
(ω′1,ω
′
2,b
′
1,b
′
2)6=(·,·,∅,∅)
uP (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2)
Pr[(ω1, ω2, b1, b2) = (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2)]
Pr[(b1, b2) 6= (∅, ∅)]
≤
∑
(ω′1,ω
′
2,b
′
1,b
′
2)6=(·,·,∅,∅)
uP (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2) Pr[(ω1, ω2, b1, b2) = (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2)]
=
∑
(ω′1,ω
′
2,b
′
1,b
′
2)6=(·,·,∅,∅)
(u1(ω
′
1, b
′
1) + u2(ω
′
2, b
′
2)) Pr[(ω1, ω2, b1, b2) = (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2)] (4.41)
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=
∑
ω′1,ω
′
2,b
′
1,b
′
2
(u1(ω
′
1, b
′
1) + u2(ω
′
2, b
′
2)) Pr
[
(ω1, ω2, b1, b2) = (ω
′
1, ω
′
2, b
′
1, b
′
2)
]
(4.42)
=
∑
ω′1,b
′
1
u1(ω
′
1, b
′
1) Pr
[
(ω1, b1) = (ω
′
1, b
′
1)
]
+
∑
ω′2,b
′
2
u1(ω
′
2, b
′
2) Pr
[
(ω2, b2) = (ω
′
2, b
′
2)
]
(4.43)
=
∑
ω′1∼1b′1
u1(ω
′
1, b
′
1) Pr
[
(ω1, b1) = (ω
′
1, b
′
1)
]
+
∑
ω′2∼2b′2
u1(ω
′
2, b
′
2) Pr
[
(ω2, b2) = (ω
′
2, b
′
2)
]
(4.44)
= E[uP (ω, ω, b1, b2)|(ω, b1, b2)← Prot(∆(Ω), k); (b1, b2) 6= (∅, ∅)] + 2(k).
For ease of comprehension, we note that (4.42) comes from (4.41) because u1(·, ∅) =
u2(·, ∅) = 0. Also, (4.43) yields (4.44) because earlier we argue that the principal
would let neither b1 6∼1 ω1 nor b2 6∼2 ω2. This completes the proof of the security of
ContractProtocol.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide an incentive analysis of outsourced computation with non-
malicious but selfish utility-maximising agents. We design contracts that minimise the
expected cost of the outsourcer whilst ensuring participation and honesty of computing
agents. We incorporate important real-world restrictions, in that the outsourcer can
only levy a restricted fine on dishonest agents and that auditing can be costly and/or
limited. We allow partial outsourcing, direct auditing and auditing through redun-
dancy, i.e., employing multiple agents and comparing the results, and optimised the
utility of the outsourcer among all hybrid possibilities.
We observe that outsourcing all or none of the tasks is optimal (and not partial
outsourcing). We show that when the enforceable fine is restricted, achieving honest
computation may still be feasible by appropriately increasing the reward above the sheer
cost of honest computation. We demonstrate that when auditing is more expensive than
the cost of honest computation, redundancy scheme is always the preferred method, and
when the auditing cost is less than half of the cost of honest computation, independent
auditing is preferable. When the cost of auditing is between half and the full cost
of honest computation, the preferred method depends on the maximum enforceable
fine: for large enforceable fines, redundancy scheme is preferred despite the fact that
it is more expensive “per use” than independent auditing, since owing to its higher
effectiveness, it can be used more sparingly. We established the global optimality of
contracts involving at most two agents among any arbitrary number of agents as far
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as implementing honesty as a Nash Equilibrium is aimed for.
Another focus of this work is on the effect of side information and collusion on the
optimal contracts involving a hybrid of direct computation and redundancy scheme
(duplication of the same task to two agents and comparing the returned results). In
particular, we explicitly developed conditions in which the redundancy scheme fails to
be the preferred method and conditions in which it will be the preferred method even
under such adverse conditions. Notably, we showed that that making collusion a less
attractive equilibrium is not an effective way at all to save the redundancy scheme in
the face of collusion. Instead, an effective way is bounty-like schemes that attempt
to make collusion a dis-equilibrium. Overall, we noted that preference for redundancy
in the presence of side information or collusion occurs for high values of auditing cost
(expected), and low values of maximum enforceable fines, where the latter is in sharp
contrast with the cases that collusion or side information is absent. This work in part
provided insights on potentials and limitations of redundancy scheme as a method
of auditing. Finally, we present a light-weight cryptographic implementation of our
contracts that provides mutual affirmation on proper execution of the agreed terms
and conditions.
Future directions. Our work opens a number of potential avenues for future investi-
gation. One of the major scenarios which we have simplified in this work is the possible
interactions among the agents. Here we assume that agents share accurate information
about their state with respect to the job assignments to each others, and then each
individually and independently decides its action. However, the agents may be able to
deceive their peers by giving them wrong signals about their state with the objective of
winning the bounty. Also, we assume cheating agents, although able to collude, cannot
have a means of commitment among themselves. If enforceable commitments among
colluding agents are assumed, the analysis can become more complicated: the agents
may agree to pass the honest result to one another, or intentionally plan for one of
them to get the bounty, only to share it among themselves later. In terms of global
optimality, we established that when agents are non-colluding and non-communicating,
the optimal contracts developed assuming at most two agents per each task are in fact
globally optimal among all contracts involving any number of agents per task. However,
in the presence of information leakage and collusion, this becomes more challenging,
as more parameters (e.g., the bounty) can be involved to build contracts. This enables
further investigation which are interesting as future research.
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Chapter 5
Rational Security for
Unauthenticated Communication
In the context of secure communication, cryptographic techniques often operate on the
basis of entity authentication. On the other hand, studies of security for unauthenti-
cated communication have often not been well motivated, and have thus received little
attention from the research community. This may be partly because cryptographic
definitions of security make it difficult to find an acceptable solution, but also due to
an argument that security, as a service, is not for free, whereas authentication carries
a cost for its own infrastructure.
In this chapter we provide an initial study of the security of unauthenticated com-
munications under the rational security model. We investigate a simple but prevalent
type of communication, namely, the query-response protocol, in which one party sends
a request for information, and the other replies. With a meaningful relaxation of attack
called online man-in-the-middle on query-response communication, we show a positive
theoretical result: even without any mean of authentication, such attacks can always
be rationally discouraged. Our notion of security is represented under the form of a
3-player game perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which two communicating peers follow a
prescribed protocol, whilst the adversary choose to not perform the designated attack.
We justify in the chapter our assumptions and definitions in relation to real life sce-
narios, as well as discuss matters on the practicality of our theoretical result. We hope
that the work presented in this chapter motivates further research on rational security
of communication protocols, in particular more elaborate unauthenticated communi-
cation protocols.
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5.1 Introduction
Due to physical and geographical separation, secure communication is vital in our
inter-networked world. Various aspects of security have been established for this need,
e.g., confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation. Security services, such as encryption
and message authentication, that can offer these aspects often operate on top of a
mechanism that guarantees authenticity/correct identification of communicating par-
ties. Typically, a secure communication (e.g. TLS-protected) between two networked
parties consists of three phase [44]. In the beginning, the parties present their identities
to one another. Next, they execute a key exchange protocol to establish a common
session key. Lastly, security services such as encryption and message authentication
are employed, using the common key, to protect messages in transmission. While the
common key (along with encryption and message authentication) guarantees that a
message on the line cannot be read or tampered with by anyone other than the sender
and intended receiver, it cannot assure who these sender and receiver actually are.
Therefore, an attacker can easily pretend to be the sender or receiver. Such assurance
can only be accomplished during the first phase, i.e., authentication. As a result, en-
tity authentication mechanisms become the “Achilles’ heel” of security systems, and in
their absence security services can seldom be considered fully effective.
Authentication in general is not an easy task. The most notable authentication
systems are Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), but they mostly target communications
that create monetary or sensitive effects, such as banking, e-commerce or military.
Another example is Web of Trust (WoT), which can offer authentication for more
neutral communication, but is less secure and scalable, as it depends on the efforts of
selfish individuals within the WoT. When it is assumed that attacks during the first
connection between two parties are unlikely, then the so-called leap-of-faith (LoF) [112]
can be used to offer “quasi-authentication”. The parties will make a leap of faith that
no attack occurs, and remember each other’s authenticating credential, so that in the
future mutual authentication can be achieved.
Undoubtedly the vast majority of Internet communication is unauthenticated, e.g.,
WWW surfing, peer-to-peer networks such as BitTorrent. On the one hand, it is
arguable that these communications are often not worth protecting due to their low
values and sensitivity. On the other hand, the number of entities involved are beyond
the managerial capacity of nowadays infrastructures. We are thus intrigued by the
question: “What security can be achieved in the presence of an attacker, without
authentication?”, as similarly asked by Barak et al. [10].
The above question has unfortunately received little attention from the research
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community. One obvious reason is that, since definitions of security adopted in con-
ventional cryptographic and network security research are so strong, in the absence
of authentication they are simply too difficult, or even impossible to achieve. Notable
examples are the concepts of matching conversations and mutual authentication by Bel-
lare and Rogaway [18]. Moreover, popular adversarial models, e.g., PPT adversaries in
provable security, are often too powerful and much more highly motivated than what
one would encounter in most real-life cases.
Without authentication, two-party communication may suffer from two important
attacks: impersonation and man-in-the-middle (MitM). In impersonation attacks the
adversary pretends to be one of the parties, and communicates with the other. MitM
attacks, on the other hand, allow the adversary to control the communication between
the two parties. Here the MitM attacker has an advantage in communicating with each
party, as it may receive useful information from the other. It is thus natural to assume
that the latter are more powerful and hence more harmful than the former.
It is a theoretical implication that the lack of authentication directly leads to the
threat of impersonation, which is unavoidable. We therefore focus, instead, on what
can be done against MitM attacks. Specifically, we investigate a proliferated form
of communication: request-reply. Our works involve two steps. First we specialise
the generic notion of MitM attacks from cryptographic/formal method literatures, so
as emphasise the clear distinction between these and impersonation attacks in the
context of request-reply communication. Then, we devise an economic model involving
communicating parties and a potential adversary, within which we show that there is
always a mechanism that discourages MitM attacks. Of course the adversary may still
perform impersonation, but in our argument, that is the best it could do.
Our work is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we review existing related liter-
ature, which indicates a lack of solutions for unauthenticated communication. Then
we establish our framework with a redefinition of MitM attacks in Section 5.3, and an
economic model in Section 5.4 representing the security problem. Under this model,
we progress by showing in Section 5.5 that there exists an equilibrium in which the
adversary does not attack. Section 5.6 shows a cryptographic implementation of such
equilibrium, thus making it a feasible solution. Although our solution is a proof-of-
concept that unauthenticated security is nontrivial, we nevertheless discuss concerns
regarding its practicality in Section 5.7.
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5.2 Related Work
Man-in-the-middle attacks have always been a central problem in communication se-
curity, both practically and theoretically. Formal treatments of such attacks have been
considered in several different ways. Most notable ones are summarised as below.
Ping-pong protocols. Dolev et al. [46, 47] defines successful attackers as ones who
can revert a function evaluation on a message sent over the communication channel.
Their focus on ping-pong protocols is particularly related to our context, as any protocol
implementing a query-response communication is of type ping-pong, i.e., the communi-
cation is stateless. However, their definition has the flavour of formal-method security,
and thus it alleviates many important low-level cryptographic requirements which may
be nontrivial to satisfy. Also, it mostly serves analysis of attacks on confidentiality,
and hence assumes authentication in the first place. Instead, we look at a more natural
problem (cryptographically) associated with man-in-the-middle attacks: lack of (even
weak) authentication.
Oracled-based security. Probably the most popular model of man-in-the-middle
attacks is via oracle-based models. Particularly, to model a security problem, one
would set up a context, with necessary information (keys, nonces, etc.) ready for the
communication, except that there are no communicating parties. Instead, all these
information are embedded into one or more input/output oracle(s), with which an
adversary can interact with. The adversary is successful if, given interaction with the
oracle(s), it is able to produce some legitimate messages. Man-in-the-middle attacks
are thus effectively captured, in that one can think of the oracle(s) as one endpoint
where the adversary receives helps in order to communicate with the other.
Oracled-based models are powerful in that the adversary is not bound to any com-
munication protocol, and is thus free on what it can do (as there is no worry about
attack detection). Meanwhile, each model is normally used to capture a very specific
and narrow security requirement, as otherwise the formal definition might become too
complicated to express. In fact, different security objectives have been captured using
oracle-based models, such as encryption (public-key [119], private-key [79]), message
authentication [16], digital signature [61].
Non-malleability. The more intuitive concept, but also more cumbersome to work
with, is non-malleability. Informally, a communication protocol is non-malleable if,
each party’s interaction with the adversary A can be simulated by an isolated algo-
rithm that does not interact with anyone. In other words, any information the adver-
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sary receives from the communication is not useful, as whatever it can do with such
information, it can also do without. This thus violates the common understanding of
man-in-the-middle attacks, in which an adversary must rely on manipulating of com-
munication messages. Non-malleability is introduced by Dolev et al. [45], applied to
several objectives, including commitment, encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs.
Unauthenticated communication. There have been some attempts to study se-
curity for unauthenticated communication. In [10] Barak et al. consider the problem of
multiparty computation, which usually require pairwise secure communication among
parties involved. They study the problem when there is completely no authentication.
Their idea is first to let parties exchange their public keys, then executing a secure mul-
tiparty protocol (SMPC). Relying on the power of SMPC, this mechanism ensures that
the adversary can only perform sequential impersonations, and not meaningful man-
in-the-middle attacks. For example, in attacking the communication between Alice
and Bob, the protocol ensures that, if the adversary wants to use information obtained
from Alice in talking to Bob, it must first completely finish a protocol execution with
Alice. In other words, the adversary cannot maintain concurrent conversations with
both sides and pass on messages online. In another work, Maurer and Wolf [96] pro-
pose key agreement protocols over unauthenticated public channels, which is secure
if the adversary cannot simulate either party and its knowledge. Finally, Pham and
Aura [113] devises a framework to analyse whether LoF is an acceptable replacement
for authentication without compromising too much security. Note that these solutions
still assume some form of correlation in protocol participant’s knowledge as well as
restriction in adversary’s capabilities.
Our contributions. Our work coincides with that of Barak et al. [10] in the research
question as well as objective, but using a different approach, and hence giving a solution
with different properties. Particularly, we consider the question of whether non-trivial
yet meaningful security can be achieved in completely unauthenticated settings. To
answer this, we propose the notion of online-man-in-the-middle (oMitM) attack, which
in turn yields a relaxed notion of security. In fact, our concept of oMitM attack/security
is the same as that developed by Barak et al. More specifically, it guarantees that either
the adversary will not tamper with the communication, or must do so sequentially (e.g.,
first finishing all communication with Alice, then starting with Bob, not concurrently).
Our argument is that while Barak et al. provides a cryptographic solution that sat-
isfies the relaxed security, its use of SMPC techniques make it practically unfavourable,
as it requires considerable efforts, only works well with static computation, and is not
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compatible with modules unfamiliar with SMPC [110]. Instead, we seek a solution that
operates totally beneath the actual communication. At this stage, our goal is to pro-
vide a solution for query-response protocols, the most primal form of communication
in the Internet.
In addition to a proposal of relaxed security, we develop a game-theoretic model
to study the conditions under which the adversary does not have an incentive to carry
oMitM attacks, and consider this as satisfaction of security. Our notion of security
is thus rational, as opposed to cryptographic one by Barak et al. We then develop
a cryptographic protocol operating beneath the query-response communications that
forces the adversary into playing a game we design for him and the two endpoints. By
playing this game in our designated equilibrium points, the adversary is incentivised to
at most perform sequential impersonation, not oMitM attacks. Compared to SMPC,
our solution is cheaper in complexity, and fully supports all dynamic changes in the
application-level communication.
5.3 The Nature of MitM Attacks
In this section we formally define the notion of communication which is convenient for
our study, which is then followed by the (weaker) notion of man-in-the-middle attack.
We also provide explanation of why we believe that such attack can be effectively and
efficiently discouraged in the lack of authentication facilities.
5.3.1 Defining Query-Response MitM Attacks
As the first study in the economics of unauthenticated communication, we focus on
the most primal and typical form of communication, i.e., single-round query-response.
A single-round query-response communication consists of two parties, a client and a
server. During the course of communication, the client sends a query q ∈ Q to the server
who, upon receipt of q, would send back a response r ∈ R. Because the communication
is considered single-rounded, this process happens only once from the client’s view. We
start by defining the queries and responses which are meaningful to the client and the
server:
Definition 5.1. A query-response space is a tuple 〈Q,R, F 〉, where Q 63⊥ and R 63⊥
are finite sets of strings with polynomially-bounded lengths , and F is the set of polynomial-
time computable functions from Q to R.
In the above definition, the finiteness of Q and R indicates that the client and
the server can recognise if a query/response is valid, e.g., a well-formatted HTTP
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query/response. Any other malformed query/response would be treated as ⊥. In
the next step we define communication transcripts, which is the central concept in
formalisation of attacks. In short, a communication transcript consists of messages
exchanged among parties during a protocol execution. We formalise this notion below:
Definition 5.2. A messaging event is a tuple (A,B,m, s, t) indicating that party A
starts sending a message m at time s and party B receives it at time t. With respect
to a query-response space 〈Q,R, F 〉, a communication transcript is a finite sequence
of messaging events 〈(Ai, Bi,mi, si, ti)〉n where mi ∈ Q ∪R ∪ {⊥} and si ≤ ti.
In this case the notion of “message” is context-specific, and thus is not necessarily a
physical message being sent over the network. For example, a HTTP request message is
sent from the client to the server after several IP packets to establish a TCP connection,
followed by a few more TCP segments if the request content is large enough. However,
in the context of HTTP, all these exchanges are counted as one message being sent.
At this moment, we assume that knowledge about a message is always atomic, that is,
it is either known in full or not at all. Note also that a messaging event (A,B,m, t)
has a universal meaning, rather than from any party’s viewpoint. We are now ready
to define a protocol for query-response communication:
Definition 5.3. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query-response space. A single-round protocol im-
plementing 〈Q,R, F 〉 is a tuple 〈Qry,Res〉 such that:
• Qry is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a query q ∈ Q,
• Res is a PPT algorithm that takes as input f ∈ F ,
• let C := Qry(q) and S := Res(f), denote by transcript the communication tran-
script w.r.t. 〈Q,R, F 〉 of an execution of C and S, then ∀q ∈ Q and ∀f ∈ F :
Pr[∃ (C, S, q, s1, t1), (S,C, rq, s2, t2) ∈ transcript : q = q ∧ rq = f(q)] = 1 (5.1)
where q and rq denote a query made by C and the corresponding response it
received, respectively.
Regarding Definition 5.3, one can think of Qry and Res as the protocol implemen-
tation for the client and the server, respectively. An example of Qry, in reality, is a
WWW browser, and the corresponding Res is the WWW server. A client will think of
a query q ∈ Q and enter it on the browser. The browser interacts (in some way) with
the server, and it presents a response r to the client. For correctness, the requirement
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Figure 5.1: Attacks on a query-response conversation
(5.1) makes sure that when there is no attacks or errors, the server S must receive the
correct query q, and the client C must receive the correct response r = f(q).
The protocol defined in Definition 5.3 suffers from attacks as presented in Figure 5.1.
In this case there is potentially an adversary sitting in the middle of the conversation.
The simplest form of attacks is impersonation, in which the adversary simply drops the
conversation with one end and interacts only with the other. The more sophisticated
attacks are man-in-the-middle (MitM). In particular, the adversary captures traffic
from C representing a query q ∈ Q, and then makes a number of queries to S. By
receiving the traffic containing the replies, the adversary Adv somehow crafts a traffic
transmitting a response r ∈ R back to C. As benefits, the adversary for example learns
the content of q or f(q), or is able to make r different from f(q), and so on.
Without authentication, neither impersonation nor MitM attacks can be discour-
aged in cryptographic sense. This is because the adversary Adv has exactly the same
knowledge as the server S, except that of f , which it can replace by some arbitrary
f ′ ∈ F . Instead, let us consider a relaxing, but also natural form of attacks, which we
call online man-in-the-middle (oMitM): the attack must necessarily yield an informa-
tion flow from C to S and then back to C, both via the adversary Adv. In other words,
the adversary must rely on communication with each end in talking with the other.
A successful oMitM attack consequently requires both ends to be concurrently ac-
tive for at least some period of time. By “active” we mean that a party is engaged in
a protocol execution and has not finished it yet. The intuition is clear: if concurrent
activeness is not required, then any one-way/two-way impersonation would become a
valid attack, which is unavoidable and thus uninteresting. Indeed, referring to Fig-
ure 5.1, Adv is only considered a successful oMitM attacker if some qi correlate(s) with
q and r correlates with the corresponding ri. Due to atomicity of message knowledge,
this means that at least some query qi must be made after Adv receives q. Similarly, the
response r must be sent after Adv receives ri = f(qi) from S. In other words, for two
messaging events (C,Adv, q, sq, tq) and (Adv, C, r, sr, tr), there exist messaging events
(Adv, S, qi, s1, t1) and (S,Adv, ri, s2, t2) such that tq < s1 < t2 < sr. The flow of infor-
mation is thus from q to qi, ri, and finally to r. Since C and S must be active within
[sq, tr] and [t1, s2] respectively, the concurrent activeness period is at least [t1, s2]. We
visualise this in Figure 5.2 and summarise the notion of oMitM adversary below.
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Client (C) Adv Server(S)
time
q = q
rq
q′
r′
Figure 5.2: Example communication transcript with successful oMitM attack
In overall, our relaxation of security makes sense in that, a non-online MitM at-
tacker, although is able to modify the traffic, cannot exploit the power of a man in
the middle: using the convenience in access to information from one side in commu-
nicating with the other. In this case, such attacker might equivalently send a random
response back to C := Qry(q) without even talking to S := Res(f), and it thus becomes
a less-powerful attacker, i.e., an impersonator. Alternatively, it can also construct the
knowledge of f via massive querying, so that later on it can plausibly impersonate S
to C, which could however be very costly.
Definition 5.4. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query-response space, and 〈Qry,Res〉 be a single-
round protocol implementing it. For each q ∈ Q and each f ∈ F let C := Qry(q) and
S := Res(f) and Adv be a PPT algorithm. Denote by transcript the communication
transcript resulted from the execution of C, S and Adv. Then, Adv is said to be a
successful online man-in-the-middle (oMitM) attacker if there exist (C,Adv, q, sq, tq),
(Adv, C, rq, sr, tr), (Adv, S, q
′, sq′ , tq′), (S,Adv, r′, sr′ , tr′) ∈ transcript such that
tq < sq′ < tr′ < sr ∧ q = q (5.2)
where q and rq denote a query made by C and the corresponding response it received,
respectively, and q′ and r′ denote a query received by S and the corresponding response
from S, respectively.
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M1 M2
q
r
paused
f
q′
r′
Client(C) Adv Server(S)
Figure 5.3: MitM attacks as machine execution
In this definition, the notion of adversary is formalised for each pair of query q and
function f , since the adversary may discretely choose its behaviour based on the re-
ceived query and/or the perceived response function. Also, because C, S, and Adv are
PPT algorithms, it is possible that (5.2) only holds with some probability p. In that
case, we consider that Adv succeeds with probability p. Note also that the definition
inherently assumes that Adv has complete knowledge of all messages during the com-
munication. This is a stricter adversary model than cryptography that allows partial
knowledge. However, we later show that this assumption is reasonable by making sure,
using several cryptographic techniques, that the adversary can intercept/capture either
all messages, or none at all.
5.3.2 Solution Motivation and Overview
Our approach to discouraging oMitM attacks stems straightforwardly from Definition
5.4. Indeed, the protocol execution of C := Qry(q) and S := Res(f) implies that Adv
would need to capture q, and then it must be able to make a query q′ to S for r′ = f(q′).
Therefore, if it is possible to make either or both of these two steps costly, there is a
potential that an adversary would refrain from attacking.
To visualise this approach, we model an oMitM attack as two concurrent executions
of the query-response protocol, one between the client C and Adv, and the other between
Adv and the server S, as can be seen in Figure 5.3. Each execution, including the
computation at both ends and the communication, can be thought of as inner operation
within a (Turing) machine. For convenience we name these machines M1 and M2 as in
the figure. In this case, M1 takes as input a query q ∈ Q, for instance from a user. It
outputs a response r to the user, as well as some query representing what Adv received
from C. Meanwhile, M2 takes as input some queries from Adv and a response function
f ∈ F , and outputs corresponding responses to Adv.
As the first step of an oMitM attack, Adv must be able to query the server with a
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request q′ related to q, e.g., q′ = q. The simplest way to do so is for Adv to honestly
follow Res, so that after termination M1 would correctly produce q, which can then
be used to construct q′. However, the termination of M1 also produces a response r,
that is, the client has already received a result for its query. Evidently, such response
was not influenced by any communication with the server, and thus the attack is not
a valid oMitM attack. Alternatively, Adv may pause the operation of M1 at some
point and make a copy of M1 along with its current states (memory, registers, etc.),
called M ′1. The adversary then resumes M ′1 and waits for it to output q, which should
be identical to the eventual output of M1. This would give Adv a chance to perform
relevant inquiries to the server before a response is produced to the client. Nevertheless,
this attack method only works if Adv has full knowledge of the circuitry of M1, which
involves the PPT algorithms implemented at both the client and Adv. Unfortunately,
this is not always guaranteed because the adversary may not know the realisation of the
probabilistic nature of the client. In fact, later on in our solution we actually introduce
randomness at the client side to prevent this attack from happening.
The remaining option for Adv is to pause M1, then examines its inner states to
extract information about q to produce a related query q′. After getting a response r′
for q′, it can then modify M1 so that on termination the output response r is related
to r′. However, there is again an obstacle for Adv, which is the potential difficulty in
obtaining information about q while examining M1. This is key to our solution. In
a nutshell, we exploit the fact that because there is a lack of obtainable information
about q, the adversary must make many different queries to the server in the hope
that at least one of them relates to q. By introducing a cost of making queries, the
attack may be discouraged if the total cost of querying exceeds the attack benefit. Note
however that the querying cost per query also applies to the client, but since the client
knows exactly its query, the total cost is much less.
Our solution involves several rounds of querying in the presence of Adv, an example
of which is found in Figure 5.4. In particular, the client picks, in addition to the desired
query q, a number of other random queries, so as to have a total, say n queries, one for
each round. The client then shuﬄes this set of queries randomly, denoted by q. Next,
given the shuﬄed order, the queries are made one-by-one to the server S , which in
fact are intercepted by Adv. For each query, Adv must decide whether to perform the
oMitM attack, and in overall it is only successful if the oMitM attack is carried on the
round where the actual query q is made. Meanwhile, to perform the oMitM attack on
each query, the adversary must execute the entire protocol1 with the actual server. In
order to guarantee a successful oMitM attack, the number of queries (e.g. n2) made
by Adv is thus much more than that made by the client (e.g. n). Any attempt to
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Client (C) Adv Server(S)
q1 q1,1
r1,1
.
.
.
q1,n
r1,nr1
q2 q2,1
r2,1
.
.
.
q2,n
r2,nr2
Figure 5.4: Example query-response communication with n = 2 rounds
lessen the querying cost would also reduce the adversary’s chance of success. When the
cost reaches zero (no query), the adversary becomes at most an impersonator (with
certainty).
5.4 Defining Security Game
We recall from previous sections that strict security for unauthenticated communication
cannot be achieved, i.e., against all efficient adversaries. Therefore we seek the notion of
rational security, i.e., safety against rational adversaries who would only attack if there
is positive payoff in doing so. To study such possibility, we model the communication
as a strategic interaction, i.e., a game among three players: the querier (e.g. user),
the responder (e.g. server), and the adversary. Our goal is to design a communication
mechanism that restricts the possible actions of the players in the game, so that there
would exist an equilibrium point in which the adversary has no benefit in becoming an
oMitM attacker.
We present our result in the reverse order. In this section we describe the desirable
game which we want the players to play. The next section focuses on showing the
existence of equilibrium points. After that we show how players can be forced to play
this game via a cryptographic protocol. Indeed, we use cryptographic techniques to
1Later on we show, using cryptographic commitments, that the adversary must execute the entire
protocol with the server in order to receive any response from the server.
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ensure that the adversary cannot perform outstanding behaviours, such as capturing
the content of query at early stages, or partially performing an otherwise atomic action
specified by the game.
5.4.1 Specifying Environment Parameters
Before formalising the game, we first need to identify assumptions about the oper-
ating environment that would help us construct players’ utility functions. Our first
assumption is about the gain of attacker and loss/damage on the client and server:
Assumption 1 (Transferability). Let LC < 0 and LS < 0 be the losses of the client and
the server compared to a normal attack-free communication, then GAdv = −(LC + LS)
is the benefit to the adversary.
Transferable/zero-sum utility is a natural assumption often used in game-theoretic
analysis, which is reasonable as it signifies the fact that benefit neither vanishes nor
expands, but is simply transferred from one hand to another. Our argument for using
zero-sum gain/loss is likewise. Indeed, assume otherwise that GAdv > −(LC + LS),
then, working under the assumption that there exists a “market” for such transactions,
the victims (client and server) can at least raise the potential value of the loss by
having an option to “sell” the attack to the adversary at price GAdv. In other words,
the victim would agree to let the attack happen, or even carry the attack against itself
where possible, so as to receive a “fee” of GAdv from the adversary. If the adversary
is able to attack without this agreement, the victim inherently loses this amount. On
the other hand, having GAdv < −(LC +LS) would undermine the determination of the
adversary, and thus is a bad assumption. This concludes our choice of transferability.
For the sake of simplicity, we also assign a single value of damage for each attack
type, i.e., impersonation and man-in-the-middle, instead of letting it to be influenced
by how the attack is carried out. In reality, the actual damage of an attack also depends
on, for example which response is returned to the client, or how much the adversary
learns about the query. However, in this case we assume either the average value or
the maximum damage, which may be taken from statistics. This can be summarised
as below, as well as in Table 5.1.
Assumption 2 (Simplified loss). Denote by LmitmC < 0 (resp. L
mitm
S < 0) the loss to
the client (resp. server) when Definition 5.4 is satisfied. Denote by LimpC < 0 (resp.
LimpS < 0) the utility contribution to the client (resp. server) otherwise.
Our next argument is about the relation among these losses. For simplicity we
assume the same ordering of losses for both the client and the server across all situations,
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Client(C) Server(S) Attacker(Adv)
oMitM (Definition 5.4) LmitmC L
mitm
S G
mitm
Adv = −(LmitmC + LmitmS )
Impersonation LimpC L
imp
S G
imp
Adv = −(LimpC + LimpS )
No attack 0 0 0
Table 5.1: Table of losses in different scenarios.
i.e., for events A 6= B, LAC > LBC implies LAS > LBS (and vice versa), and similarly for <
and = relations. We also assume that Lmitm < Limp, as otherwise it would be the case
that GmitmAdv ≤ GimpAdv , and thus the adversary has no incentive in becoming an oMitM
adversary. We omit this case as there is no need for a solution against such adversary.
Assumption 3 (Utility ordering). We assume the following regarding losses of the
client and the server: LmitmC < L
imp
C and L
mitm
S < L
imp
S .
Finally, we introduce the most important component of our game model, which is
the cost of querying c, as it is our mean of discouraging oMitM attacks. In association
with the querying cost, there is also a cost of processing a query, denoted τ(c), which we
assume to be increasing but negligible, which implies that although the server/respon-
der would prefer less processing, but that is of least importance in its decision-making
process. In reality, querying/processing cost can be introduced in several ways, for
example as below:
• Efforts: the cost may stem from a requirement that before making a query,
the querier must perform some expensive tasks. Here the processing cost τ(c) is
the cost of verifying that the task is carried out properly. Expensive tasks are
normally facilitated using Proof-of-Work (PoW) mechanisms [28], which involves
solving a freshly generated puzzle with adjustable difficulty. PoW offers different
forms of cost, such as memory [48], network [1], and CPU (e.g., DDH [145], hash
inversion [75], factoring [49]).
• Time: in time-critical environments, cost may be introduced via mandatory
waiting time before a query can be made. Again, τ(c) comes from the fact that
the responder also has to wait before making a response.
• Monetary: it might be possible that a querier must pay to make a query. In
compatible with our model, we assume that the payment is not made to the
responder, but to some non-player party, such as the channel operator, e.g., the
ISP. Likewise τ(c) is shaped by the channel operator’s policy. We also assume
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that the amount of payment is agreed between the querier and the responder,
whereas the bounds on such value is designated by the channel operator.
Assumption 4 (Querying cost). Denote by cmin ≥ 0 and cmax ≥ cmin ≥ 0 the minimum
and maximum possible costs for sending a query and receiving a response. The cost
is not transferable, that is, it does not come from one player to another. Let c ∈
[cmin, cmax] be the actual querying cost, then the cost of processing a query is τ(c),
which is an increasing but negligible function in c.
5.4.2 The High-Level Protocol
In order to specify the communication game, we first need to identify the actions/s-
trategies of involved players. In a nutshell, the game is informally described as follows:
the client and server will choose how to communicate, and the adversary will choose
how to attack. In this case we are not interested in the possibility that a party can
abstain from the communication process, and instead assume that they are always
willing to participate. This is because our main focus is to demonstrate that it is
possible to discourage oMitM attacks over impersonation, even though the former is
more beneficial to the adversary, rather than showing what exactly players should do
in reality.
As for the adversary, cryptographic literature imposes no boundary on its possible
strategies, apart from being probabilistically polynomial-time (PPT). On the contrary,
we employ restrictions on the strategies of the client and the server, mainly by forcing
them to follow some communication protocols. There are a few reasons in favour of
these restrictions. Firstly, choices made by the client and the server in an actual com-
munication are often preprogrammed into communication software, and thus they are
only able to act in certain ways that the software allows. Secondly, having unrestricted
actions may result in an optimal choice that is difficult to implement, for example it
may require sophisticated cooperation between human and machines. The last reason
is to avoid complication of game analysis, as for example the client could have strate-
gies involving out-of-band channels which are difficult to model. On the other hand,
we try not to restrict their strategies more than necessary, since that would render the
mechanism inflexible, and hence reduce its applicability.
We specify strategies for the client and the server as a set of protocols they may
choose in order to communicate with each other. Our protocols are aligned with the so-
lution overview captured in Figure 5.4. We start with a query-response space 〈Q,R, F 〉,
and let nmax ≤ b
√|Q|c. Our sets of protocols for Qry and Res implementing 〈Q,R, F 〉
are given in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, respectively. The protocol uses extra machines,
150
5.4. Defining Security Game
(Qry) Bridge B (Res)
“start”, (n, c) “start”, (n, c)
(n′, c′) (n′, c′)
q1 q1
r1
q2 q2
r2
.
.
.
qn∗ qn∗
rn∗r1, . . . , rn∗
Figure 5.5: (Qry,Res) operation with bridge B
which we call store-then-forward bridges, as can be seen in Figure 5.5. The involve-
ment of the adversary requires two bridges to facilitate protocol executions between
the adversary and the two endpoints. Although these machines do not exist in real-
ity, they can be implemented using cryptographic commitments, which we show later.
Nevertheless, the components of the (Qry,Res) protocol set can be explained as follows:
• ⊥: a message the does not belong to Q∪R.
• Senddst(m): a subroutine that sends a message m to the destination dst. When
it is invoked by src, then m is added to the tail of a queue at dst allocated for
messages from src.
• Receivesrc(m): a subroutine that receives a message m from the source src. When
invoked at dst, it takes a message m out from the head of its local queue allocated
for messages from src. If the queue is empty, it waits for a message to come, and
timeouts after reasonable waiting time.
• Senddstc (m): similar to Senddst(m), but incurs a cost c to complete.
• Receivesrcc (m): similar to Receivesrc(m), but its execution at dst implies a cost c
to the immediate sender who executed Senddstc (m). If it fails, then m is set as ⊥.
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• QueryGen(q, n, r,D): given D as a prior probability distribution of q over Q,
selects an n-tuple q of distinct queries in Q such that qr = q, and that gives no
information about r. We provide a construction for this in Proposition 5.2.
• B1: a machine connected to the client C and Adv. Informally, it serves as a
“smart” bridge between Adv and C. Normally messages are simply forwarded in
between, with the exception of responses from Adv which will be accumulated
and stored in B1 and only get forwarded to C after all the rounds of querying are
completed. For this reason, B1 is called a store-then-forward bridge.
• B2: similar to B1, but bridges the adversary Adv and the server S.
• All above subroutines never fail, but only timeout after reasonable waiting time,
the effect of which we assume to not influence any player’s utility. If a timeout
occurs, then the corresponding algorithm is terminated. Note however that the
bridges never timeout.
The correctness of (Qry,Res) is given below:
Proposition 5.1. For any valid choices of n, c, r and n′, c′ and any query-response
space 〈Q,R, F 〉, (Qryn,c,r,Resn′,c′) is a single-round protocol implementing 〈Q,R, F 〉.
Proof. Given that there is no adversary, then the protocol involves C := Qryn,c,r(q),
S := Qryn′,c′(f), and bridge B, for some q ∈ Q and f ∈ F . The protocol starts with
the client C sending a message “start” to initiate the conversation. The server and
the client then exchange their round complexity parameters, i.e., (n′, c′) and (n, c),
respectively. The round complexity is agreed to be the maximum of the two choices:
n∗ = max(n, n′) and c∗ = max(c, c′), where n∗ is the number of queries/rounds the
client will make, and c∗ is the cost the client incurs in each querying round. This is
followed by a sequence of rounds, in each of which C make a query qi and the server
provides a response ri, which is held at B. After n
∗ rounds, all responses are flushed
back to C, thus satisfying Definition 5.3.
Proposition 5.2. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query-response space, and D be a probability
distribution over Q. Define QueryGen(q, n, r,D) as follows:
Qq ← {q′ ∈ Q | PrD [q
′] = Pr
D
[q]}
if |Qq| < n then return ⊥
s← {q}
for i = 1 to n− 1
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Protocol Qryn,c,r(q)
Parameters: n ∈ [nmax], c ∈ [cmin, cmax], r : [nmax] × [cmin, cmax] → [nmax] s.t.
r(n′, c) ≤ max(n′, n) ∀(n′, c) ∈ [nmax]× [cmin, cmax].
Channels: peer.
Input: A query q ∈ Q and a probability distribution D over Q.
Protocol.
Sendpeer(“start”)
Sendpeer(n, c)
Receivepeer(n′, c′)
if n′ 6∈ [nmax] ∨ c 6∈ [cmin, cmax] then return ⊥
n∗ ← max(n, n′)
c∗ ← max(c, c′)
q ← QueryGen(q, n∗, r(n′, c′),D)
if n′′ 6= n∗ then return ⊥
for i from 1 to n∗
Sendpeerc∗ (qi)
Receivepeer(sig)
if sig 6= “done” then return ⊥
for i from 1 to n∗
Receivepeer(Ri)
if ⊥∈ {R1, . . . , Rn∗} then return ⊥
return Rr(n′,c′)
Figure 5.6: The set of Qry client strategies over the choices of n, c, r.
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Protocol Resn′,c′(f)
Parameters: n′ ∈ [nmax], c′ ∈ [cmin, cmax].
Channels: peer.
Input: A response function f ∈ F .
Protocol.
Receivepeer(sig)
while sig = “start” do
Receivepeer(n, c)
Sendpeer(n′, c′)
if n′ 6∈ [nmax] ∨ c 6∈ [cmin, cmax] then continue
n∗ ← max(n, n′)
c∗ ← max(c, c′)
for i from 1 to n∗
Receivepeerc∗ (q)
if q ∈ Q then Sendpeer(f(q))
else Sendpeer(⊥)
Sendpeer(“done”)
Receivepeer(sig)
Figure 5.7: The set of Res server strategies over the choices of n′ and c′.
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Protocol B
Channels: src and dst.
Protocol:
while true do
Receivesrc(sig)
Senddst(sig)
Receivesrc(n, c)
Senddst(n, c)
Receivedst(n′, c′)
Sendsrc(n′, c′)
if sig 6= “start” ∨ n, n′ 6∈ [nmax] ∨ c, c′ 6∈ [cmin, cmax] then
continue
n∗ ← max(n, n′)
for i from 1 to n∗
Receivedst(Ri)
Receivedst(sig)
Sendsrc(sig)
for i from 1 to n∗
Senddst(Ri)
Figure 5.8: Operation of store-then-forward bridge B1 (resp. B2) where (src, dst) =
(Qry,Adv) (resp. (Adv,Res)).
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qi ←$ Qq \ s
s← s ∪ {qi}
qn ← qr
qr ← q
return (q1, . . . , qn).
Then the output of QueryGen gives no information about r. In other words, for all
n ∈ N+, all distinguisher M and r0, r1 ∈ [n] we have
Pr[q ←D Q; q ← QueryGen(q, n, r0,D) : M(q, n) = 1]
= Pr[q ←D Q; q ← QueryGen(q, n, r1,D) : M(q, n) = 1]
Proof. To prove this result, we only need to show that QueryGen produces probabilis-
tically the same output regardless of the value of r, and since M receives the same
input, it must give the same output. Indeed, we first notice that QueryGen outputs
=⊥ with the same probability for both r0, and r1. This is because the condition for
outputting ⊥ is n > |Qq| which is independent of r. Assume otherwise that QueryGen
always outputs a valid query tuple, then it is easy to see from the algorithm above
that QueryGen is a simple random sampling without replacement of equal probabilities
over the set Qq. This means that any permutation of the sample will have the same
probability distribution. On the other hand, QueryGen(q, n, r0,D) can be converted
to QueryGen(q, n, r1,D) by swapping qn with qr0 , then qr1 with qn, which results in a
permutation. Thus any distinguisher would have the same view in both cases.
5.4.3 Game Formalisation
In the previous subsection we declare the strategies of players. Our next concern is
on the type of game that appropriately captures the players’ interactions. For this we
first notice that our oMitM attacks are defined over choices of query q and response
function f . In addition, our assumptions on losses (transferability, simplified losses)
indicate that players’ utilities are influenced by the type of attack, i.e., Definition 5.4,
which is subject to the value of the query q. Since the adversary and the server do not
know q before taking an action, they thus have incomplete knowledge of their utility.
This suggests us to consider using Bayesian games in the analysis.
We start with the standard definition of Bayesian game in Definition 1.6, i.e., a tuple
〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉. Our game is played between the client, the server, and
the adversary, meaning that N = {C, S,Adv}. Here the state of nature essentially
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captures the unknown parameter, i.e., q, and hence with respect to a query-response
space 〈Q,R, F 〉 we set Ω = Q. As a proof of concept, we assume that the query is
picked uniformly randomly from Q. In other words, pC(ω) = pAdv(ω) = pS(ω) = 1/|Q|
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Next, Ai captures available actions for players, in which the strategies for the client
and the server are described in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, respectively. Meanwhile, the
adversary strategy set is the set of all possible PPT algorithms. For consistency, we
then have the client’s type and signal function as TC = Q and τC(q) = q for all q ∈ Ω.
Likewise, we also have TS = TAdv = {0} and τS(q) = τAdv(q) = 0 for all q ∈ Ω. As for
type-to-actions mappings Ci, we notice that since players’ strategies are in the form of
Turing machines, which accept all possible inputs, therefore Ci(ti) = Ai for all i ∈ N
and all ti ∈ Ti.
What is left to identify is ui : Ω× A→ R, i.e., the utility function for each player,
where A = AC × AS × AAdv. Essentially, the utility for each player is composed
of two parts: its gain/loss as the result of an attack, and the cost for carrying out
its action. Following Definition 5.4, the first part can inherently be inferred from the
communication transcript of C := Qry(q), S := Res(f) and Adv, where (Qry,Res,Adv) ∈
A. Note that even though B1 and B2 are network entities, but since they honestly bridge
messages (with delays), we do not consider them in the communication transcript.
Meanwhile, the cost of action is essentially the number of queries multiplied by the
cost of making query (resp. processing query) for the querier (resp. responder). For
the convenience of players’ utilities, for each (ω, a) = (q, (Qry,Res,Adv)) ∈ Ω × A we
define the following:
LC(ω, a) =
LmitmC if Definition 5.4 is satisfied, orLimpC otherwise.
LS(ω, a) =
LmitmS if Definition 5.4 is satisfied, orLimpS otherwise.
q(ω, a): the set of queries received by S
cC(ω, a): cost value c
∗ in the description of Qry
cS(ω, a, q): cost value c in Receivec(q) in the description of Res
nC(ω, a): number of times Qry invokes Sendc∗
Then, players’ utilities can be constructed as follows:
uC(ω, a) = E [LC(ω, a)− cC(ω, a) ∗ nC(ω, a)] (5.3)
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uAdv(ω, a) = E
−(LC(ω, a) + LS(ω, a))− ∑
q∈q(ω,a)
cS(ω, a, q)
 (5.4)
uS(ω, a) = E
LS(ω, a)− ∑
q∈q(ω,a)
τ (cS(ω, a, q))
 (5.5)
We notice that in this case the cost of querying for the client is the same for each
query, as can be straightforwardly inferred from Figure 5.6. In contrast, at the server
side, there is a chance for the querying cost to change after each of the while loop,
hence the cost must be calculated per query, which explains the summation
∑
over
q(ω, a). Also, the utilities are of expected values due to the probabilistic nature of the
adversary. For convenience, the game is properly defined as follows:
Definition 5.5. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query response space. Let {Qry} and {Res} be
strategy spaces defined as in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, respectively. With respect to
above components, an unauthenticated communication game is a Baysian game
〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 such that:
• N = {C, S,Adv},
• Ω = Q,
• AC = {Qry}, AS = {Res}, and AAdv is the set of all PPT algorithms,
• TC = Q, TS = {0}, and TAdv = {0},
• Ci = Ai,
• τC(ω) = q, τS(ω) = 0, and τAdv(ω) = 0 for all ω = q ∈ Ω,
• pC(ω) = pS(ω) = pAdv(ω) = 1/|Q| for all ω ∈ Ω,
• ui are as in (5.3), (5.4), (5.5).
5.5 Game Analysis
In this section we analyse the previously specified game and construct equilibria in
which the adversary cannot successfully perform an oMitM attack. In other words,
the outcome of the equilibrium is that with certainty Definition 5.4 is not satisfied.
To facilitate equilibria computation, we first provide categorisation of the adversary’s
strategies, along with elimination of weakly dominated strategies, thus making them
much more tractable than the set of all possible PPT algorithms.
158
5.5. Game Analysis
5.5.1 Simplifying Attack Strategies
In general, the behaviour of the adversary consists of two parts: external communica-
tion with different parties, and internal computation, which may happen in parallel or
in an arbitrarily mixed order. For the sake of our game analysis, we do not need to
study all details about adversary’s strategies. This is because the following is true with
regards to players’ utility functions:
• Players’ utilities can be computed solely from the observing the communication
among entities.
• Players utilities do not depend on the values of query/response messages, only
on their order appearance.
Hence, we omit the adversary’s internal computation, and only mention it briefly in
our analysis. In the following we construct the general algorithm that captures the
adversary’s possible communication, based mainly on its protocol execution with the
client C := Qry(q), for two reasons. Firstly, since the adversary cannot actively start
a protocol execution with C, the behaviour of C is fixed and well-known, which is
ideal for building a framework of the adversary’s strategies. Secondly, the timeline of
this execution would help us detect the type of attack that may occur. In Figure 5.9
we construct the general structure of Adv’s communication, which is supported by the
following result:
Lemma 5.1. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query-response space. For some cmin, cmax > 0, let
{Qry} and {Res} be defined according to Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, respectively. Let
G = 〈N,Ω, 〈Ai, Ti, Ci, τi, pi, ui〉i∈N 〉 be an unauthenticated communication game with
respect to above components. Let AreducedAdv be the set of PPT algorithms such that their
communication framework are as in Figure 5.9 for all states of nature ω ∈ Ω and all
a−i ∈ A−i. Then AAdv reduces to AreducedAdv via elimination of weakly dominated strategies
and/or equivalent strategies2.
Proof. Our proof has three steps. In the first step we show that the adversary Adv’s
communication with the client C must be as specified. Next, we explain why Adv only
communicates with the server S at certain points as in Figure 5.9. Finally, we prove
that Adv should communicate with S in a way suggested by Figure 5.9.
For the first part of the proof, we notice that the specification of the adversary Adv’s
communication with C in Figure 5.9 resembles that in Figure 5.7. Suppose otherwise
2Two strategies s and s′ of player i are equivalent if Eωui(ω, s, s−i) = Eωui(ω, s′, s−i) for all s−i ∈
A−i.
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Protocol Adv
Channels: C, S.
Protocol:
ReceiveC(“start”)
ReceiveC(nC , cC)
SendS(“start”)
SendS(n′, c′) where n′ 6∈ [nmax] ∨ c′ 6∈ [cmin, cmax]
ReceiveS(nS , cS)
SendC(nAdv, cAdv) for (nAdv, cAdv) ∈ P
n∗ ← max(nC , nAdv)
for i from 1 to n∗
ReceiveC(qi)
Execute Qry to S with (n′, c′) = (1, cmin) (Optional)
SendC(ri)
SendC(“done”)
Figure 5.9: Generic adversary’s strategies where optional steps can be skipped.
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that Adv either omit some of these steps, or arrange them in a different order, or both.
We discuss omission of steps as below:
• ReceiveC(“start”) and ReceiveC(nC , cC): skipping these steps has the same effect
as executing them and then ignoring the received messages.
• SendC(nAdv, cAdv), SendC(ri), and SendC(“done”): skipping these steps will cause
the client C to timeout and acknowledges no response for any of its queries, and
thus together failing Definition 5.4. This is the worst case for the adversary since
executing these steps incur no cost. Thus it is in Adv’s best interest to execute
these steps.
• ReceiveC(qi): the reasons for executing this step are the same for previous two
cases. In other words, skipping it is the same as executing it and then ignoring
qi, and also reduces the chance that Definition 5.4 is satisfied.
Consider the option of shuﬄing the above steps in a different order. Assume that this
does not cause the client C to timeout or terminate, then the Adv receives the same
set of messages from C, and hence gains no additional benefit from their contents. The
only way shuﬄing could affect the adversary’s utility is via the order of appearance of
ReceiveC(qi) and Send
C(ri), as they relate to Definition 5.4. However, if Receive
C(qi)
occurs after SendC(ri), this means that for messaging events (C,Adv, qi, sq, tq) and
(Adv, C, ri, sr, tr) we have sr < tq, which clearly does not improve the chance for Defi-
nition 5.4 to be satisfied. Thus, shuﬄing of prescribed steps can be safely eliminated.
Next we show that communication with S should only be made at specific moments
relative to Adv’s communication with C. Suppose otherwise that communication with
S can occur at different stages below, we show that this is fruitless:
• Before ReceiveC(nC , cC): this has the same effect as for Adv to wait for ReceiveC(nC , cC)
to finish and then ignore the received messages while communicating with S.
• After SendC(nAdv, cAdv) and before ReceiveC(q1): similar to above, and addition-
ally, any communication with S at this stage does not improve the chance of
satisfying Definition 5.4, as there is yet any messaging event (C,Adv, q, s, t).
• After SendC(ri) and before ReceiveC(qi+1): this is similar to the previous point,
as any communication with S at this stage does not change Adv’s communi-
cation with C, and also does not fall between any pair of messaging events
(C,Adv, qi, sq, tq) and (C,Adv, ri, sr, tr).
The final part of the proof is to show that the prescribed communication with
the server S is optimal. Following Figure 5.9, the first three steps are SendS(“start”),
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SendS(n′, c′), and ReceiveS(nS , cS), which serve as initialisation of a query-response
process with the server. The purpose of this initialisation is to observe (nS , cS), which
is a server’s private information apart from its response function f ∈ F . The value of
(nS , cS) might be important to Adv in deciding (nAdv, cAdv) that would be sent back
to the client C, as it would contribute to influencing the adversary’s utility (5.4).
In addition, the use of invalid round parameters n′ 6∈ [nmax] or c′ 6∈ [cmin, cmax] will
cause the stateless server S to reset (Figure 5.7), thus creating no effect to any future
communication. It is therefore optimal for Adv to execute these steps to learn (nS , cS).
On the other hand, Adv needs not communicate further with S in order to decide
(nAdv, cAdv), because the best Adv can gain is information about f via the S’s responses
to queries. However, players’ utilities are independent of the value of f , and therefore
the adversary needs not learn it at this stage.
The remaining point is to reason why after each ReceiveC(qi), the adversary should
execute a query-response protocol with S at most once, with round parameters (n′, c′)
= (1, cmin). Indeed, the idea of communicating with S between Receive
C(qi) and
SendC(ri) is to ensure that Definition 5.4 is satisfied once qi = q. In other words, this
communication must yield a communication transcript containing messaging events
(Adv, S, q′, sq′ , tq′) and (S,Adv, r′, sr′ , tr′) where r′ is the response by S to q′. Be-
cause of the feature of B2 that delays the bridging of responses, Adv must make
n = max(nS , n
′) number of queries. To send each query Adv must executing SendSc (q′),
where c = max(cS , c
′), or otherwise the server’s execution of ReceiveAdvc (q′) will fail,
causing r′ to be set as ⊥, thus failing Definition 5.4. In overall this incurs a cost c · n,
which is minimised by setting (n′, c′) = (1, cmin). This process can be conveniently
achieved by executing Qry1,cmin,r for arbitrary query-hiding function r. Note also that
to satisfy Definition 5.4 the adversary needs not execute Qry more than once. Therefore
it is amongst the optimal choices for the adversary to behave a prescribed.
The above lemma implies a significant elimination of attack strategies that allow
us to parameterise them. Indeed, there are only a few parameters in Figure 5.9 that
can be customised by the adversary:
• nAdv : P 2 → [nmax], cAdv : P 2 → [cmin, cmax]: the probabilistic choice of round
complexity when negotiating with Qry, decided by Adv after observing (nC , cC)
and (nS , cS).
• di : P 2 → {0, 1}: the adversary’s probabilistic decision whether to query S at
round i, where 1 indicates a communication to S and 0 otherwise. Potentially it
is a function of several parameters: other players’ choices of round complexity,
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the client’s choice of where (r) to hide q, the client’s choice of queries q. We
however show in Lemma 5.2 that the di only needs to depend on other player’s
round complexity parameters, i.e., (nC , cC) and (nS , cS). Also, as in the proof of
Lemma 5.1, the adversary’s utility does not depend on the response function f ,
and hence it needs not base the choice of di on its communication with S.
Lemma 5.2. Consider an unauthenticated communication game where the adver-
sary’s strategy is (nAdv, cAdv, d1, . . . , dnmax), then there exists an equivalent strategy
(n′Adv, c
′
Adv, d
′
1, . . . , d
′
nmax) with probabilistic functions d
′
i : P
2 → {0, 1}.
Proof. We first set the probabilistic round complexity parameters n′Adv := nAdv and
c′Adv := cAdv. Let (nC , cC , r) and (nS , cS) be strategies of the client C and the server S,
respectively. Then it must be the case that di is probabilistically identical for all valid
r and i, as otherwise it is easy to construct a distinguisher that violates Proposition
5.2. Denote by Pr[di = 0 | nC , cC , nS , cS , q] the probability that di = 0 given player’s
strategies and query q, we construct a strategy such that for all i ∈ [nmax],
Pr[d′i = 0 | nC , cC , nS , cS ] =
∑
Q
Pr[di = 0 | nC , cC , nS , cS , q].
Note that such construction is always possible, and it takes as input only (nC , cC , nS , cS)
before outputting the probabilistic decisions of d′i. Therefore we only need d
′
i : P
2 →
{0, 1}. This mixed strategy yields the same adversary’s utility since it leads to the
same expected number of queries made by the adversary to the server, i.e.,
nS
max(nAdv,nC)∑
i=1
Pr[d′i = 0 | nC , cC , nS , cS ] = nS
max(nAdv,nC)∑
i=1
∑
Q
Pr[di = 0 | nC , cC , nS , cS , q]
(5.6)
as well as the same success probability of satisfying Definition 5.4 which is determined
by checking whether d′r(nAdv,cAdv) = 1:
Pr[d′r(nAdv,cAdv) = 1 | nC , cC , nS , cS ] =
∑
Q
Pr[dr(nAdv,cAdv) = 1 | nC , cC , nS , cS , q]. (5.7)
Since we assume that the adversary is a PPT algorithm, each attack strategy can
thus have a probabilistic choice over nAdv, cAdv and di. For convenience of game analysis
however, we equivalently consider the deterministic choices as pure attack strategies,
and represent probabilistic choices by mixed strategies. The simplification of attack
strategies leads to more tractable players’ utility functions:
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Lemma 5.3. Consider an unauthenticated communication game where the client’s
strategy is (nC , cC , r), the server’s strategy is (nS , cS), and the adversary’s strategy is
categorised by a tuple (nAdv, cAdv, d1, . . . , dnmax), then players’ utilities are:
uC(ω, a) = LC(ω, a)−max(nC , n) max(cC , c) (5.8)
uAdv(ω, a) = −(LC(ω, a) + LS(ω, a))− cSnS
max(nC ,n)∑
i=1
di(param) (5.9)
uS(ω, a) = LS(ω, a)− τ(cS)nS
max(nC ,n)∑
i=1
di(param) (5.10)
where
param = (nC , cC , nS , cS), n = nAdv(param), c = cAdv(param),
LC(ω, a) =
LmitmC if dr(n,c)(param) = 1, orLimpC otherwise. , and,
LS(ω, a) =
LmitmS if dr(n,c)(param) = 1, orLimpS otherwise. .
Proof. The proof for this lemma is rather straightforward. We first notice that r(n, c)
is the round number of the querying round in which the actual query is made, i.e.,
qr(n,c) = q. Meanwhile, dr(n,c)(param) = 1 indicates that within this round, Adv
communicates with the server S after ReceiveC(qr(n,c)), and before Send
C(rr(n,c)), thus
successfully satisfying Definition 5.4 with certainty. Therefore, players’ benefit from
attack is deterministic as expressed. The querying cost of their utilities are trivial,
where nS
∑max(nC ,n)
i=1 di(param) is the total number of queries Adv makes to S.
The above lemma allows us to simplify the notion of unauthenticated communi-
cation game, from Bayesian game to a simple strategic-form game. Indeed, players’
utilities as expressed in Lemma 5.2 depend on their strategies but the state of nature
ω ∈ Ω. In addition, players’ strategies also do not depend on ω. Therefore we can
redefine our game easily in strategic-form.
Definition 5.6. Let 〈Q,R, F 〉 be a query response space with some Ans ∈ F , and
[cmin, cmax] be a cost interval, with 0 ≤ cmin ≤ cmax. With respect to above compo-
nents, a refined unauthenticated communication game is a strategic-form game
〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 such that:
• N = {C, S,Adv},
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• AC = {(nC , cC , r)}, AS = {(nS , cS)}, and AAdv = {(nAdv, cAdv, d1, . . . , dnmax)},
• ui are as in (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10).
5.5.2 Finding Good Equilibria
We apply the most intuitive method to find equilibrium for this three-player game. In
particular, we fix the strategy of one player, and find an equilibrium of the induced
game between the remaining players. This is repeated for every strategy, until we find
one that is also a best response against the choices (in equilibrium) of other players.
For this we realise that the utilities of the client and the server do not strongly depend
on each other’s strategy. Therefore, if we choose either one and fix its strategy, then
there is a better chance to reuse a two-player equilibrium for a new fixed strategy of
that player. In particular, we choose to fix the server’s strategy as it has a smaller
strategy set, and thus less repetition of equilibrium finding is required. In terms of
equilibrium type, our game formulation suggests that we use the notion of “one-shot”
Nash equilibrium. However, because the nature of communication is sequential, it is
thus more desirable to seek a refinement of such equilibrium, i.e., a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We achieve this by breaking players’ strategies/algorithms into steps and
represent the game in extensive form.
By fixing the server’s strategy, we are given aS = (nS , cS) for some (nS , cS) ∈ P ,
and the refined unauthenticated communication game is now played between the client
(C) and the adversary (Adv). Our goal is to find equilibria in which the adversary
would avoid oMitM attacks. In the language of security, this means to look for client
strategies that minimise the adversary’s information-theoretic advantages. In game
theory this would mean to minimise the adversary’s maximum possible gain. Our
approach is thus similar to finding minimax strategy in zero-sum games. In fact, our
game shares a similar structure to zero-sum games due to the transferability of payoff.
Whilst the game tree is depicted in Figure 5.10, we fix the server’s strategy, i.e.,
(nS , cS) ∈ AS . The game play, following the communication and Definition 5.6 is:
1. The client picks a round complexity parameter (nC , cC) and send them out.
2. The adversary, on receipt of (nC , cC) and (nS , cS), picks a round complexity
parameter (nAdv, cAdv) and send them back.
3. The client decides where to hide its query, and the adversary (simultaneously)
decides which of the queries to perform oMitM attacks.
We start by analysing the smallest possible subgame, which basically emerges from each
node where (nC , cC) and (nAdv, cAdv) are set. To see this, we recall that (nAdv, cAdv) is
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S
C C
Adv Adv Adv Adv
C C C C
Adv Adv
outcome
(nS , cS)
(nC , cC) (nC , cC)
(nAdv, cAdv) (nAdv, cAdv)
r
d
Figure 5.10: Illustration of the game tree, where triangles indicate omitted subgames.
a function over (nC , cC) and (nS , cS), which means that Adv must have observed C’s
choice of these values. Likewise, r is a function over (nAdv, cAdv), and hence C must
have observed Adv’s choice before deciding where to hide q in the query list. Obviously
this can also be explained by looking at the protocol specifications, i.e., players must see
each other’s choice of round complexity parameters during negotiation before moving
on to the querying phase.
Getting back to the subgame, we can easily see that it is actually a “one-shot”
game, where informally, the client decides where to hide the actual query q, whilst the
adversary decides which of the queries from the client will be queried further to the
server in attempting an oMitM attack. Following (5.9), the attack is only successful if
q falls within the set of attempted queries. The following result establishes the Nash
equilibrium for each of these subgames.
Lemma 5.4. Let (nC , cC), (nS , cS) and (nAdv, cAdv) be given and let n
∗ = max(nC , nAdv).
In the induced subgame let aC denote the client’s mixed strategy in which r ∈ [n∗] is
selected uniformly random. Let G = LimpC + L
imp
S − LmitmC − LmitmS . Denote the ad-
versary’s strategy by d ∈ Z2n∗ such that dk is the k-th most significant bit of d for all
k ∈ [n∗], i.e., dk = (d (n− k)) ∧ 1. Then:
• If and only if G ≤ nScSn∗ there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
form (aC , d) for d = 0b0 . . . 0 (no oMitM attack).
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• If and only if G ≥ nScSn∗ there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
form (aC , d) for d = 0b1 . . . 1 (oMitM attack with certainty).
Proof. Let n = n∗ for convenience of presentation. The subgame involves the client
picking a round r ∈ [n] to hide the query, and the adversary decides which of the
rounds to mount oMitM attacks, that is, to query S within those rounds. We denote
the client’s action r by i = n− r, so that i ∈ Zn, and the adversary’s action d by j = d
so that j ∈ Z2n . To analyse the mixed-strategy version of this subgame, we utilise the
notion of payoff matrices in game theory. Essentially they are matrices MC and MAdv
of size n×2n such that uC(i, j) = (MC)i,j and uAdv(i, j) = (MAdv)i,j , respectively. This
also means that given pC and pAdv be column vectors of probabilities representing the
mixed strategies of the client and the adversary, respectively, then their mixed-strategy
utilities are respectively
UC(pC ,pAdv) = p
T
CMCpAdv and UAdv(pC ,pAdv) = p
T
CMAdvpAdv.
We start the proof by forming the payoff matrices for the client C and the adversary
Adv. Let one(j) be the number of occurrences of 1 in the binary form of j, and the
components of payoff matrices MC and MAdv at row i ∈ Zn and column j ∈ Z2n are
(MC)i,j =
L
imp
C − ncC if 2i ∧ j = 0
LmitmC − ncC otherwise
(MAdv)i,j =
G
imp
Adv − one(j)nScS if 2i ∧ j = 0
GmitmAdv − one(j)nScS otherwise
where GimpAdv = −(LimpC +LimpS ) and GmitmAdv = −(LmitmC +LmitmS ). Let pC be the client’s
mixed strategy with a uniform distribution, and pAdv be the adversary’s mixed strategy.
Then
UAdv(pC ,pAdv) = p
T
CMAdvpAdv =
1
n
(
n−1∑
i=0
(MAdv)i
)
pAdv (5.11)
where (MAdv)i denotes the row vector with index i ∈ Zn of MAdv. We further notice
that for each column j ∈ Z2n of MAdv, there are exactly one(j) components with
value GmitmAdv − one(j)nScS , and the rest are GimpAdv − one(j)nScS . Hence, the sum of n
components of columns j are
n−1∑
i=0
(MAdv)i,j = one(j)G
mitm
Adv + (n− one(j))GimpAdv − one(j)nScSn
167
5.5. Game Analysis
= one(j)(GmitmAdv − nScSn) + (n− one(j))GimpAdv
Denote by p′Adv the adversary’s mixed strategy with 2
n components of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0).
In words, by selecting p′Adv the adversary’s realised strategy is d = 0b0 . . . 0, i.e., it never
attempts an oMitM attack. It is easy to see that UAdv(pC ,p
′
Adv) = G
imp
Adv . Consider
GmitmAdv −GimpAdv ≤ nScSn we then have
UAdv(pC ,pAdv) =
1
n
(
n−1∑
i=0
(MAdv)i
)
pAdv
=
1
n
2n−1∑
j=0
(pAdv)j
(
one(j)(GmitmAdv − nScSn) + (n− one(j))GimpAdv
)
≤ 1
n
2n−1∑
j=0
(pAdv)j
(
one(j)GimpAdv + (n− one(j))GimpAdv
)
= GimpAdv = UAdv(pC ,p
′
Adv).
Therefore p′Adv is always the adversary’s best response. In addition, the client’s mixed-
strategy utility is always UC(pC ,p
′
Adv) = L
imp
C − ncC for all pC . Therefore (pC ,p′Adv).
Further, if GmitmAdv − GimpAdv < nScSn then p′Adv becomes the adversary’s strictly best
response.
Similarly, denote by p′′Adv the adversary’s mixed strategy with 2
n components of
the form (0, . . . , 0, 1). In words, by selecting p′Adv the adversary’s realised strategy is
d = 0b1 . . . 1, i.e., it attempts oMitM attacks in all querying rounds with certainty. It
is easy to see that UAdv(pC ,p
′
Adv) = G
mitm
Adv −nSnCn. Consider GmitmAdv −GimpAdv ≥ nScSn
we likewise have
UAdv(pC ,pAdv) =
1
n
(
n−1∑
i=0
(MAdv)i
)
pAdv
=
1
n
2n−1∑
j=0
(pAdv)j
(
one(j)(GmitmAdv − nScSn) + (n− one(j))GimpAdv
)
≤ 1
n
2n−1∑
j=0
(pAdv)j
(
one(j)(GmitmAdv − nScSn) + (n− one(j))(GmitmAdv − nScSn)
)
= GmitmAdv − nScSn = UAdv(pC ,p′′Adv)
This eventually implies that (pC ,p
′′
Adv) is an equilibrium, and that p
′′
Adv is a strictly best
response when GmitmAdv −GimpAdv > nScSn. This concludes both claims of the proposition.
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The equilibria suggested in Lemma 5.4 provide strategies for the client and the
attacker during the querying phase that match the requirement for a PBE. Indeed,
given a belief about (nC , cC), (nS , cS) and (nAdv, cAdv), the client’s strategy taken from
an equilibrium is apparently optimal against the attacker’s attack strategy. Likewise,
given a belief about (nC , cC), (nS , cS), (nAdv, cAdv) and the client’s strategy from an
equilibrium, the attacker’s attack strategy from that same equilibrium is also optimal.
Nevertheless the equilibria indicates that the adversary would receive
uAdv = max
(
−(LimpC + LimpS ),−(LmitmC + LmitmS )− nScSn∗
)
as the outcome of the whole game. By employing backward induction on the game tree
(Figure 5.10), we can see that the adversary would choose (nAdv, cAdv) such that n
∗ is
minimised. This requires setting nAdv ≤ nC , thus making n∗ = nC , and we may as
well assume that nAdv = 1, since any value of nAdv ≤ nC would yield the same utility.
What remains is the choice of cAdv(nC , cC , nS , cS), which does not affect the adversary’s
utility, and therefore we assume that cAdv = cmin. In overall, the optimal utility of the
adversary is:
uAdv = max
(
−(LimpC + LimpS ),−(LmitmC + LmitmS )− nScSnC
)
(5.12)
Here we assume that if there is a tie, then the adversary would prefer strategy d = j =
0b0 . . . 0 (impersonation) over strategy d = j = 0b1 . . . 1 (oMitM). At this stage, the
client’s utility, for each of its choice of (nC , cC) would then be
uC =− nC max(cC , cmin)
+
LmitmC if L
imp
C + L
imp
S − LmitmC − LmitmS > nScSn∗, or,
LimpC otherwise.
(5.13)
Working backward another step, we need to analyse (5.13) to see how the client should
pick nC and cC . Let (n
(1)
C , c
(1)
C ) be the client’s choice should it want oMitM to occur,
and (n
(2)
C , c
(2)
C ) otherwise. (5.13) can be rewritten as
uC = max
(
−c(1)C n(1)C + LmitmC ,−c(2)C n(2)C + LimpC
)
(5.14)
where [nmax] 3 n(1)C <
⌈
LimpC + L
imp
S − LmitmC − LmitmS
nScS
⌉
≤ n(2)C ∈ [nmax]
Following the above expression, it is best to minimise the round complexity parameters,
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and hence it is in the client’s interest that
n
(1)
C = 1, n
(2)
C =
⌈
LimpC + L
imp
S − LmitmC − LmitmS
nScS
⌉
3, and c
(1)
C = c
(2)
C = cmin.
This gives the following optimal utility for the client:
uC = max
(
LmitmC − cmin, LimpC − cminn(2)C
)
(5.15)
Here also, we assume that if there is a tie, then the client would prefer to invoke
more rounds to stop an oMitM attack over experiencing it. This would complete the
construction of a subgame perfect equilibrium. For the reader, we summarise our
analysis above in a lemma:
Lemma 5.5. Let (nS , cS) be given, then the game between the client and the adversary
whose extensive form depicted in Figure 5.10 has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which the client’s utility is as in (5.15).
We now have characterised an equilibrium point for the client and the adversary
given each choice of the server. To complete the equilibrium finding process, it is
necessary to check which of the server’s choice is also its best response against the
corresponding equilibrium. Nevertheless, we summarise the extensive form of the whole
game as follows:
1. Server: The server takes its action by selecting (nS , cS).
2. Client: Without observing (nS , cS), the client selects its pair of (nC , cC).
3. Adversary: On observing (nS , cS) and (nC , cC), the adversary picks (nAdv, cAdv).
4. Client: On observing (nAdv, cAdv), the client picks r ∈ [max(nC , nAdv)] as the
place to hide q.
5. Adversary: Without observing r, the adversary picks d ∈ {0, 1}[max(nC ,nAdv)].
We fully characterise desirable perfect Bayesian equilibria in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.3. Assume that there exist nC , nS ∈ [nmax] and cS ∈ [cmin, cmax] such
that nCnScS ≥ LimpC + LimpS − LmitmC − LmitmS and LimpC − LmitmC ≥ cmin(nC − 1), then
a refined unauthenticated communication game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which an oMitM attack does not occur, i.e., Definition 5.4 is not satisfied.
3In order to compute n
(2)
C the client needs to know (nS , cS), which is not possible, as the game tree
shows. However, under the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the client is allowed to select n
(2)
C based on
its belief about (nS , cS), which should be available when such equilibrium point is clearly specified.
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Proof. The equilibrium involves the server’s strategy (nS , cS), the client’s strategy
(nC , cC = cmin, r) where r is as in Lemma 5.4, and the adversary’s strategy (nAdv =
1, cAdv = cmin, d1, . . . , dnmax) where di are as in Lemma 5.4. Following Lemma 5.5, the
conditions nCnScS ≥ LimpC + LimpS − LmitmC − LmitmS and LimpC − LmitmC ≥ cmin(nC − 1)
imply that if we assign (nS , cS) to be the server’s strategy, then the rest of players’
strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. On the other hand, the server’s utility
is LimpS , which is its maximum possible utility value, and thus (nS , cS) is thus part of
the equilibrium.
Corollary 5.1. Assume that nmax = cmax = +∞ and cmin = 0, then a refined unau-
thenticated communication game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which an oMitM
attack does not occur.
5.5.3 Solutions for Adversaries with Feedbacks
In this subsection we consider an extra situation which might arise in reality: the
adversary is able to tell if it has received the actual query, based on its communication
with the server. We call this a feedback adversary. It is best to motivate this via an
example. Indeed, suppose that the server has to perform some extra processing on the
query before returning the response. This extra processing, though, is independent of
the response construction, as it only delays the response. The adversary knows the
construction of the response, but does not necessarily know the extra processing, and
thus may use the delay time as an advantage in guessing if the query it made to the
server somehow relates to the client’s actual query, as opposed to being some random
garbage. To deal with this extra issue we need to introduce the attacker’s advantage
into the model.
We start with the game definition as in Definition 5.6 with further restrictions on
the strategies of the client and the adversary as in Lemma 5.3 (Figure 5.10). Our
modification affects the adversary’s behaviour after round complexity parameters have
been exchanged. When (nC , cC), (nS , cS) and (nAdv, cAdv) are given, instead of picking
d ∈ {0, 1}n∗ at once, the value of each di ∈ {0, 1} is decided as below:
di := di
(
〈bnAdv,cAdv(j)dj〉j∈[i−1]
)
where bnAdv,cAdv(j) =
0 if j = r(nAdv, cAdv), or,1 otherwise.
(5.16)
In other words, if the adversary consults the server at round j, then it receives a
feedback bit bnAdv,cAdv(j) of whether the client’s query at this round is q, i.e., whether
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j = r(nAdv, cAdv). If the adversary does not mount an oMitM attack at round j, then
bnAdv,cAdv(j)dj gives no information since dj = 0. Otherwise it conveys the feedback
via the value of bnAdv,cAdv(j). Also, the adversary’s decision in each round theoretically
depends on feedbacks it received from all previous rounds. We now provide equilibria
condition as in the previous analysis, starting with a modification of Lemma 5.4:
Lemma 5.6. Let (nC , cC), (nS , cS) and (nAdv, cAdv) be given, so that r ∈ [nmax] and
(di)i∈[n∗] are the remaining strategies to pick, where n∗ = max(nC , nAdv). Let G =
LimpC +L
imp
S −LmitmC −LmitmS and c = nScS. Let aC be the client’s mixed strategy such
that Pr[r = k] = c′/(G+(n∗−k)c′), where c′ > 0 satisfies that ∑n∗j=1 c′/(G+(n∗−j)c′) =
1. Then,
• if and only if ∑n∗−1k=0 c/(G+ k · c) ≥ 1 there exists a Nash equilibrium of the form
(aC , (di)i∈[n∗]) in which di = 0 for all i ∈ [n∗] (no oMitM attack).
• if and only if ∑n∗−1k=0 c/(G+ k · c) ≤ 1 there exists a Nash equilibrium of the form
(aC , (di)i∈[n∗]) in which di
(〈bnAdv,cAdv(j)dj〉j∈[i−1]) = 1 iff bnAdv,cAdv(j)dj = 0 for
all j ∈ [i− 1] (oMitM attack success with certainty).
Proof. We first analyse the pure strategies of C and Adv. The strategy for C remains
the same as before, since C does not receive any information during the game play.
Adv’s action seems to be more complicated, as it depends on history, i.e., the value r
decided by the client’s strategy i, as depicted in (5.16). We prove that this complication
can be alleviated. For simplicity of presentation we let n = n∗ = max(nAdv, nC) and
c = nScS .
We show that the adversary’s strategy can be conveniently represented by a number
d ∈ Zn much like in Lemma 5.4 when it has no feedback. This is equivalent to showing
that at each of the n rounds, the adversary does not have to provide different decisions
against different client’s strategies r ∈ [n]. We show this by induction. For convenience
we denote by forward the adversary’s decision to mount an oMitM attack at a round,
and by respond the act of impersonating the server S. For round 1, Adv receives the
first query from C, and thus its decision is independent of the client’s strategy r.
Suppose our claim holds for round k, consider round k+1. If Adv responds (without
querying S) at round k, then Adv does not receive any feedback, and consequently
no further information about C’s strategy r, and thus its decision at round k + 1 is
independent of r. Otherwise, if Adv mounts an attack at round k, then it receives
a feedback that either the real query q or a random query qk was sent in round k.
In the former case, Adv can end the game by responding (without querying S) to all
the remaining queries, that is, to set dm = 0 for all m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}, because
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due to Definition 5.4 Adv already succeeded an oMitM attack, and thus any later
communication to S is unnecessary. Since this is without doubt the optimal strategy,
the adversary Adv needs not make a decision. In the latter case, Adv receives a new
query qk+1, and has to decide whether to forward (dk+1 = 1) or respond (dk+1 = 0).
This means that the adversary needs to plan its decision for only one case, i.e., when
r > k, which proves our claim by the principle of mathematical induction.
Consequently, we can represent Adv’s strategy by d ∈ Z2n , where for each k ∈ [n],
the k-th bit dk of d means the following (assuming always d−1 = 0):
• dk = 0: if dk−1 = 0, then respond; if dk−1 = 1 and feedback is 0, then responds
in all remaining rounds, i.e., {k + 1, . . . , n}; otherwise, respond in this round r
(and move to the next round).
• dk = 1: if dk−1 = 0, then forward; if dk−1 = 1 and feedback is 0, then responds in
all remaining rounds, i.e., {k+ 1, . . . , n}; otherwise, forward in this round r (and
move to the next round).
For compatibility with Lemma 5.4 and its proof, we replace the adversary’s strategy
d by symbol j ∈ Z2n , and the client’s strategy r by i = n − r, so that i ∈ Zn. In this
case i represents the number of remaining rounds after the real query q was sent by
the client C. The difference of this case compared to Lemma 5.4 is in Adv’ utility.
Indeed, suppose for example that n = 3, C’s strategy is i = 1 (sending q at round
r = 3 − 1 = 2) and Adv’s strategy is j = 3 = 0b011. In words, C sends q in the
second round, whereas Adv responds in the first round, forwards in the second round,
and forwards again in the third round if the second round query is not q, that is, if
2i ∧ j = 0. In Lemma 5.4 Adv’s utility would be GmitmAdv − 2c, whereas here it would be
GmitmAdv − c because Adv will respond in the last round, knowing that the second round
query is q (since 2i ∧ j = 21 ∧ 3 = 2 6= 0). While MC is identical to that in Lemma 5.4,
MAdv is such that
(MAdv)i,j =
G
imp
Adv − one(j)c if 2i ∧ j = 0
GmitmAdv − one(j  i)c otherwise
where  is the right-bit-shift operator.
Let c′ > 0 be such that
∑n−1
k=0 c
′/(GmitmAdv − GimpAdv + k · c′) = 1. Let column vector
pC with n components be C’s strategy, such that (pC)i = c
′/(GmitmAdv −GimpAdv + i · c′) for
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Clearly we have ∑pi = 1 and pi > pj for i < j. In words, q appears
more and more likely toward the end of n rounds. In response to this, the best strategy
for Adv is to communicate with S at later rounds rather than early ones. In fact, it
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is obvious that, among all strategies j, j′ of Adv such that one(j) = one(j′), then Adv
would prefer j over j′ if j ≤ j′, since
GmitmAdv − one(j  i)c ≥ GmitmAdv − one(j′  i)c.
This means that the adversary would prefer j of the form 0b0 . . . 01 . . . 1, for all j of
the above form. Thus, to prove the lemma statement it is sufficient to prove that
strategies of this form give Adv no better utility than simply responding to all queries
(d = 0b0 . . . 0). Let G1 = G
mitm
Adv and G0 = G
imp
Adv , the column vector of MAdv for each
such j is
(G1 − one(j)c,G1 − (one(j)− 1)c, . . . , G1 − c,G0 − one(j)c, . . . , G0 − one(j)c)
Let p
(j)
Adv denote a mixed strategy of the adversary that assigns j with probability 1. It
is easy to see that UAdv(pC ,p
(0)
Adv) = G0. Consider
∑n−1
k=0 c/(G
mitm
Adv −GimpAdv + k · c) ≥ 1,
which implies c′ ≤ c. Then the adversary’s mixed-strategy utility is
UAdv(pC ,p
(j)
Adv)
= pTC MAdv p
(j)
Adv =
n−1∑
k=0
(pC)k(MAdv)j,k
=
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(G1 − c(one(j)− k))
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(G0 − c · one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k
=
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(G1 − c′(one(j)− k))
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(G0 − c′ · one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k
− (c− c′)
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(one(j)− k)
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′ · one(j)
G1 −G0 + c′k

≤
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(G1 − c′(one(j)− k))
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(G0 − c′ · one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k
=
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(G1 −G0 − c′(one(j)− k))
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(−c′one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k +G0
=
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(G1 −G0 + c′k)
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=0
c′(−c′one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k +G0
=c′one(j)− c′one(j) +G0 = G0 = UAdv
(
pC ,p
(0)
Adv
)
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This thus implies that (pC ,p
(0)
Adv) is a Nash equilibrium since given p
(0)
Adv the client’s
utility is independent of its strategy. Also, when
∑n−1
k=0 c/(G
mitm
Adv − GimpAdv + k · c) > 1
we have p
(0)
Adv as the adversary’s strictly best response against pC .
Next we consider the other case, i.e.,
∑n−1
k=0 c/(G
mitm
Adv − GimpAdv + k · c) ≤ 1, which
implies c ≤ c′. Inheriting the above manipulation we have
UAdv(pC ,p
(j)
Adv)
= G0 + (c
′ − c)
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(one(j)− k)
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′ · one(j)
G1 −G0 + c′k

= G0 + (c
′ − c)
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(n− k)
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(n− k)
G1 −G0 + c′k

− (c′ − c)
one(j)−1∑
k=0
c′(n− one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k +
n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′(n− k − one(j))
G1 −G0 + c′k

= UAdv
(
pC ,p
(0b1...1)
Adv
)
− (c′ − c)
n− one(j)− n−1∑
k=one(j)
c′k
G1 −G0 + c′k

≤ UAdv
(
pC ,p
(0b1...1)
Adv
)
− (c′ − c) (n− one(j)− (n− one(j))) = UAdv
(
pC ,p
(0b1...1)
Adv
)
Therefore
(
pC ,p
(0b1...1)
Adv
)
is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when
∑n−1
k=0 c/(G
mitm
Adv −
GimpAdv+k·c) > 1 we also have p(0b1...1)Adv as the adversary’s strictly best response. Together
with the previous conclusion we can infer the claims of the proposition.
Given this result, we again perform backward induction in a similar manner to
the previous subsection, by analysing how round parameters are chosen given that the
client and the adversary behave as in Lemma 5.6. Moving a step upward the game tree
Figure 5.10, the adversary would need to pick (n′, c′) knowing that its utility would be
uAdv = max
(
−(LimpC + LimpS ),−(LmitmC + LmitmS )−
n∗∑
k=1
c · k · c′
G+ (n∗ − k)c′
)
(5.17)
It is thus best for the adversary to select n′ = 1 so that n∗ = max(nC , n′) is minimised,
i.e., n∗ = nC . Again, for simplicity we also set c′ = cmin, as the choice of c′ does not
affect Adv’s utility. Working backward the game tree another step, the above choice of
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(n′, c′) yields the client’s utility as
uC =− nC max(cC , cmin) +
LmitmC if
∑n∗−1
k=0 c/(G+ k · c) < 1 or,
LimpC otherwise.
where n∗ = max(n′, nC) = nC . Let (n
(1)
C , c
(1)
C ) and (n
(2)
C , c
(2)
C ) be as before, then their
optimal values would be
n
(1)
C = 1, n
(2)
C = n, and c
(1)
C = c
(2)
C = cmin. (5.18)
where n ∈ N be minimum such that ∑n−1k=0 c/(G + k · C) ≥ 1. The client’s utility can
then be shortened as in (5.15), giving the following alternative version of Proposition
5.3:
Proposition 5.4. Assume that there exist nC , nS ∈ [nmax] and cS ∈ [cmin, cmax] such
that
∑nC
k=0 c/(G+ k · c) ≥ 1 for c = nScS and G = LimpC + LimpS − LmitmC − LmitmS and
LimpC −LmitmC ≥ cmin(nC−1), then a refined unauthenticated communication game with
feedback adversary has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which an oMitM attack does
not occur, i.e., Definition 5.4 is not satisfied.
Proof. The proof for this is similar to that for Proposition 5.3, where server’s strategy
is (nS , cS), the client’s strategy is (nC , cC = cmin, r) where r is as in Lemma 5.5,
and the adversary’s strategy is (nAdv = 1, cAdv = cmin, d1, . . . , dnmax) with di are as in
Lemma 5.5.
Corollary 5.2. Assume that nmax = cmax = +∞ and cmin = 0, then a refined unau-
thenticated communication game with feedback adversary has a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in which an oMitM attack does not occur.
5.6 Protocol Implementation
In our game model, we make use of several assumptions about the communication
among protocol participants. Particularly, we assume with respect to Definition 5.2
that message transmission is atomic, that is, either no information or the whole message
is conveyed. We also assume in Definition 5.4 that the communication relevant to an
oMitM is revealed in full to the adversary, which could be considered too strict for an
adversary model. Also, in the specification of the client and the server’ strategies, we
assume the unrealistic existence of store-then-forward bridges among the players, as
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well as the enforcement of cost when sending a query. All of these assumptions are
meant to simplify the model so that analysis is tractable.
In this section, we discuss techniques that would help realising above assumptions.
The main idea is to use cryptographic tools in restricting players’ abilities, so that
they would eventually behave in ways stated in the assumptions. Since we use cryp-
tographic techniques under computational security rather than information-theoretic
security, our implementation would introduce some negligible advantages to game play-
ers. This would result in at most some negligible gain in utility once a player deviates
from prescribed equilibria computed in Section 5.5. However, we do not discuss such
situations as they can be trivially captured by replacing the traditional notion of equi-
librium to computational one, e.g., -Nash equilibrium.
5.6.1 Definitions of Security
Our first step is to convert above assumptions into formal objectives. These objectives
allow us to later verify that our cryptographic implementation of Qry (Figure 5.6) and
Res (Figure 5.7) protocols reconciles with such assumptions. Informally the assump-
tions include:
• Atomic message transmission: a message destined to one party should be easily
intercepted by another. The interceptor, or adversary, would then have no reason
not to capture the whole message before performing any further action.
• Costly querying: the descriptions for Sendc and Receivec respectively used in
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 requires that, even with knowledge from past queries
and current help from the client, if the adversary does not incur a cost c, the
server would not accept any query. However, we note that if the server rejects
the query, the adversary receives no useful information, which is same as if it
did not at all communicate with the server. Therefore, we may relax the above
requirement: if the adversary’s cost is c · p for some probability p, then the server
would accept the query with probability at most p. Given that, the adversary’s
cheapest way to cheat is to randomise between honestly executing Sendc and not
communicating with the server at all. Such randomisation is properly considered
in our game analysis. In this section we thus focus on satisfying this relaxation.
There are different types of cost as mentioned in Section 5.4.1. As an example,
in this section we use proof of work in the form of computation cost.
• Store-then-forward bridges: because such bridges are unrealistic, an implementa-
tion of delaying message transmission must occur solely between the sender and
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the receiver, and thus must ensure that during the delaying period, the intended
recipient of the message must neither learn any information about the message
(hiding) nor be able to produce any related message (non-malleability), and that
the sender must not be able to modify the content of the message during the
delaying period (binding).
We translate these descriptions into formal definitions as below:
Definition 5.7. An atomic message transmission process is a tuple of PPT algorithms
(Send,Receive) such that for all strings m and dst of polynomially-bounded lengths there
exists a PPT receiver Adv with
Pr[m′ ← AdvSenddst(m) : m = m′] = 1
Definition 5.8. Denote by cost(Alg) a realisation of the computational cost when ex-
ecuting a probabilistic algorithm Alg. A secure costly message transmission process is
a tuple of PPT algorithms (Send,Receive) satisfying for some negligible function  that
for all strings m, src and dst of polynomially-bounded lengths the following properties
are satisfied:
• Correctness:
Pr
 (sig1,m′)← (Senddstc,n(m),Receivesrcc,n) :
sig1 = true ∧m′ = m ∧ cost(Senddstc,n(m)) ≥ c− (n)
 = 1,
• Message indistinguishability: if the adversary does not tamper with the commu-
nication messages, then it can infer no information about the high-level about the
protocol message being sent, i.e., for all PPT adversaries Adv = (Adv1,Adv2) and
all cost values c ∈ [cmin, cmax], define the following experiment:
ΠAdvIND-MSG =
 (m0,m1, s)← Adv1Send·n,·(·)(n, c); b←$ {0, 1};
(·, ·)← (Senddstn,c(mb),Receivesrcn,c); b′ ← Adv2(n, c, s, tr)

where tr denotes the message transcripts of the communication produced by Senddstn,c(mb)
and Receivesrcn,c, then
Pr
[
ΠAdvIND-MSG : b = b
′
]
≤ 1/2 + (n), (5.19)
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• Costly modification: if the adversary tampers with the communication, in order
to either capture the high-level protocol message being sent, or to modify it, then
it would cost the same as the adversary trying to send a message itself, i.e., for
all PPT adversaries Adv = (Adv1,Adv2) and all cost values c ∈ [cmin, cmax] define
the following experiment:
ΠAdvMOD-MSG =
(s,m)← Adv1Send·n,·(·)(n, c); (sig, ·,m′)←
(Senddstn,c(m),Adv2(n, c, s),Receive
src
n,c)

then for all probabilities p ∈ [0, 1]
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG :⊥6= m′ | cost(Adv2) ≤ c · p ∧ trS 6= trR
]
≤ p+ (n) (5.20)
where trS and trR are message transcripts in the view of Send
dst
n,c(m) and Receive
src
n,c,
respectively.
Definition 5.9. Let Send = (Send1,Send2) and Receive = (Receive1,Receive2) be tuples
of PPT algorithms4. Then (Send,Receive) is a secure delayed message transmission
process if there exists a negligible function  such that for all strings m, src and dst of
polynomially-bounded lengths the following properties are satisfied:
• Correctness:
Pr
(t, s)← (Send1dstn (m),Receive1srcn ); (·,m′)←
(Send2dstn (m, t),Receive2
src
n (s)) : m = m
′
 = 1
• Hiding: for all stateful PPT adversaries Adv
Pr[(m0,m1)← Adv(dst); b←$ {0, 1}; b′ ← AdvSend1
dst
n (mb) : b = b′] ≤ 1/2 + (n)
• Binding: for all stateful PPT adversaries Adv
Pr
 s← Adv(dst); (m, ·)← (Receive2srcn (s),Adv);
(m′, ·)← (Receive2srcn (s),Adv) : m 6= m′ ∧m,m′ 6=⊥
 ≤ (n)
4Here Send1 and Receive1 resemble the transmission of a message from the sender to the bridge,
and Send2 and Receive2 represent forwarding it by the bridge to the receiver.
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• Non-malleability: for every stateful PPT adversary Adv, there exists a PPT ad-
versary Adv′ such that for all valid efficiently sampleable distribution D and all
polynomial-time computable relation R
Pr
[
ΠAdv,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(m,m
′) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ΠAdv
′,n,R,D
NM-Delay-Sim
]
≤ (n),
where
ΠAdv,n,R,DNM-Delay =
m← D; (s1, ·, t1)← (Receive1srcn ,Adv(src, dst),Send1dstn (m));
(m′, ·, ·)← (Receive2srcn (s1),Adv(src, dst),Send2dstn (m, t1))

ΠAdv
′,n
NM-Delay-Sim =
[
m← D;m′ ← Adv′(src, dst, n) : R(m,m′) = 1]
5.6.2 Protocol Construction
Our final step is to construct the process of sending and receiving messages in Figure 5.6
(client’s strategies)and Figure 5.7 (server’s strategies) using cryptographic techniques
mentioned in Section 1.3. The simplest way of sending messages that satisfies Definition
5.7 is to transmit them in plaintext. That way the adversary can effortlessly intercept
any message destined to any party. The problem is that most likely it would not
support Definition 5.8 and Definition 5.9 which require some form of binding between
a message being sent and the actual sender and receiver. Indeed, whilst Definition 5.8
requires that the cost of querying cannot be transferred between client-adversary and
adversary-server communications, Definition 5.9 also desires that a delayed message
from the server to the adversary must not be passable to the client.
The above observation suggests a need to securely bind the knowledge of the sender
and the receiver to the communication between them. We achieve this using a secure
key-exchange protocol (Definition 1.16) and an authenticated encryption mechanism
(Definition 1.18). The former facilitates the binding by forming a key between the
sender and the receiver, and the latter ensures that an adversary must properly execute
key exchange in order to receive the incoming message. All communication would
then be encrypted and authenticated. The details of the protocol are provided in
Figure 5.11, where “Enck(·) :” (resp. “Deck(·) :”) indicates a step in which a message
is encrypted then sent (resp. received then decrypted) using key k agreed previously.
Likewise,“Enck(·),Deck(·) :” indicates a step in which a number of encrypted messages
are sent and received. The security of this protocol is provided below.
Proposition 5.5. Assume that (I,R) is a secure-key exchange protocol, (Prove,Verify)
is a secure proof-of-work mechanism, and (K,Enc,Dec) with K’s output generated by
180
5.6. Protocol Implementation
Parameters: (I,R), (Prove,Verify), (K,Enc,Dec).
Protocol.
Senddstn,c(m) : Receive
src
n,c :
k ← I(n) k ← R(n)
if k is not valid then return ⊥ if k is not valid then return ⊥
Enck(·),Deck(·) : sig ← Prove(c, k) Enck(·),Deck(·) : sig ← Verify(c, k)
if sig 6= true then return ⊥ if sig 6= true then return ⊥
Enck(·) : m Deck(·) : m
return true return m
Figure 5.11: Protocol Send and Receive for messages other than responses ri.
(I,R) is a secure authenticated encryption mechanism with respect to some message
space M, then the tuple (Send,Receive) as in Figure 5.11 is an atomic (Definition 5.7)
and secure costly (Definition 5.8) message transmission process.
Proof. Before proceeding with the proof, we provide the following supporting lemma:
Lemma 5.7. Assume that (I,R) is a key-exchange protocol that satisfies the correct-
ness and key indistinguishability of Definition 1.16 and (K,Enc,Dec) with K’s output
generated by (I,R) is a secure authenticated encryption mechanism with respect to some
message space M, for all stateful PPT adversaries Adv define the following experiment
ΠAdvMOD-SUP =
[
(k, ·, k′)← (I(n),Adv,R(n)); c← AdvEnck(·)
]
there exists a negligible function  such that
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-SUP : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C ∧ k = k′
]
≤ (n)
where C is the set of ciphertexts output by Enck(·).
Proof. We first assume that Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-SUP : k = k
′] = 1(n) is non-negligible. Given
k = k′, we notice that ΠAdvMOD-SUP is the same as the IND-CTXT experiment in Definition
1.18, except that k is generated by (I(n),Adv,R(n)) characterised by some distribution
181
5.6. Protocol Implementation
D′ (given k = k′) instead of (I(n),R(n)) with distribution D. We also have
Pr[ΠAdvMOD-SUP : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C | k = k′] (5.21)
=
∑
k∈D′
Pr[c← AdvEnck(·) : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C] = 2(n),
Pr[IND-CTXT succeeds] (5.22)
=
∑
k∈D
Pr[c← AdvEnck(·) : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C] ≤ (n)
Note that Pr[IND-CTXT succeeds] ≤ (n) due to the fact that (K,Enc,Dec) is se-
cure given that K’s output is generated by (I,R). Suppose that 2 is non-negligible,
then Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-SUP : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C | k = k′
] − Pr [IND-CTXT succeeds] is non-
negligible. In other words, there exists some key k′′ such that PrD′ [k = k′′]− PrD[k =
k′′] > 0 is non-negligible. However, this means that we can use Adv as a valid adversary
against the key-exchange experiment in Definition 1.16, who returns 0 whenever given
kb = k
′′. The attack success of such adversary is:
Pr
 (k0, ·, k2)← (I(n),Adv,R(n)); k1 ←D K;
b←$ {0, 1}; b′ ← Adv(kb) : b = b′ | k0 = k2

≥ 1/2 + 1/2 1(n)(PrD′ [k = k
′]− Pr
D
[k = k′])
which violates the assumption that (I,R) is a secure key-exchange protocol since Pr[k0 =
k2] = 1(n) which is non-negligible. Hence 2 must be negligible, and so is the following:
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-SUP : Deck(c) 6=⊥ ∧ c 6∈ C ∧ k = k′
]
= 1(n)2(n)
The proof for atomicity is trivial since the behaviour of Send and Receive does not
depend on src and dst, therefore the adversary Adv can effortlessly execute Receive
and capture m. The correctness property is also straightforward. Indeed, because
I(n) and R(n) are executed correctly, the two ends receive the same key k. Because
(Prove,Verify) is a secure proof-of-work mechanism, and that Prove(c, k) and Verify(c, k)
are executed correctly, they both produce sig1 = true deterministically, and that the
cost of executing Prove(c, k) is bounded below by c−(n). Finally, the test for sig = true
in Senddstn,c(m) is passed, and thus m is sent over, ensuring that the receiver gets m
′ = m
correctly. This concludes the proof of correctness.
Due to the correctness of the key exchange protocol (I,R), both ends would receive
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the same key k. The correctness of secure querying in (Prove,Verify) guarantees that
cost(Senddstn,c(m)) ≥ cost(Prove(c, k)) ≥ c− (n). It also indicates that both Prove(c, k)
and Verify(c, k) returns true, leading to Senddstn,c(m) and Receive
src
n,c returning true and
m′ = m, respectively. Thus the correctness property is complete. Also, the proof
for message indistinguishability comes straightforwardly from the IND-CPA property of
encryption, and thus can be omitted.
To prove the costly modification property, we consider several different modifications
the adversary can make to the communication between Senddstn,c(m) and Receive
src
n,c . For
simplicity of presentation we always assume cost(Adv2) ≤ c ·p∧ trS 6= trR and omit it in
all probability expressions. Let kS and kR be the session key perceived by Send
dst
n,c(m)
and Receivesrcn,c , respectively. Let kS be the set of keys perceived by all executions of
Send in the experiment, with kS ∈ kS . Consider the following cases:
• kR 6∈ kS : we note from the construction of Receive in Figure 5.11 that m′ 6=⊥
in the experiment ΠAdvMOD-MSG implies that the proof-of-work verifier in Receive
returns sig1 = true. We also note that because kR 6∈ kS the adversary does
not interact with any Prove oracle with input id = kR. Therefore, due to the
verifiability property of proof-of-work (Definition 1.17) there exists a negligible
function 1 such that
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kR 6∈ kS
]
≤ Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : sig1 = true | kR 6∈ kS
]
≤ p+ 1(n)
• kR ∈ kS : we break this down further to two sub-cases:
– kS = kR ∈ S: assume that this occurs with non-negligible probability,
then due to the synchronisation property of key exchange (Definition 1.16)
the adversary must not have modified the key-exchange communication.
Therefore, in order for trS 6= trR to hold, Adv must modify the consequent
encrypted messages. Lemma 5.7 however guarantees that Receive would
accept any modified ciphertext with negligible probability, and hence there
exists a negligible function 2 such that
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kS = kR ∈ S
]
Pr[kS = kR ∈ S] = 2(n)
– kS 6= kR ∈ S: to be able to ensure that m′ 6=⊥, the adversary must convince
the Verify routine in Receive to return sig2 = true. We also note that because
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kR 6= kS the adversary does not interact with any Prove oracle with input
id = kR while communicating with Prove. Therefore,
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kS 6= kR ∈ S
]
≤ Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : sig2 = true | kS 6= kR ∈ S
]
≤ p+ 1(n)
In overall we thus have:
Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kR 6∈ kS
]
Pr[kR 6∈ kS ]
+ Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kS = kR ∈ S
]
Pr[kS = kR ∈ S]
+ Pr
[
ΠAdvMOD-MSG : m 6=⊥ | kS 6= kR ∈ S
]
Pr[kS 6= kR ∈ S]
≤ p+ 3(n)
for some negligible function 3.
We notice that in our design of Send and Receive, we have to perform key exchange
for every message transmission. This is in fact unnecessary, as the client and the
server can reuse the same key for every message transmission within the same protocol
execution. Our proof of security above also supports this as it implies stricter security
by mean of less flexibility to the adversary. We thus assume that this is the case from
now on. Let kC and kS be the keys perceived by the client and the server, respectively.
We moreover assume that kC 6= kS since Lemma 5.7 shows that if kC = kS then no
adversary is able to obtain any information. In fact, the best it can do is to either
behave as a router or simply drop the whole communication.
The remaining part of this protocol to construct is the message delayed transmission
procedures, i.e., (Send1, Send2) and (Receive1,Receive2) that implements the bridges in
Figure 5.8. The detailed algorithms for these procedures are given in Figure 5.12. The
security of this construction heavily relies on the properties of non-malleable commit-
ments, which can be shown below.
Proposition 5.6. Assume that (Setup,Commit,Open) is a non-malleable commitment
scheme. Let CK← Setup(n) be a common reference string, and kS , kC 6=⊥ be parame-
ters embedded in Send and Receive such that kS 6= kC in the presence of an adversary
and kS = kC otherwise. Then the tuple (Send,Receive) as in Figure 5.12 is an atomic
(Definition 5.7) and secure delayed (Definition 5.9) message transmission process.
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Parameters: n > 0, (Setup,Commit,Open), CK← Setup(n).
Protocol.
Senddstn,kS (m) : Receive
src
n,kC
:
Send1dstn,kS (m) : Receive1
src
n,kC
:
if kS =⊥ then return ⊥ if kC =⊥ then return ⊥
(c, d)← CommitCK(kS ||m) DeckC (·) : c
EnckS (·) : c s← c
t← d return s
return t
Receive2dstn,kC (s) :
Send2dstn,kS (m, t) : c← s
d← t if kC =⊥ then return ⊥
if kS =⊥ then return ⊥ DeckC (·) : d
EnckS (·) : d k′||m← OpenCK(c, d)
return true if k′ 6= kC return ⊥
return m
Figure 5.12: Protocol Send and Receive for delaying responses ri.
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Proof. As usual, the correctness property is rather straightforward to prove. Note that
in the correctness experiment there is no adversary, and therefore kS = kC = k. In this
case it relies on the correctness of commitment and encryption/decryption. Further,
the fact that dst and src are not used anywhere in the protocol description, therefore
the atomicity property automatically applies.
In proving the hiding property, let ΠAdvHide-Delay denote the hiding experiment un-
der adversary Adv, and ΠAdv
′
Hide-Commit denote the hiding experiment in the commitment
scheme under adversary Adv′. We assume that Adv succeeds in guessing with probabil-
ity 1/2 + ′(n) for some non-negligible function ′. Then we can construct an adversary
Adv′ against ΠAdv
′
Hide-Commit from an adversary Adv against Π
Adv
Hide-Delay as follows:
1. Let Adv picks m0,m1.
2. Output m′0 = kS ||m0 and m′1 = kS ||m1.
3. Receive c← CommitCK(m′b).
4. Give EnckS (c) to Adv and receives bit b
′.
5. Return b′.
We notice the view of Adv in this case is exactly the same as in ΠAdvHide-Delay, meaning
that it returns b = b′ with exactly the same probability, and therefore
Pr
[
ΠAdvHide-Delay succeeds
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdv
′
Hide-Commit succeeds
]
= 1/2 + ′(n)
which contradicts with the hiding property of commitment. Therefore, the hiding
property of this protocol holds.
The proof for the binding property is in a similar manner. Let ΠAdvBind-Delay and
ΠAdv
′
Bind-Commit denote the binding experiments for the delayed message transmission and
commitment scheme, respectively. The three steps in the experiment ΠAdvBind-Delay involves
Adv giving out (c, d, d′). Assume that Adv succeeds with non-negligible probability
′(n), then we construct Adv′ against ΠAdv
′
Bind-Commit as follows:
1. Let Adv picks c, d, d′ and gives c, EnckC (d) and EnckC (d
′) to Adv′.
2. Perform decryption to get c, d, d′ and output them to ΠAdv
′
Commit-Bind .
The success probability Adv′ is then
Pr
[
ΠAdv
′
Commit-Bind succeeds
]
= Pr
[
t← OpenCK(c, d), t′ ← OpenCK(c, d′) : t 6= t′ ∧ t, t′ 6=⊥
]
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≥ Pr [k||m← t, k′||m′ ← t′ : t 6= t′ ∧ t, t′ 6=⊥ ∧ m 6= m′ ∧ k = k′ = kC]
= Pr
[
m 6= m′ ∧ k = k′ = kC
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdvDelay-Bind succeeds
]
= ′(n).
This again contradicts with the binding property of commitment, and therefore the
binding property of the delayed message transmission protocol must also hold. The last
part of the proof is the non-malleability property. Assume that Adv has non-negligible
advantage in producing related messages, i.e., for all simulator Sim
Pr
[
ΠAdv,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(m,m
′) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ΠAdv
′,n,R,D
NM-Delay-Sim
]
≥ ′(n) (5.23)
for some non-negligible function ′. For convenience we recall the operation of Adv
(following Definition 5.12) below:
1. Receives (from Send1) an encrypted commit value c1.
2. Output (to Receive1) an encrypted commit value c2.
3. Receives (from Send2) an encrypted decommit value d1.
4. Output (to Receive2) an encrypted commit value d2.
Define Adv1 as a slight modification of Adv as follows: whenever Adv outputs c2 = c1,
then Adv1 outputs c2 6= c1 and later d2 such that (c2, d2) ← CommitCK(k′||m′) such
that k′ 6= kC . Due to the binding property, if Adv outputs c2 = c1 then it would lead to
Receive2 receiving kS ||m′, and would eventually output ⊥ because the check kS = kC
fails. In the same vein Adv1 would also lead to Receive2 outputting ⊥. Thus Adv1 also
satisfies (5.23). Consider experiment ΠAdv
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit with the adversary Adv
′ constructed
as follows:
1. Define R′ as below:
R′(k||m, k′||m′) =

1 if kS = k ∧ kC = k′ ∧R(m,m′) = 1, or
1 if kS = k ∧ kC 6= k′ ∧R(m,⊥) = 1, or
0 otherwise.
2. Define distribution D′ of k||m such that PrD′ [kS ||m] = PrD[m] for all messages
m sampleable by D.
3. SampleD′ form = k||m (which guarantees k = kS), produce (c1, d1)← CommitCK(k||m),
send c1 to Adv1, who would give c2 6= c1 back, then output c2.
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4. Send d1 to Adv1 and receives back d2 from Adv1, then output d2.
5. Compute k′||m′ = m′ ← OpenCK(c2, d2).
The success probability of Adv′ is analysed as follows:
Pr
[
ΠAdv
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit : c1 6= c2 ∧R′(m,m′) = 1
]
= Pr
[
k′ = kC ∧R(m,m′) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
k′ 6= kC ∧R(m,⊥) = 1
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdv1,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1 ∧m′t 6=⊥
]
+ Pr
[
ΠAdv1,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1 ∧m′t =⊥
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdv1,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1
]
.
The above manipulation is made possible because the probability distribution over
the pair (mt,m
′
t) is the same as that of the pair (m,m
′) in experiment ΠAdv1,n,R,DNM-Delay ,
thank to the design of D′. Then for every simulator Sim on the simulation experiment
ΠSim,n,R,DNM-Delay-Sim in the delayed message transmission scheme define a simulator Sim
′ on
the simulation experiment ΠSim
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit-Sim in the commitment scheme, as follows:
• if Sim outputs m′ 6=⊥, then Sim′ outputs m′ = kC ||m′,
• if Sim outputs m′ =⊥, then Sim′ outputs m′ = k′||m′, with k′ 6= kC .
We then have:
Pr
[
ΠSim
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit-Sim : R
′(m,m′) = 1
]
= Pr
[
k′ = kC ∧R(m,m′) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
k′ 6= kC ∧R(m,⊥) = 1
]
= Pr
[
ΠSim,n,R,DNM-Delay-Sim : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1 ∧m′t 6=⊥
]
+ Pr
[
ΠSim,n,R,DNM-Delay-Sim : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1 ∧m′t =⊥
]
= Pr
[
ΠSim,n,R,DNM-Delay-Sim : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1
]
Again, this is made possible since the value of mt is distributed according to D, and
the distribution over m′t is the same as that output by Sim. This thus implies that
Pr
[
ΠAdv
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit : c1 6= c2 ∧R′(m,m′) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ΠSim
′,n,R′,D′
NM-Commit-Sim : R
′(m,m′) = 1
]
= Pr
[
ΠAdv1,n,R,DNM-Delay : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ΠSim,n,R,DNM-Delay-Sim : R(mt,m
′
t) = 1
]
≥ ′(n)
for every simulator Sim′ and corresponding Sim, which is contradictory, and hence the
non-malleability of the delayed message transmission must hold.
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5.7 Practical Considerations
In this section we discuss several concerns regarding the practicality of our protocol
implementation as well as of the overall game solution. These involve situations that
are not covered by definitions of both the game and the security, as well as limitation
rooted from environment parameters.
5.7.1 Multiple Executions
In our game model we only provide security for the client C to make a query once.
Security does not automatically expand when C makes the second query, or re-send
the previous query should the first execution of Qry fails for some reason. This is
because information exposed during the first execution may give Adv some advantage
in guessing the value of subsequent queries.
Several examples of this problem exist. In one case, suppose the adversary knows
that C would make the same query q every time. He would then perform oMitM attack
for the first query in order to learn the value of q, even if it results in an expected loss for
that communication session. However, in subsequent executions the adversary knows
in which round the real query would occur, and only attack at that round. Thus Adv’s
utility now becomes more promising.
In general, security (by definition) for multiple executions is guaranteed as long
as query indistinguishability is achieved, as in Proposition 5.2. Fortunately in most
communication nowadays it is not easy to predict what would happen next in a con-
versation unless the adversary spends enough efforts to study the previous “discussions”
as well as the parties involved. Our model is meant for unauthenticated communica-
tion, which mean that the purpose of communication is not very sensitive, e.g., WWW
surfing. Therefore above “information gathering” efforts account for cost that might
be unbearable to the adversary, and thus demotivate him.
Another technical problem is information leakage which might occur even if q is not
learned. Consider an adversary Adv who aborts the protocol with C after it receives
the first query q1. It costs Adv nothing to do so. However, there is 1/n
∗ chance that q1
is q. As the protocol is aborted, C may re-execute it until she succeeds. By carrying
out this attack over and over again, Adv collects a set {q(i)1 }, where each q(i)1 has 1/n∗
chance of being q. Thus, with no expense Adv can be certain that q ∈ {q(i)1 } with high
probability. It may then ask S these queries to learn q.
The problem of leakage can be solved by persistently forcing the protocol to finish.
In other words, if C experiences an abort, then in the next time C would continue from
the last stage rather than restarting Qry. For security reason one needs to make sure
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that an adversary cannot deny a protocol abort to C, nor can it claim a protocol abort
to S while it did not happen. To do so, it is possible to have both parties signing the
protocol execution as they proceed, using their own private key and a digital signature
scheme. These signatures are exchanged, so that later each party has a proof from the
other about the state of an execution.
5.7.2 Small Query/Response Spaces
The size of the query space Q may also influence the security of multiple executions.
Indeed, if Q is small, then C’s queries between two different executions may likely to
coincide. Although not considered as a valid oMitM attack by our definition, in case the
nature of the response is static, then if Adv encounters a query that was seen previously,
Adv does not need to query S for a reply and thus saves some efforts. Our protocol is
thus practically unsuitable for multiple executions when Q is small and responses are
static, i.e., they do not change over time. Otherwise, an example of dynamic responses
where our solution is applicable is: queries asking the result of a live football match.
While the query set Q is large in many conversations, e.g., human chat, remote con-
trol, WWW queries, the answers to queries might be restrictive. We exclude situations
when there is only one answer, because they are rather one-way communication than
query-response. In the worst case, a response may be either “yes” or “no”. Thus Adv
may simulate S’s response with high probability. What the client C can do, however,
is to execute Qry many times, each with a different query. This would lessen Adv’s
chance of giving all correct answers. In practice C can save these multiple executions
by examining all answers in a single execution, as opposed to accepting only the answer
to q as Qry does. This achieves the same effect with less cost.
5.7.3 Uninteresting Impersonations
In many scenarios, impersonation attacks are not attractive to adversaries. These
include, for example, WWW surfing, private chat between people unknown to the
adversary, remote login (apart from password stealing purposes). The main reason is
that it is hard to simulate the other end’s behaviour without causing suspicion. When
this happen we may consider Adv payoff GimpAdv = −(LimpC + LimpS ) negative, because he
gains nothing while risking detection.
This means that if impersonation (with certainty) is the only available attack, Adv
would rather choose to not attack at all. To capture this, we need to modify Adv’s payoff
matrix MAdv (as in the proofs of Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5) so that all values in the
first column (originally GimpAdv) are set by 0 to reflect Adv’s inactivity. Similarly, the first
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column (originally LimpC −ncC) of MC must also be set by −max(nC , nS) max(cC , cS).
Assume that −LmitmC ≥ max(nC , nS) max(cC , cS)− nCcC , that is, the benefit of being
attack-free is greater than the extra cost for carrying out an attack-free communication,
it is not difficult to prove that with these changes Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5 still
hold if G is replaced by GmitmAdv instead of the original value G
mitm
Adv − GimpAdv . Thus,
given appropriate choices (which we discuss later) by C and S that validate the above
assumption, no attack would happen. This also motivates our protocol construction.
5.7.4 Proof-of-Works May Fail
Several works have criticised the effectiveness of POW mechanisms in deterring attack-
ers, notably [28,88]. The main problem is the difference in production frontiers, which
refers to the fact that the adversary and the user have different valuation of the same
cost, i.e., cost metric. For example, while the user cannot afford 10 minutes of com-
puting because he is in a hurry, the adversary can if he has more than one computer
and can divide the work load, thus shortening the computing time. Even if parallel
computing is not possible, the adversary can still survive 10 minutes computing if he
has spare time to wait. As a result, the cost for POW to sufficiently deter attacks would
surpass the client’s payoff.
Our solution has a feature that addresses this issue. We first let RC ≥ 1 denote
the ratio between C and Adv’s valuations of cost. In other words, if a computing cost
has value c to C, then it has value c/RC to Adv. Proposition 5.3 and Proposition
5.4 give NEs in which Adv does no better with an oMitM attack. This is possible as
costmitmAdv ≥ G, where costmitmAdv is the attack cost that guarantees an oMitM attack, and
G = LimpC +L
imp
S −LmitmC −LmitmS . When the difference of production frontiers is taken
into account, the new condition must be costmitmAdv ≥ G ·RC . This means that the client
C and the server S must change their choices of (nC , cC) and (nS , cS) to reflect this
update, which most likely results in an increase for C’s executing cost, which is at most
costC = max(nC , nS) max(cC , cS) (occurs when there is no attack).
Moreover, our solution is only useful if min(0, LimpC ) − LmitmC ≥ costC . Let RU =
G/(LimpC − LmitmC ) ≥ 1, the following condition is necessary
costmitmAdv /costC ≥ G ·RC/(LimpC − LmitmC ) = RCRU (5.24)
and also this ratio should be as large as possible. There are at least two ways to raise
attack cost (and hence executing cost), either via increasing the number of rounds
n∗ = max(nC , nAdv), or by introducing higher querying cost. However, only the former
would help raising the ratio costmitmAdv /costC . Figure 5.13 shows how choices of n
∗ in
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Figure 5.13: Adversary-user cost ratio
Proposition 5.3 and Proposition 5.4 affect this ratio. It is thus evident that with ap-
propriate choices of n∗ and c∗ the aforementioned problem with POW can be overcome.
Note that the cost ratio for adversary with feedbacks assumption is not linear in n∗,
only approximately. Also, although theoretically one can raise n∗ arbitrarily high to
ensure (5.24), there are factors against that. First, raising n∗ more than necessary
would lead to prohibitive cost to the client C. Secondly, n∗ should be bounded by the
number of queries that can be made, i.e., |Q|, or else repetitions of queries might be
noticeable.
5.7.5 Bootstrapping of Security
The main practical limitation of our solution is that it is expensive due to the cost of
querying. It is therefore necessary to mitigate its use once security has been confirmed.
This is known as bootstrapping of security. A real-world example of bootstrapping is
Secure Shells (SSH). In SSH, the security bootstrapping happens when a client connects
to the server for the first time and receives its public key. The client must make a leap
of faith that the key belongs to the server, instead of an adversary who luckily appears
in the middle of the communication. This leap of faith is made once only, and future
communication is authenticated based on the trusted key.
In this scenario, the client C may execute Qry once with as many rounds as pos-
sible to deter oMitM attacks. Suppose then, that either the adversary decide not to
impersonate, or it does so but is then discovered by C (perhaps because the imposture
is not plausible enough). In the latter case C is alerted and may find a more secure
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route to communicate with the server S. In both cases C succeeds in bootstrapping
security with S by, e.g., learning S’s public key, as in the case of SSH. In subsequent
communication, both parties would not need to use our solution any more.
There are a few problems with security bootstrapping, however. First, the adversary
Adv may impersonate C and force S to bootstrap security. This allows Adv to query
S in the future using normal methods that involve no cost. After that Adv can easily
arrange an oMitM attack no matter how C executes Qry, since it needs not pay to
query S. Secondly, even if Adv may not impersonate C to S, Adv may sacrifice by
launching an oMitM attack during C’s first communication with S, and suffer even
enormously negative utility. However, after (in)security is bootstrapped, both C and
S switch to normal communication, and Adv starts reaping positive utility as he stays
persistently in between.
Our argument is that in many cases the same adversary may not stay persistently
between C and S for longer than a period of, say length T . This length value may be
lessened, e.g., when C and/or S are mobile. In that case, both C and S may set the
bootstrapping period to be of length T , within which all communication must use our
solution. This clearly eliminates Adv’s advantage after security bootstrapping.
5.7.6 Attack Detection
The fact that our solution makes oMitM attacks more difficult than legitimate commu-
nication means that it might as well be used for MitM attack detection in addition to
deterrence. This can be achieved, for example through recognition of excessive number
of queries to S within a short time period, as they would be many times more than
normal (Figure 5.13). The attacks may also be realised by C, e.g., it takes too long to
receive a response, as Adv needs to execute Qry to communicate with the server S.
These uses of timing analysis to detect attacks may be defeated, for example if Adv
is able to assume a different identity for every connection to S, or if it has fast enough
computing power to shorten the execution time Qry, for example when querying requires
proof-of-work in terms of computation. Otherwise, the success of detection would likely
to reduce the cost of security bootstrapping, as attacks may be discovered before (Qry,
Res) finishes being executed.
5.7.7 Examples of Application
The structure of Q should depend strongly on the public knowledge of the client C’s
potential query q before it is sent out. As a result, it is mostly bound to each individual
server S, while in private conversation it may also be bound to each particular client
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C. We illustrate this with two examples of application where our solution might be
applied: search engine and password authentication.
Search engine. When S is the search engine, q is in the form of a search phrase.
Depending on the search areas covered by S, the set Q should contain all possible
phrases in those areas. On the other hand, if C’s interest is well-known, e.g., C is a
nurse, then Q should discard all phrases that relate to for instance computer science.
When Q is very large, C does not need to store the whole Q, but a subset of it
is sufficient. An example could be a dictionary of words in nursing area, so that a
random search phrase could be formed by several of these words together.
Password authentication. In password authentication, a query is essentially a pass-
word. Therefore Q should contain all plausible passwords that following a particular
rule. Again, Q should be refined if information about C is exposed, e.g., C is English,
then Q should not contain passwords with Norwegian words. In general case, Q needs
not be stored, as passwords can be easily generated at random.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we explore a topic that has not been well studied, i.e., security of
unauthenticated two-party client-server communication. With strong definitions of
adversaries and security used in cryptography or formal method security, it is generally
hard to derive a satisfying solution. Alternatively, we define a weaker, but meaningful
security notion, called online man-in-the-middle (oMitM) attacks, in which the attacker
communicate with both ends in parallel, and effectively use information from each side
in communicating with the other. For attacks that do not fall in this category we are
regarded as impersonation.
By assuming a fixed payoff for the adversary in each type of attacks, as well as
communicating parties’ losses and utilities, we use game theory to model a game that
captures interactions and behaviours of these entities. The game analysis points out
solution concepts in the form of Nash equilibria that discourage man-in-the-middle at-
tack. We implement the game by designing a communication protocol that equivalently
captures the players’ activities, with supports from cryptographic primitives. Finally,
we discuss additional practicality features regarding our solution.
Our solution relies on the use of cost in querying and multi-round requests to
make attacks more expensive than the communicating cost (Figure 5.13). It places the
very first steps in dealing with the known presence of an attacker in unauthenticated
communication. The communicating cost might be further optimised via bootstrapping
of security and attack detection. Therefore, our solution is reasonable given that the
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risk is certain. That said, it might even be tailored less costly for scenarios where the
presence of an attacker is less certain (e.g. SSH remote login). This creates a motivation
for future research in economic approaches to unauthenticated communication.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Following the proliferation of information technologies in business routines, security of
information infrastructures has become a major concern for societal entities, ranging
from individuals to large organisations, as well as governmental and critical infras-
tructures. While traditional treatments of security have been well-established in both
results and research community, the economics of information security bring a new
awareness to the problem of securing information. Indeed, this approach addresses
the rationality of participants involved in a security scenario, something which have
been assumed otherwise by traditional security research. Although in its infant stage,
this area of research possess many potentials, as the nature of security issues involves
scenarios consisting of multiple independent and selfish decision makers. This is thus
a “fertile” land for research that applies game-theoretic techniques to study potential
behaviours of the relevant decision makers. This thesis is no more than an effort to
contribute in developing further this new approach, with works on problems in differ-
ent subfields of information security. Our research employs game-theoretic analysis to
produce insights, as well as rational solutions for these problems.
Particularly, our work starts with addressing a high-level problem, i.e., organisa-
tional strategic security investments in protection against advanced persistent threats
(APTs). We extend FlipIt, a game of timing model developed by Dijk et al. [141], by
enriching it with different types of strategies. We then analyse, compare and contrast
these strategies to provide insights on how organisations should make their strategic
security plans in dealing with APTs. Moving to a more specific problem, in Chapter 3
we consider the needs for investing in security research, as well as sharing of security
information among firms, especially in competitive environments. Here firms must con-
sider the trade-offs between selfishly protecting themselves to earn competitiveness, or
“open their hearts” for mutual improvements and better social welfare. Our analysis
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leads to insights about how firms would behave under different conditions of compe-
tition, markets, and risks from security breaches. Next, in Chapter 4 we look at the
problem of security for outsourced computation, i.e., the honesty of the contractors
who carry out the computation. As solutions, we design principal-agent contracts that
attract contractors, while at the same time encouraging them to be honest, as well as
optimising the outsourcer’s expenditure. We also consider the problem of information
leakage and collusion among agents. Finally, Chapter 5 is dedicated to an investigation
on a low-level problem: security of network communication. Here we study an issue
seldomly considered in the research community: unauthenticated communication. As
contributions, we formalise a relaxed yet meaningful notion of security, which otherwise
cannot be satisfied when there is no authentication. From game-theoretic modelling
and analysis, we develop a cryptographic protocol that rationally discourages the ad-
versary from violating our prescribed security.
In summary, by studying a breadth of problems in information security, it is in
our hope that the thesis contributes to demonstrating the potential of this research
approach, especially on using game-theoretic analysis. Indeed, our works alone open
a number of questions for future research, as can be seen throughout each chapter
individually.
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Appendix A
Basic of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) Optimisation
Named after its developers William Karush, Harold W. Kuhn, and Albert W. Tucker,
the KKT conditions provide an essential tool for non-linear optimisation. It can be
stated in the following [62]. Consider the following optimisation problem:
min
x
f(x)
subject to: gi(x) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ [n], and,
hj(x) = 0 ∀j ∈ [m],
for functions f, gi, hj : Rk → R and some n,m, k ∈ Z+. Suppose that f, gi.hj for i ∈ [n],
j ∈ [m] are continuously differentiable in x∗ ∈ Rk, then if x∗ is a local minimum of the
above problem and that it satisfies a regularity condition, there exist constants µi for
i ∈ [n], and λj for j ∈ [m] such that the following KKT conditions hold
Stationary: ∇f(x∗) +
n∑
i=1
µi∇gi(x∗) +
m∑
j=1
λj∇hj(x∗) = 0
Complementary slackness: µigi(x
∗) ∀ i ∈ [n]
Primal feasibility: gi(x
∗) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n], hj(x∗) = 0 ∀ j ∈ [m]
Dual feasibility: µi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n]
There are many regularity conditions that x∗ can satisfy in order for it to qualify
the KKT conditions above. For the purpose of our work, we only mention the so-called
Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ) [72], i.e., the following vectors
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are positive-linearly independent in Rk:
∇hj(x∗) ∀ j ∈ [m], ∇gi(x∗) ∀ i ∈ [n] s.t. gi(x∗) = 0
Our process of optimising outsourcing contracts proceed as follows. We first prove
that the cost function to minimise f , along with gi (there is no hj) satisfies MFCQ
regularity condition for all non-trivial points x∗. This ensures that all interesting local
minima of f will satisfy the KKT conditions. The remainder of the work is to write a
program that solves KKT conditions to find all points that satisfy them, then comparing
the found results to eliminate points which are not local minima. The remaining points
thus form the global minima of f .
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Appendix B
Mathematica Code for KKT
Optimisation
The program takes as input several parameters, including eqsys, var, sup, and supV ar.
It means to solve the following optimisation, for a tuple of k variables x and n con-
straints:
min
x
f(x) subject to gi(x) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ [n].
To do so, set eqsys = {f(x), g1(x), . . . , gn(x)}, var = {x1, . . . ,xk}. The other param-
eter sup is of the form {inequality 1, . . . , inequality t}, which gives further restrictions
to the solution. For example in Section 4.5 we need to optimise two-agent contracts, in
which there are extra requirements such as Λ < 1, γ > 0, etc. These restrictions would
later be used to filter optimal solutions that are not meaningful, e.g., if it assumes that
c < 0, or Λ > 1. Finally, supV ar gives the list of parameters that appear in sup, e.g.,
c, Λ, γ.
Listing B.1: Optimisation using KKT conditions
1 Clear[KKT];
2 KKT[eqsys , var , sup , supVar ] := (
3 min = eqsys [[1]];
4 len = Length[eqsys] − 1;
5 nMax = 2ˆ(Length[eqsys] − 1);
6 tmpEqSys =
7 Table[eqsys [[ kh]] Subscript [\[Mu], kh − 1], {kh, 1,
8 len + 1}] /. {Subscript[\[Mu], 0] −> 1};
9 orgSys =
10 Table[D[Plus @@ tmpEqSys, var[[kh]]] == 0, {kh, 1, Length[var ]}];
11 For[ i = 0, i < nMax, i++, (
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12 sys = orgSys;
13 newEqSys = {};
14 For[ j = 0, j < len, j++, (
15 sys =
16 Union[sys,
17 If [Mod[BitShiftRight[i , j ], 2] ==
18 0, {Subscript[\[Mu], j + 1] == 0}, {eqsys[[j + 2]] == 0}]];
19 newEqSys =
20 Union[newEqSys,
21 If [Mod[BitShiftRight[i , j ], 2] ==
22 0, {eqsys [[ j + 2]] <= 0}, {eqsys[[j + 2]] == 0}]];
23 ) ];
24 sol =
25 Solve[sys ,
26 Union[var, Table[Subscript [\[Mu], kh], {kh, 1, len }]]];
27 If [ sol == {}, , (
28 \[Mu]Conditions =
29 Table[Subscript [\[Mu], kh] >= 0, {kh, 1, len }];
30 For[mh = 1, mh <= Length[sol], mh++,
31 (Print [ sol [[mh]]]; Print [”To reduce:”];
32 Print [And @@
33 Flatten[
34 Union[sup /. sol [[mh]],
35 newEqSys /. sol [[mh]], \[Mu]Conditions /. sol [[mh ]]]]];
36 Print [”Start reducing ... ” ];
37 abc = Reduce[
38 And @@ Flatten[
39 Union[sup /. sol [[mh]],
40 newEqSys /. sol [[mh]], \[Mu]Conditions /. sol [[mh ]]]],
41 supVar];
42 If [abc == False, Continue[]];
43 Print [”Solution = ”, sol [[mh]] // FullSimplify , ”\n”,
44 ”\nConditions = ”,
45 And @@ Flatten[
46 Union[newEqSys /. sol[[mh]],
47 orgSys /. sol [[mh]], \[Mu]Conditions /. sol [[mh]]]] //
48 FullSimplify , ”\n\n”];)
49 ]
50 ) ];
51 ) ;
52 ];) ;
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Appendix C
A Key-Exchange Protocol for
Definition 1.16
In order for our schemes to work, we need the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) as-
sumption and the existence of a collision-resistant hash function, defined below:
Definition C.1 ( [25]). Consider a generator G that on input n would output a cyclic
group G of prime order q and generator g. We say that the DDH problem is hard relative
to G if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function  such that
|Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gxy) = 1]− Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gz) = 1]| ≤ (n)
where the probabilities are taken over G(n), and the uniform randomness of x, y, z ∈ Zq.
Definition C.2 ( [126]). A tuple (Gen, H) where Gen is a key generator, and H is a
hash function, is said to be a collision-resistant hash function if for all PPT algorithms
A there exists a negligible function such that
Pr[k ← Gen(n); (m,m′)← A(k, n) : m 6= m′ ∧H(k,m) = H(k,m′)] ≤ (n).
The existence of the desired key-exchange protocol is stated in the following result:
Proposition C.1. Assume that the DDH problem is hard relative to some generator
G, and that there exist a collision-resistant hash function (Gen, H) and a non-malleable
commitment scheme (Setup,Commit,Open), then under the common-reference string
(CRS) model there exists a key-exchange protocol (I,R) satisfying the correctness and
key indistinguishability properties of Definition 1.16. Assume that there exists an au-
thenticated encryption scheme (K,Enc,Dec) where keys are generated by honest execu-
tions of (I,R), then there exists a protocol (I′,R′) satisfying Definition 1.16.
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Proof. With the CRS assumption, we first assume that there exists a trusted third party
that generates (G, g, q)← G(n), k ← Gen(n) and CK← Setup(n), and distribute these
to the two parties performing key exchange. Then, we construct the protocol (I,R) as
follows:
1. I: generates x←$ Zq, gI = gx, (cI , dI)← CommitCK(gI), and sends cI .
2. R: generates y ←$ Zq, gR = gy, (cR, dR)← CommitCK(gR), and sends cR.
3. I: receives cR and sends dI .
4. R: receives dI and sends dR.
5. I: computes gR ← OpenCK(cR, dR), if gR =⊥, returns ⊥, otherwise computes
ksess ← H(k, gxR).
6. R: computes gI ← OpenCK(cI , dI), if gI =⊥, returns ⊥, otherwise computes
ksess ← H(k, gyI ).
The correctness of this mechanism with respect to Definition 1.16 is straightforward,
kI = H(k, g
x
R) = H(k, g
xy) = H(k, gyI ) = kR.
For key indistinguishability, we first assume for some adversary Adv there exists a
non-negligible function ′ such that
Pr[(k0, ·, k1)← (I(n),Adv,R(n)) : k0 = k1 6=⊥] = ′(n)
Let g′R and g
′
I be the Diffie-Hellman components received by I and R, respectively.
Given that k0 = k1, two situations might have occurred:
• g′xR 6= g′yI : this means that H(k, g′xR ) = k0 = k1 = H(k, g′yR ), which only occurs
with negligible probability due to the collision property of hash function.
• g′xR = g′yI : Let trI and trR be the message transcripts of the communication
perceived by I and R, respectively. Consider two sub-cases:
– trI = trR: this indicates that Adv did not modify any message at all. There-
fore, it receives gx, gy, and that k0 = k1 = g
xy. The key indistinguishability
thus becomes the DDH experiment, and thus the adversary’s success is at
most 1/2 plus some negligible probability.
217
– trI 6= trR: Let (c′I , d′I) and (c′R, d′R) be commitment values received by R and
I, respectively. If either c′I = cI or c
′
R = cR, then due to the binding property
of commitment, with at most negligible probability the adversary can make
both gI 6= g′I and gR 6= g′R. Otherwise we have either gI = g′I or gR = g′R.
This implies that k0 = k1 = g
xy, and thus the key indistinguishably again
becomes the DDH experiment, which implies that the adversary’s success is
at most 1/2 plus some negligible probability.
Consider the case cI 6= c′I and cR 6= c′R. From the construction it is easy
to see that either the adversary does not receive dI before producing c
′
I ,
or it does not receive dR before producing c
′
R. Assume the former holds,
due to the non-malleability property of commitment, the value of gI and g
′
I
are statistically independent, and so are x and x′ which they respectively
correspond to. Due to the hiding property, gI and g
′
R are also statistically
independent, and so are x and y′. Therefore, we eventually have k0 = gxy
′
is
statistically indistinguishable from some gc for c ←$ Zq, and that it is also
statistically independent from k1 = g
x′y. This means that the probability
that k0 = k1 is negligible. A similar analysis also applies when we consider
that fact that the adversary does not receive dR before producing c
′
R.
The above points together imply that the adversary’s success probability in the key
indistinguishability is negligibly different from 1/2. We now construct (I′,R′) from (I,R)
that satisfies also the synchronisation property. Indeed, (I′,R′) inherits all six steps of
(I,R), along with the following additions:
7. I′: produces cI ← Encksess(trI), where trI is the transcript of all previous messages,
and sends cI .
8. R′: produces cR ← Encksess(trR), where trI is the transcript of all previous mes-
sages, and sends cR.
9. I′: computes trR ← Decksess(cR), and if trR 6= trI , then set ksess =⊥.
10. I′: computes trI ← Decksess(cI), and if trI 6= trR, then set ksess =⊥.
We note that (I′,R′) preserves the correctness and key indistinguishability properties
because the last four steps above do not have a possibility to change the value of ksess
to anything other than ⊥. The synchronisation property holds because if k0 = k1 and
trI 6= trR, due to Lemma 5.7 the adversary is able to produce valid ciphertexts that pass
the checks in step 9 and 10 above with negligible probability, that is, k0 = k1 6=⊥ with
negligible probability. Otherwise, if trI 6= trR the adversary’s only mean of modifying
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the communication is to produce either c′I 6= cI or c′R 6= cR in steps 7 or 8, respectively.
However, the IND-CTXT property of encryption guarantees that these modifications are
accepted with negligible probability, i.e., they pass test 9 and 10 with negligible chances,
which also implies k0 = k1 6=⊥ occurs with negligible probability. This completes the
proof of security of key exchange.
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Appendix D
A Proof-of-Work Scheme for
Definition 1.17
To satisfy Definition 1.17, we adapt the constant-time puzzle scheme proposed by
Rivest et al. [125]. First, we assume the existence a generator ModGen that on integer
input n > 0 outputs a pair of primes p, q of n-bit length, as well as a family of hash
functions (Gen, Hm) for all m ∈ Z+ that maps the message space {0, 1}∗ to hash space
Z∗m = Zm \ {0, 1}. Then suppose there exists a trusted third party that generates
k ← Gen(n) and makes k publicly and securely accessible. The (Prove,Verify) proceeds
as follows for integer cost c:
1. Verify: generates (p, q)← ModGen(n) and sends pq.
2. Prove: receives m, computes g ← Hpq(k, id), t ≡ g2c (mod m), and sends t.
3. Verify: receives t, computes g ← Hpq(k, id), e ≡ 2c (mod (p − 1)(q − 1)), t′ ≡
ge (mod pq), and returns true if t = t′ or ⊥ otherwise.
When cost c is non-integer, the prover and the verifier could engage in a proof-of-work
with cost bcc, and for the remainder r = c − bcc the prover could ask the verifier to
perform any simple costly computation, e.g., hashing the id repeatedly multiple times
until the observed cost matches r. Nevertheless, the security of this proof-of-work
mechanism is provided below, followed by a remark on the practicality of (D.1):
Proposition D.1. Assume that the cost of squaring in modular arithmetic is one (unit
cost), and that any computation with cost p ∈ [0, 1] would give the correct squaring
result with probability at most p. In other words, assume that for all PPT algorithms
A = (A1,A2), all positive integer c > 0, all g ∈ Z∗pq, and all probabilities p, there exists
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a negligible function  such that
Pr
(p, q)← ModGen(n), s← A1(g, c), t← Asq(·,·)2 (s, g, c, pq) :
cost(A) ≤ c · p ∧ t ≡ g2c (mod pq)
 ≤ p+ (n) (D.1)
where sq on input g,m would output g2 (mod m), A is not allowed to query sq with
inputs of the form (g, ·), and that cost(A) ignores the computation cost of sq. Assume
that there exists a family of collision-resistant hash functions (Gen, Hm) for all m ∈ Z+,
then the proof-of-work scheme above satisfies Definition 1.17 for all integer costs c > 0.
Proof. As usual, the proof of correctness is rather trivial. We notice the totient function
φ(pq) = (p− 1)(q − 1), therefore
t ≡ g2c ≡ g2c (mod φ(pq)) ≡ ge ≡ t′(mod pq)
and thus Verify would return true. On the other hand, the computation of g2
c
(mod pq)
requires c successive squaring computations, which bears the cost of c. This thus proves
the correctness property of proof-of-work.
For the verifiability property, due to the collision-resistance property of hash func-
tions, A can find id′ 6= id such that g = Hm(k, id) = Hm(k, id′) = g′ with negligible
probability. Otherwise, the fact that Adv2 cannot query Prove with id matches that A
cannot ask sq to square g = Hm(k, id) with respect to any modulus. Meanwhile, the
adversary Adv1 is given id and c matches that A1 is given c and g. Thus, the verifia-
bility experiment becomes the squaring experiment as described in (D.1). Therefore,
given that (D.1) holds, the adversary Adv = (Adv1,Adv2) succeeds with probability at
most p+ (n).
Remark. The assumption expressed in (D.1) is made possible by several observa-
tions. First, A1 represents the adversary’s preparation before engaging in the process
of proving its proof-of-work, and therefore it should not be given pq, which is gener-
ated freshly by the verifier Verify. This can be strengthened by designing ModGen that
generates p and q at random. Meanwhile, the fact that cost(A2) ≤ c × p indicates a
success probability p+ (n) results from the fact that it is hard to reduce the number
of squaring computations, and that any attempt to lessen the code of each squaring
would reduce accuracy of the result. The former is ensured by the assumption of hard-
ness in integer factorisation: the chance for any adversary to factor pq for n-bit length
primes p and q is at most (n). Indeed, the only known effective way to lessen the
number of squaring computations is to compute 2c (mod φ(pq)), which is possible only
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if knowledge of p and q are known. For the latter, we notice that during squaring
modulo pq, some steps can be omitted, for example the computation of the last few
bits of the remainder. In such case although the reduce in computation cost is small,
it is nevertheless non-negligible. However, this means that the adversary must guess
the unknown part of the result, and may succeeds with sharply reduced chance. We
thus reasonably assume that the fraction of save in cost is always less than the reduce
in accuracy, as in (D.1).
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